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NOTES 
 The term ‘Crowd Controller’ is used to describe a security person whose primary job 
description includes managing crowds in a nightclub or event related scenario, the 
term ‘bouncer’, due to its negative connotations has only been utilised when 
referencing other research 
 
 The term ‘Security Professional’ is utilised when describing a person working in the 
industry who is compliant with all relevant training and educational best practices as 
well as all legislative and regulatory issues 
 
 The term ‘security officer’ is utilised when the topic of discussion extends through the 
entire man-power focused aspects of the security industry 
 
 Every attempt has been made to remain gender sensitive but in certain cases where 
terms are described in the male context, it has been done so because it is generally 
acknowledged that many of the violence-related issues in security are male 
dominated both on the offender and the officer’s sides  
 
 At times the terms ‘minimum force’, ‘proportionate force’ and ‘reasonable force’ have 
been used interchangeably, based on the fact that in most situations, the reasonable 
amount of force is usually also the lowest possible force option that could be applied 
 
 When referring to the subject of use-of-force as a noun the words have been 
hyphenated. When the actual application of force (use of force) is being described 
there are no hyphens. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The private security industry plays an ever increasing role in protecting people and assets 
globally. The use of force in the private security environment is an area of concern for many 
groups and individuals. Role-players range from individual officers, who may have to put 
their lives in harm’s way whilst carrying out their duties, to regulators tasked with enforcing 
legislative compliance. There are various points of view and levels of concern regarding use 
of force by private security officers. Incidents where innocent civilians were killed by private 
security contractors in countries such as Iraq are most relevant to this study. Equally, 
incidents involving Crowd Controllers who may use force on a nightly basis to manage 
rowdy patrons, are just as important (and sometimes just as lethal). With the roles of 
traditional policing and the private security industry becoming more inter-related every day, 
the use of force by the private security industry cannot be ignored. 
 
The core concerns regarding use of force are twofold. Firstly is the issue of the use of 
excessive force and secondly is the need to constantly enhance the safety levels for all 
parties (security officers, assailants and innocent bystanders). Addressing these concerns 
is impossible without a systematic structure that ensures officers are adequately trained and 
equipped for the job-related activities that they must conduct. This research indicated the 
need not only for an integrated system of training and acclimatisation (familiarisation) to the 
use of force, but also for a model of assessment that measures use-of-force competency. 
The perishable nature of use-of-force skills means that training should expand to include 
on-going refresher and skills training as well as regular competency assessments. The 
need to train officers for the real thing is of paramount importance. They need to be taught 
to manage adrenal response in order to perform effectively under the extreme duress of an 
attack situation. Existing force continua provide guidelines for use-of-force but fail to provide 
recommendations on how officers should be trained to actually apply the guidelines (in 
physical and psychological terms) that most continua prescribe. 
 
Early on in the research it was identified that the scope and duties of officers in the private 
security industry are very wide. The vast majority of security officers operate in a low risk 
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static guarding role, where the likelihood of having to utilise force is very low. The rest of the 
industry engages in higher risk activities such as Cash-in-Transit, Crowd Control or Close 
Protection. In order to create an appropriate structure applicable for use-of-force training, 
the officers in the security industry were divided into four broad categories based on their 
level of use-of-force options and the risk level of the environment that they operate in. 
These four categories are as follows: 
 
1. Security officers who operate unarmed with no alternative weapons1 (this means that 
the officer is completely unarmed and does not carry any ancillary equipment such 
as a torch or handcuffs). This category is applicable to low risk level functions that 
have a low likelihood of officers having to face an attack situation.  
 
2. Security officers who operate with alternative weapons but not with firearms. This 
classification is also linked to a low-to-medium risk level, with a low to medium 
likelihood of officers having to face an attack situation. 
 
3. Security officers who operate with firearms and possibly alternative weaponry. This 
classification is linked to a medium-to-high risk level, with medium to high likelihood 
of officers having to face an attack situation. 
 
4. Security officers who operate in high risk environments with assault type weaponry. 
This classification is linked to a high risk level, with a high likelihood of officers having 
to face an attack situation. 
 
The selection of use-of-force options, and the application thereof, is usually referred to as 
Defensive Tactics. ‘Defensive Tactics’ as the name implies relies on skills and techniques 
that are required to carry out duties in a defensive manner, i.e. enhance the safety of all 
parties. An outcome of this research was the determination of criteria that measured the 
usability and effectiveness of a Defensive Tactic skill or technique. The importance of 
                                                 
1 See definition of this term later on in this thesis. 
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ensuring that Defensive Tactics Training provides skills that are relevant and can be applied 
under the duress of a potentially lethal attack is vital. The roles performed by security 
officers combined with many other factors (long hours, lack of equipment, limited training, 
etc.) mean that many techniques and tactics taught in traditional Martial Arts are often not 
transferable to the Defensive Tactics requirements of private security officers. 
 
The need to not only develop practical skills and techniques but also to train officers in 
effective decision-making practices, cannot be overstated. Making the correct decision 
under pressure, and being able to actually act on it, is truly the measure of use-of-force 
competency. It is the job of trainers and assessors to ensure that they equip officers as 
effectively as possible to be able to think and act effectively under stress. It is for this 
reason that training programs should include adrenal management and stress inoculation 
as core aspects of instruction. Use-of-force decision-making models (often referred to as 
continuums) come in a variety of shapes and sizes. This research indicated that it is 
important to teach the concepts outlined in most of these models but the superiority of one 
model over another is not as important as the instructor’s skill in transferring the necessary 
knowledge and skills to his/her students. Effective training was segmented into the following 
categories and discussed in detail in this study: 
 
 The content of the training;  
 The focus of the training ; 
 The duration of the training;  
 The trainee’s profile; 
 The intensity of the training;  
 The instructor’s skills; and  
 The materials (protective equipment, gloves, impact shields, etc.) and training venue 
that are needed to deliver effective training. 
 
The core outcome of this research has been the development of the Practical Use of Force 
Training Model (PUoFTM). This Practical Use of Force Training Model was designed based 
on the feedback obtained from the interviews, questionnaires, literature review, participatory 
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action research and the focus group. The model was designed to continue where existing 
continua end and provide a guideline for integrated training and assessment on use-of-force 
for private security officers. Once the model was designed a process of evaluation research 
was undertaken. As part of the evaluation research the Practical Use of Force Training 
Model was tested on a willing group of candidates and a summary comment document was 
sent out to a wide base of security practitioners for public comment and peer review. The 
model consists of two core components. The first component serves as a guideline for 
content and best practice in training delivery. The second component provides a guideline 
for competency assessment. These two components are comprised of various sub-
categories that interlink to create a solid platform for training and assessment. In summary, 
the first component consists of the following aspects: 
 
 A candidate needs to understand and demonstrate knowledge of the private security 
industry and his/her job description as well as the skill requirements of the job; 
 
 A candidate should understand and be able to apply the tools of aggression 
management and proactive prevention of violence, within their working environment. 
Tools such as the Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action (OODA) loop or Colour 
Codes of Awareness should be included in this category; 
 
 A candidate should be able to apply security and crime prevention models to reduce the 
likelihood of violence occurring and effectively manage a situation should it occur. 
 
 A candidate should be able to apply a use of force explanatory model (continuum) in the 
context of his/her job description. This should include the capability to explain the 
decision-making process and apply it under pressure. This should also extend to the 
ability to justify and record actions after an incident; and 
 
 A candidate should be able to demonstrate the effective application of use of force tools 
and use of force options within work-related contexts. Whilst these physical skills could 
be taught throughout a training course they need to be integrated and assessed as one 
skill set. The primary training and development of these skills should commence with 
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foundational skills and culminate in scenarios, simulations and role-plays that enable the 
candidate to implement these skills in the correct context, i.e. practical situation if faced 
with an applicable incident.  
The second component focuses on the practical assessment of skills and reactions. In 
order for it to be applied effectively, there are several guidelines and considerations that 
need to be taken into account. This is of particular relevance when training is delivered in 
different regions that may have diverse laws and practices. It is crucial that the model is 
customised to the specific environment that officers, who are being trained or assessed, will 
operate in. The primary goal of this assessment tool is to utilise role-plays, scenarios and 
simulations to assess the student in situations where they are unsure of what will occur and 
thus have to make decisions under pressure. This is important as decision-making as well 
as action are both important aspects in order to measure use of force competency. The aim 
is to generate a bank of reality-based experiences, which will also enhance confidence 
levels. Realistic training and experience, that is effectively assessed, will enhance the 
likelihood of the candidate acting correctly should a real situation occur. This will enhance 
the safety of all parties and provide a solid platform from which to apply best practice duty 
of care principles when a violent action occurs. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATION 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
The use of force is by its very nature a controversial and complicated issue. The need to 
use force is an instinctive function that is core to the way that humans interact. It is 
probably accurate to state that the use of force is one of mankind’s earliest activities. 
The potential to exert force is ingrained into our flight-or-fight instincts and inherently 
linked to the human survival response. As societies evolved and developed, rules of 
acceptable behaviour (laws) were among the first issues to be addressed in relation to 
violent activities. It is unnecessary to state that laws are not effective without enforcers 
to ensure that they are adhered too. Even in ancient times, the use of force could be 
subdivided into two broad categories, namely: acceptable use of force and excessive 
use of force. An example of this would be the application of force in defence of one’s 
life, as opposed to an act of murder.  
 
As modern societies evolved, the need for protectors to enforce laws as well as more 
definite guidelines as to what is acceptable and what is not when applying an act of 
force, developed. These specifics may differ from culture to culture and region to region 
and we need to be cognisant of the fact that the application of force within our societies 
is still a core component of the way we function today. Enhanced weapons technology 
makes use of force and violence even more important today than ever before. Whether 
it is police apprehending a violent suspect or a potential rape victim fighting off her 
attacker, there are literally thousands of applications of force every day. The reality is 
that on-going problems with violence are a commonplace aspect of the world we live in, 
as is the need for guardians (police or private sector) to manage and counteract violent 
and unlawful behaviour. 
 
1.2  DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH CONCEPT 
Whilst many criminologists, psychologists and even members of the legal fraternity have 
applied extensive resources and time to better understand violence and the 
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management thereof, there still appears to be much that is unknown in the. Further to 
this is the fact that the private security industry is a very under researched area in a 
scientific sense (Minnaar, 2007; Schneider, 2005). In order to best contribute to the 
body of knowledge and focus on areas that require research and greater academic and 
scientific understanding, the application of use of force within the private security 
industry is a critical field of research. There are many reasons motivating the need for 
this research. More than any other group of persons, outside of the military and law 
enforcement jurisdictions, private security officers are exposed the most frequently to 
use-of-force situations. This fact makes the private security industry a key area of 
interest to researchers and practitioners alike. 
 
The use of force by police officers is a well-accepted part of their job descriptions. 
Tuckey states that “the goal of promoting a safe and secure community necessitates the 
application of force by police officers on a daily basis, at a range of levels” (Tuckey, 
2004: 5). The reality is that Defensive Tactics training is needed to manage use of force 
situations. It is critical for any person whose job extends to that of law enforcement. 
Defensive Tactics also refers to the various ‘use-of-force tools’ utilised by security, 
military and police personnel in the performance of their duties. The need for a workable 
set of skills covering various force levels is vital to ensure not only officer safety 
(Nowicki, 2005: 36-37) but also to ensure that suspects, offenders or even innocent 
bystanders and members of the public are not the victims of the excessive use of force. 
The security officers’ ‘use-of-force’ skills must also include a set of techniques that 
would enable him/her to restrain and control potential suspects without causing them 
unnecessary harm or discomfort.  
 
In today’s age there are many cross-over’s between traditional policing roles and those 
of private security. Whilst police forces have long been considered the primary agents 
utilised to ensure the safety of a designated community, it is now widely acknowledged 
that partnership policing models, whereby police and private security work together to 
ensure the safety of communities, is best practice (Berg, 2004, 2004a & 2008; Minnaar, 
2004, 2006b and 2007b; Prenzler, 2005; Wilson, 2008).  
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The primary purpose of the security industry is to enhance the safety of persons and 
assets within a designated environment. This purpose cannot be achieved without 
security service providers/operators following an integrated approach to the provision of 
security in their specific sectors or fields of specialisation. The levels of specialisation 
have now extended into a vast array of services such as bodyguarding, electronic 
security, aviation security, facilities management and even security management 
outsourced to private security companies provided to government departments. In order 
for security officers to operate efficiently and safely they need to undergo extensive 
training and build a base of knowledge and experience from which to operate. In many 
cases, private security officers are the ‘first on scene’ when crimes are committed. This 
role of first response means that the need to defend themselves or apprehend suspects 
until police officers or other officials arrive is critical. Self-defence or the application of 
restraint and control tactics (use-of-force tools) are therefore important attributes and 
skill-sets for private security officers. It follows then that training in these skills should be 
part-and-parcel of the way that security officers are taught and equipped to carry out 
their duties. The training structures should also include a system for maintaining and 
improving levels of competencies. This is because many of the skills developed are 
considered perishable, i.e. if they are not practised regularly, competency is diminished 
(Schneider, 2005: 115).  
 
The continued growth and development of the private security industry has created the 
need for various divisions of roles and functions within the private security industry (i.e. 
Security Guard, Crowd Controller, Close Personal Protection Officer). Based on these 
sub-divisions and the core roles and duties associated with these job descriptions, 
security officers may face physical violence and/or potentially lethal attack. The use of 
force in almost all areas of the physical security industry is a reality. In fact, when 
describing the environment that many unarmed security officers work in, it has been 
stated that: “[t]he application of physical force is an everyday occurrence in the 
entertainment industry” (Tomkins, 2005: 158).  
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To date the specialist field of security science is a comparatively under researched 
area. Use of force is an issue of on-going importance. When combined with the growth 
and expansion of duties in the private security industry it makes the need for research 
into this field imperative. There is on-going debate in South Africa and Australia 
countries regarding the professionalisation of their respective private security industries 
(Minnaar, 2006b & 2007d and Prenzler, Sarre & Earle, 2009). It will be impossible for 
effective professionalisation to occur without a comprehensive ‘stock-take’ and a 
detailed analysis of current trends within the private security industry. The specific 
nature of use of force means that it is an area which receives much media attention and 
is often associated with the highest risk rating for officers and the public.  
 
The core goal of this research is to assess the manner in which private security officers 
are trained in the use of force and make recommendations on how to improve on this 
training. In order to achieve this, mixed methodologies and triangulation was employed 
utilising both qualitative and quantitative research tools. The findings of this research led 
to the design and development of a use-of-force model for scenario-based security 
training and assessment. Whilst this research has included international benchmarking 
from many countries, the focus has been on two countries, South Africa and Australia. 
International benchmarking included, interviewing candidates from the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Israel as well as gaining feedback via other research tools 
from countries such as India and New Zealand. Furthermore, existing research from 
European Union countries, the USA, and United Nations guidelines have been utilised 
to create a basis for international comparability. The motivation for this is to provide an 
effective basis for comparison instead of assessing South Africa or Australia in isolation. 
All of the six federal states in Australia (the Australian Capital Territory Northern 
Territories, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and 
Western Australia) have separate regulatory and licensing requirements and therefore 
should actually be assessed individually (Prenzler & Sarre, 2009: 1-20). In order to 
manage this complexity the state of Queensland has been selected as a focal point. 
South Africa and Queensland have been selected because of the Researcher’s frequent 
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travels between the two regions which made it possible to effectively conduct the 
research in both countries simultaneously. 
  
1.3  AN OVERVIEW OF USE OF FORCE  
The use of force within the context of policing and private security can be broadly 
broken down into two generic categories:  
 
 Legitimate use of force; and 
 Excessive use of force. 
 
1.3.1  Legitimate use of force 
The legitimate use of force refers to any situation whereby a person may legally utilise 
force on another person. This may seem to be a very clearly defined area whereby the 
majority of use of force situations would be carried out either on the basis of self-
defence or necessity but it is often not quite so clear. Whilst this topic will be discussed 
in extensive detail throughout this dissertation, it is critical that the core concept of 
legitimate use of force be established early in this dissertation. The law enforcement 
perception based on case law in the United States is well summarised by Petrowski 
(2002: 1) who states the following: 
   
When evaluating the reasonableness of force used by law enforcement, the 
Supreme Court said in Graham v. Connor that “the test of reasonableness 
under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or 
mechanical application...; however, its proper application requires careful 
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, 
including...whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 
officers or others and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to 
evade arrest by flight.  
  
1.3.2 Excessive use of force 
The fundamental issue with use of force within the private security industry lies with the 
use of, and potential use of, excessive force. The facts are that, in many cases where 
security officers have been accused of excessive use of force, they have been found 
not guilty when these cases go to court (this is the situation with the majority of incidents 
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outlined below). The general reasoning behind this disparity is often laid at the feet of 
the media who appear to be very keen to expose violence and potential misconduct 
associated with the private security industry and law enforcement agencies’ misconduct 
in terms of excessive use of force. There are two-ends of the spectrum regarding 
excessive use of force. For the purpose of this research these will be classified as real 
and perceived excessive use of force. Real use of force is where there legitimately has 
been an unnecessary death or injury caused in a public incident, e.g. an altercation. 
Perceived use of force is often brought up after the fact and may be associated with 
incidents that are not clearly defined by a physical injury to the aggrieved party.  
 
The following are four examples, highlighting excessive use of force taken from a wide 
variety of sources. These examples have been selected to provide a sampling of the 
many use of force cases that can and have occurred in the past:  
 
1.3.3 Blackwater in Baghdad, Iraq 
One of the most publicised cases was an incident that occurred on 16 September 2007 
where security contractors, employed by the well-known company, Blackwater 
International,2 killed 17 people in Nisour Square in Baghdad. The controversy of this 
incident extends to a ruling by the then appointed American Proconsul in Iraq,3 Paul 
Bremmer, that enabled private security officers to not be charged for violence 
perpetrated whilst carrying out their duties in Iraq (Scahill, 2007: 359). The security 
officers’ claim that they had observed armed attacker’s and thus commenced firing 
which resulted in 17 civilian fatalities. The fatalities occurred while a Blackwater 
Personal Security Detail (PSD) was clearing the way for a convoy of US State 
Department vehicles en route to a meeting in western Baghdad with United States 
                                                 
2 Blackwater International was one of the largest Private Security Companies (PSCs) working on behalf of 
the United States Department of State and other clients during their occupation of Iraq after the second 
Iraq War. Blackwater provided among other services, the protection for the Proconsul which included a 
heavily armed high risk security team with helicopter support. For more information, see Minnaar, 
2007c. 
3  The Proconsul was given almost free reign and among other controversial decisions passed ‘Order 17’ 
which provided private security contractors working for the United States government immunity from 
Iraqi Law. This created a loophole whereby foreign contractors could literally ‘get away with murder 
(Glanz and Sabrine, 2007).  
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Agency for International Development officials. The Iraqi officials that conducted the 
investigation of the event claim that there were no armed attackers in the crowd and 
that the security contractors (Blackwater personnel in Iraq) had used unwarranted – for 
the situation – levels of force. This example refers to the use of maximum force and 
demonstrates the consequences of lethal force options, namely the death of civilians. 
During an informal discussion4 with the Researcher a former employee from Blackwater, 
stated that “in terms of the companies’ track record and performance, despite all the 
media uproar surrounding the Nisour Square incident the company has yet to lose a 
client [i.e. have a client for which they were contracted to protect and keep safe]”. This 
statement affirms that in many cases where excessive use of force is utilised, there are 
extenuating circumstances and complications. These issues are exacerbated in cases 
such as this one, where local security legislation and guidelines were not in place. 
Combining this with a high threat environment makes the use of force a very 
problematic issue. There are still many foreign security contractors providing security 
services in Iraq and other locations. 
 
1.3.4 The Rodney King incident, Los Angeles, USA  
The second example case outlined briefly for the background contextualisation in this 
study, is one that received much publicity in the 1990s. It involved Rodney King, who 
was the victim of excessive use of force by Los Angeles police officers. The incident 
was caught on tape and caused a massive public outcry.5 On 3 March 1991, Rodney 
King was involved in a vehicular chase with police officers. When he was stopped by 
police, he was immediately struck by two darts from a stun gun. Each of the darts 
contained 50 000 volts. Over and above this, in less than two minutes he was hit by 
fifty-six baton blows and kicked six times. He suffered eleven skull fractures, brain 
damage, broken bones, broken teeth, kidney damage and also emotional and physical 
damage. The issue was also considered, a racially motivated incident, since all the 
assaulting police officers were white and Rodney King was an African-American. All of 
the offending officers were acquitted in the first trial. This led the United States 
                                                 
4 This interview was conducted off the record and at the request of the interviewee full details are not 
available to be cited in this research. 
5 For further detail see:  http://www.glynn.k12.ga.us/BHS/Juniorprojects/Hopkins/maurices3378 
 8 
 
Department of Justice prosecuting the offending officers and finding two out of the four 
guilty. 
 
1.3.5  David Hookes incident, Melbourne, Australia  
The third case occurred in Melbourne in the state of Victoria in Australia and links more 
closely to the theme of this study. This case refers to the death of well-known Australian 
cricketer David Hookes as the result of an altercation with a nightclub bouncer,6 Mr 
Sdravko Vicevic, in January of 2004.7 Based on court transcripts and information 
obtained during the hearing, it appears that Hookes, was ejected for drunk and 
disorderly behaviour, from a hotel in St Kilda, Melbourne. Thereafter an altercation 
between Mr Vicevic and Mr Hookes broke out in the street. The outcome of which was 
that Mr Hookes was struck on the head or hit his head on the ground which ultimately 
resulted in his untimely death (Moynihan, 2004 and Richards, 2004). A great deal of 
publicity resulted from this case, which triggered a large public outcry over the Crowd 
Controller sector, not only in Victoria, but throughout Australia. 
 
1.3.6  Fisherman’s Wharf incident, Gold Coast, Australia 
The last case example outlined as background to this research is an event which has 
colloquially become known as the “Fisherman’s Wharf incident”, named so after the 
tavern where the incident occurred. The incident involved a man being beaten to death 
outside a popular drinking spot on the Gold Coast in Queensland, Australia. The 
altercation began when the Crowd Controllers denied Mr Tararo and his friends’ entry 
into the club for no apparent reason. A fight between the deceased, Mr Tararo and 
several Crowd Controllers then took place. Mr Tararo was allegedly beaten by the 
bouncers on the pavement outside of the venue.  
 
The “Fisherman’s Wharf incident” has produced mixed feedback from officials. The 
Queensland Police Union President, Cameron Pope, made the following comment after 
the incident: “We believe that this would be a good time to look at the training provided 
                                                 
6 The role and responsibility of Crowd Controllers (colloquially referred to as Bouncers or Doormen) will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, section 3.7.1. 
7 The bouncer Mr Sdravko Vicevic was charged with manslaughter but was found not guilty. 
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to security providers" whilst the Queensland Attorney-General, Kerry Shine, stated that 
he did not believe that there was a problem with the laws governing the ‘controversial’8 
private security industry. 
 
Mr Shine further stated that: "Queensland already has the toughest security provider 
laws in the country and the Bligh Government is serious about improving standards 
within the security providers industry” (Vogler, 2008).9 These comments clearly indicate 
that whilst the severity of excessive use of force by private security officers is not always 
considered with the same level of distaste as excessive use of force by police officers, it 
is universally acknowledged as an area of concern. The fact that these last two 
examples are merely selected options from a pool of cases involving violence and 
Crowd Controllers (Australian Associated Press, 2008a and 2008b) raises the need for 
further research studies in this field.  
 
In the four examples outlined above, the excessive use of force was not planned or pre-
meditated but resulted from an interpretation by the perpetrators of an escalating – in 
their view – situation. The motivation behind the use of force is usually the core issue of 
concern. In all four of these incidents the resulting consequences could have been 
‘mistakes’ or the responses could have been merely fear-driven and instinctive in terms 
of the offenders using whatever response technique or tactic that they believed was 
necessary in the specific situation. A mistaken response or fear based reaction does not 
seem the case in the Nisour Square incident where firearms were discharged recklessly 
and what can be termed irresponsibly into a crowd full of civilians. This too may be true 
in the Rodney King case where, the question arises, as to why four police officers 
utilised batons on an already downed and helpless (incapacitated to the point of not 
offering any resistance or threat) suspect. In the two Australian cases of the Crowd 
Controller violence, it does not seem as if any fancy techniques and/or weaponry were 
                                                 
8 The industry is often considered controversial as a result of the often badly trained and poorly paid staff 
as well as the perception that most security officers are persons that could not get other types of 
employment or at best are casual (after hours moonlighting or ad hoc infrequent employees) weekend 
workers.  
9 Information on the Fisherman’s Wharf incident was taken from various sources, however the article 
posted on www.goldcoast.com.au (http://www.goldcoast.com.au/article/2008/05/20/11319_gold-coast-
top-story.html) titled: Probe into fatal tavern fight, by Sarah Vogler was particularly useful. 
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utilised. The reality is that a higher level of training, an understanding of the appropriate 
and situationally applicable use of force methods, i.e. situational awareness, would 
almost definitely have contributed to the offenders using different options and perhaps 
may not have resulted in the serious consequences that prevailed in these cases. 
 
The question remains whether the correct people (Security Contractors, Crowd 
Controllers and Police Officers) are actually being employed to perform these jobs? The 
Rodney King incident happened many years ago and it is now commonplace for 
intensive pre-selection of police applicants and on-going psychological evaluation for 
operational police officers to be conducted (City of Portland, 2009; Jacobs and O’Brien, 
1998; OPI, 2009 and Scrivner, 1994). Certain guidelines for pre-employment may exist 
in the private security industry, but there certainly does not seem to be any mandatory 
psychological evaluation and assessment (aside from standard police criminal record 
and background checks) for persons becoming licensed to work in the industry. A key 
issue of concern is whether a detailed vetting and psychological pre-employment 
screening is relevant. This leads to a further question: who would actually pay for it? 
Since security officers are amongst the lowest pay scales of employment in the security 
industry,10 the issue of who pays this additional vetting would obviously be an issue of 
critical concern for the security officers, especially if they had to pay themselves. The 
design and development of a practical model of pre-selection and psychological 
evaluation that could actually be utilised in the industry could be an area of future 
research but falls out of the scope of this research project. 
 
1.4  RESEARCH OVERVIEW  
The fundamental concept that this research has shown as being critical: Is the need for 
an integrated practical approach to use-of-force training in the private security industry. 
Whilst it is important to provide candidates with a solid theoretical background and 
understanding of the legal frameworks of their respective countries, it is imperative to 
ensure that their decision-making and practical Defensive Tactics capabilities are also 
sufficiently developed. At the very least a security officer should possess the necessary 
                                                 
10 This information was obtained by comparing the pay-scales outlined on various governments websites 
including: http://www.fairpay.gov.au, http://www.fairwork.com.au and http://www.wageline.qld.gov.au  
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skills to restrain a violent offender and protect themselves (and the public) against real 
and potential attack. Examples of this could be defending against an armed robbery on 
designated property or restraining a potentially violent drunk patron at a nightclub. In 
order to summarise the necessary skill set required, the following broad summary 
breakdown will serve to introduce the topic. These issues will be discussed and 
expanded on throughout this dissertation: 
 
1. Prior to an incident occurring: Situational awareness, verbal skills, physical 
presence, etc.). 
 
2. During an incident: Physical Defensive Tactics including blocks, strikes and joint 
locks as well as use of weaponry if necessary. 
 
3. Post-incident: Restraint and control of a suspect until police or other authorities 
can take control (this would include a citizen’s arrest) and report writing/after 
action documentation. 
The core outcome of this research is to provide a universal, practical and applicable 
use-of-force training model. The model must be designed specifically for those 
situations that security officers might find themselves in when responding to an 
aggressive or violent incident. The goal would be to identify a clearly outlined and 
defined model that can be modified from region to region based on the following factors: 
 
(These issues will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 10 of this 
dissertation. As sample regions each of the below will be discussed in relation to 
Queensland, Australia and South Africa): 
 
 Legislation of each region; 
 Threat levels in each region; 
 Tolerance for the use of force in each region; 
 Structure of the private security industry in each region; and 
 Cultural acceptance of use of force in each region. 
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In order to adopt a global and holistic approach as well as to ensure that this model is 
transferable (applicable and of practical use) from one region to another, any security 
officer in the world could be categorised into one of four classifications. These 
categories provide a basis for the level of use-of-force tools (both equipment, physical 
and situational techniques that can be applied) and decision-making required in training. 
These four categories are also mapped to the risk levels associated with the jobs and 
environments that a security officer may have to operate in. This categorisation also 
provides a platform for what type of scenarios and simulation training exercises should 
be conducted, to develop experience and assess competency. These categories are as 
follows: 
 
1. Security officers who operate unarmed with no alternative weapons (this means that 
the security officer is completely unarmed and does not carry any ancillary 
equipment such as a torch, baton or handcuffs). This category is applicable to low 
risk level functions that have a low likelihood of officers having to face an attack 
situation. 
 
2. Security officers who operate with alternative weapons11 but not with firearms. This 
classification is also linked to a low-to-medium risk level, with a low to medium 
likelihood of security officers having to face an attack situation. 
 
3. Security officers who operate with firearms and possibly alternative weaponry. This 
classification is linked to a medium-to-high risk level, with medium to high likelihood 
of security officers having to face an attack situation.  
 
4. Security officers who operate in high risk environments with assault type weaponry. 
This classification is linked to a high-risk level, with a high likelihood of security 
officers having to face an attack situation. 
 
                                                 
11 See Section 1.10 for the definition of alternative weaponry. 
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Each of the above four categories will be discussed as per Schneider’s model 
(Schneider, 2005: 121) of holistic training. The model takes the following factors into 
account: 
 
 The content of the training; 
 The focus of the training; 
 The duration of the training; 
 The trainee’s profile; 
 The intensity of the training; 
 The instructor’s skills; and 
 The materials (i.e. protective equipment, gloves, impact shields) and training 
venue that are needed to deliver effective training. 
 
By making suggestions on the curriculums and training outcomes for each of the above 
categories, a generic guideline for use-of-force training and scenario based simulations 
can be created. Such a guideline can be readily utilised as a resource for security 
professionals worldwide. As mentioned above, it is critical to assess the decision-
making process when an officer must determine whether or not force should be used 
and if so, what level of force (technique, tactic or response decision) he/she should 
apply? In order to put the existing body of knowledge of this process into perspective, 
the following background and subject matter will be discussed in detail in this research 
document. The subject matter is vital in order to provide the reader with a background 
into use of force and to cover the critical issues of how and why this subject has been 
analysed. 
 
1.5  BACKGROUND TO THIS STUDY/RATIONALE 
Use-of-force studies is a well-accepted feature of the policing and criminal justice 
communities and in many cases they are considered an effective oversight tool, utilised 
to measure the performance and legal compliance of law enforcement agencies’ officers 
(Mesloh, Henych & Wolf, 2008; Minnaar, Mistry, Redpath & Dhlamini, 2001). The fact 
that private security industry is now handling many of the functions that were considered 
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the traditional sanctum of police officials12 creates a logical extrapolation whereby use-
of-force studies for the private security industry should be, at the very least, of equal 
import to their sister studies for policing. Despite this fact, the Researcher has not been 
able to find any dedicated research reports outlining use of force in the private security 
industry. The only related exception to this are studies regarding security companies 
operating in war ravaged areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan (Aguirre, 2007; De 
Nevers, 2009; Minnaar, 2007; Stoddard, Harmer & DiDomencio, 2008). 
 
The reality that there has been no dedicated research projects conducted regarding use 
of force within the context of the private security industry to date, illustrates the need for 
this research project. Furthermore, there is no standardised best practice model that 
could be applied to effectively educate and train private security officers in terms of use 
of force. The need for on-going Defensive Tactics and related training, which includes a 
system for teaching when, why and how to apply force is critical for almost all private 
security officers, albeit at varying levels, based on the four categories discussed earlier 
in this Chapter. The need for these skills extends to many related security and law 
enforcement sectors. In fact, the United Services Union of Australia, in a report on 
security and safety issues associated with park patrol officers in NSW states that: 
 
There is a need for more training to be available to Officers on a more regular 
basis with increased consistency in terms of quality of the training. In addition 
there is a clear need for training to have increased relevance to the real 
physical dangers faced by Officers with law enforcement functions, including 
their need to know evasive self-defence techniques for use when all other 
non-physical defence techniques have failed (Fraser, 2009: 8). 
 
1.6  THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
In order to address the research questions outlined below, a holistic research approach 
was utilised. The fundamental concept of use of force and Defensive Tactics is a 
practical subject. This required that a practical and field-based approach to this 
research be utilised. In order to gain an effective insight into this field, a comparative 
analysis was performed. By comparing aspects of the Queensland private security 
                                                 
12 These include but are not limited to guarding, patrols, investigations, event security and close 
protection.  
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industry with that of its counterpart in South Africa, it was possible to better evaluate the 
status of Defensive Tactics and use-of-force training for the Private Security Industry13.  
 
1.6.1 Primary research aim  
The primary aim of this study was to produce a recommended use-of-force and 
Defensive Tactics training model for the private security industry. Some of the 
secondary aims include providing a comprehensive overview of the subject and an 
analysis of where the training and competency levels of the industry lie. 
. 
The primary research question that needs to be answered is: 
 
How can defensive tactics trainer’s best train, prepare and assess private 
security officers to effectively manage use-of-force incidents? 
 
This question needs to be further analysed in order to determine what the best practice 
model for Defensive Tactics training is or should be. To gain a better understating of the 
above question, the following questions need to be answered: 
 
1.6.2 Secondary research aims 
 
1. How is defensive tactics training for private security officers currently being delivered 
(is there a best practice model)?  
 
2. If a best practice model exists, how can its utility be assessed? 
 
A further extension of this concept revolves around which additional factors relating to 
the use of force could be implemented to enhance the Defensive Tactics model, 
                                                 
13 The Researcher has previously conducted research in South Africa and understands the manner in 
which to access industry stake holders to gain their inputs. This access, unfortunately does not extend 
to the ground levels of the industry. The diverse nature of the South African industry also makes it an 
interesting comparison as well as the fact that it has a track record of regulation in the private security 
industry (commencing with the Security Officer’s Act 92 of 1987). This provides more than a twenty 
year track record and makes the South African model almost 15 years older than the British equivalent 
that was legislated in 2001 and six years older than the Queensland's Security Providers Act of 1993. 
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improve officer safety and assist in minimising the need for officers to use force. This 
concept could be summarised in the final research question: 
 
3. What, if any, additional factors would contribute to the enhancement of force 
reduction (the minimisation of the need to use force) and officer safety, within the 
private security officers working environment? 
The premise of this approach lies in the concept that the first step is to actually find out 
what is currently taking place within the industry. Only then would it be possible to 
comment on the possible need for improvement and modification. An effective 
comparative resource for this information would be to assess what is presently being 
applied in law enforcement environments by policing and similar departments where 
significant research into this field has been conducted. In summary, the ultimate aim of 
this research is to make practical recommendations that could enhance the safety of the 
security officers, as well as afford members of the public the re-assurance that they 
would not become victims of unnecessary use of force by poorly trained security 
officers. The primary recommendations will focus on the sphere of training but may 
extend to operational areas if relevant. The benefits of this will extend to the general 
public who interact with security officers on a daily basis.  
 
1.7  GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The core goals of this research project that were laid out in the initial research proposal 
are listed below:  
 
 The development of interview and focus group formats in order to extract the 
maximum amount of relevant information from candidates. 
 Conduct a thorough literature review in order to extract all relevant trends and data. 
 Conduct all research and interviews in a comprehensive and professional manner. 
 Consolidate all relevant information collected into a comprehensive and useful text 
outlining solutions to the research problem. 
 17 
 
 Should an applicable model or structure that provides a best practice guideline not 
be identified, then one will be designed and developed. 
 Should a model need to be developed, it must be tested and assessed for utility. 
 Forecasting of future trends within the industry as well as what proactive measures 
can be taken to ensure the development of future research in this growth industry. 
 
1.8  BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
The Private Security Industry has been identified as an under-researched field (Minnaar 
2007 and Prenzler & Sarre 2009). The general benefits of this research project will 
serve to add to the minimal existing body of knowledge on this topic, with specific 
reference to the private security industry and use of force. It will also serve to create a 
platform that can assess whether trainers are effectively delivering the skills required to 
trainees who will become private security officers. Better trained officers who are able to 
apply psychological tools (i.e. anger management, communication and body language) 
as well as effective physical tools and tactics if necessary, will assist in creating a safer 
environment for all concerned. The following parties will directly benefit from this study: 
 
 Individual security officers will benefit as they may be able to apply some of the best 
practice information produced by the research that will enable them to perform their 
jobs in a safer manner. 
 
 Security Training Agencies will benefit as they will have the opportunity to assess 
and adjust their curriculums, methods of delivery and focus of training in a 
standardised fashion. 
 
 The various Security Associations will benefit as they will have access to a 
compilation of problems and solutions that the industry they represent is faced with. 
 
 Security clients will benefit as they will be able to assess whether the security 
officers they employ have been trained in-line with best practice or have simply been 
“pushed through” the system. 
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 ‘Third parties’ affected by security operations, Should the findings of this research be 
implemented, there should be a spill-over effect whereby the users of security 
services shall have better trained and more confident security officers protecting 
them and their assets. 
 
 Future security researchers will benefit as they will be able to identify areas of 
concern for future study that emanate from this research. 
 
 Security and training regulatory authorities will have access to a resource in order to 
reference the performance of the training providers in their jurisdictions. This will 
extend further to include the benchmarking of use-of-force skills requirements of 
security officers. 
 
1.9  THE CONCEPT OF ‘REASONABLE FORCE’ AND THIS RESEARCH 
The field of security science is an under-researched field. Whilst there has been 
extensive study into the use of force as it relates to law enforcement agencies and the 
officers that they deploy, there has, to date, been no comprehensive academic review of 
the topic as it relates to the private security industry. When discussing use of force there 
are many variables and consideration’s that need to be understood by the reader. 
These include an understanding of the jargon associated with the subject matter and 
extend to an understanding of what could be defined as legitimate use of force or 
excessive use of force. For the purposes of this study the following definition of 
‘reasonable force’, as used by the open source not-for-profit research organisation, 
Security Beyond Borders, will be utilised: 
 
Force that is not excessive and is appropriate for protecting oneself or one’s 
property. Also called legal force. The least amount of force that will permit a 
police or security officer to subdue a subject while still maintaining a level of 
safety for himself or herself and the public (Security Beyond Borders, 2011).  
 
Whilst the scope of this research extends to understanding the basis of issues such as 
aggression and violence management, in the case of practical Defensive Tactics and 
related subject matter, the need to have a specific outcome is critical, i.e. the design of 
 19 
 
a best practice model. In order to gather the relevant information and gain a solid insight 
into the functioning of use of force in the private security industry, a holistic research 
approach was adopted that integrated both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. 
The primary reasoning for this approach is that by its very nature, use of force is a 
practical subject and as such, to fully comprehend the intricacies of the subject matter 
requires analysis from both theoretical and practical standpoints. It is forecast that there 
will be many parties who will benefit from this research and that it will create a reference 
point for future academic Researchers to further examine. The core outcome of this 
research project is to provide a suggested model for use-of-force training within the 
private security industry that could assist not only in the understanding of the subject 
matter, but in the practical evaluation of trainee officers, to determine levels of 
competency, including use-of-force decision-making capability. 
 
1.10 KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS  
As is the case with most industries (legal, medical, etc.), the area of use of force and 
specialised security training has its own unique jargon/terminology. An overview of 
these terms is critical for the readers understanding of this topic. The core terms that the 
reader should be familiar with are outlined below: 
 
(Where these terms are not referenced, they have been defined and formulated by the 
Researcher himself for the specific purposes of this research project.) 
 
Aggression: “Feelings of anger or antipathy resulting in hostile or violent behaviour; 
readiness to attack or confront” (The Oxford Online Dictionary, 2011b). 
 
Alternative weaponry: “This includes any type of non-lethal weaponry other than 
firearms. Including: batons, chemical weapons, electrical weapons, restraining devices, 
pepper spray, torches, gas powered projectile weapons and canines” (Schneider, 2005: 
72; Schneider, 2009: 22). 
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Attribute: “A quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone 
or something” (The Oxford Online Dictionary, 2011c). 
 
Candidate: refers to any security officer undergoing use-of-force training, re-training or 
skills assessment (the term trainee is used when specifically describing someone 
undergoing initial training in use of force).  
 
Defensive Tactics: The ability to apply the ideal use-of-force option (or combination of 
options) that enables the officer to not only survive an attack but to manage a non-
compliant suspect utilising the necessary self-defence or restraint and control approach, 
according to the law and situational best practice.  
 
Hard skills: The physical skills, ability to operate applicable equipment and possession 
of the relevant bodily attributes needed to apply force or defend one’ self. These include 
aspects such as strength, stamina and physical toughness.  
 
Operational safety: The skills, tactics and related procedures that should be applied, to 
ensure that officers can conduct his/her duties, as safely as possible. This includes 
applying the concepts of reasonable force to ensure that suspects are not harmed 
unnecessarily during an altercation including a citizen’s arrest or in the application of 
restraint and control techniques.  
 
Security services: “guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, 
facilities, designated sites, property or other places (whether armed or unarmed), or any 
other activity for which the personnel of companies are required to carry or operate a 
weapon in the performance of their duties” (Swiss Confederation, 2010: 5). 
 
Training: “the action of teaching a person or animal a particular skill or type of 
behaviour” (The Oxford online dictionary, 2011d). 
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Use-of-force options: This should include any applicable options that could assist an 
officer in the performance of their duties. Whilst this is specifically relevant to the 
management of a situation in which he/she would be interacting with a violent or 
potentially violent person, it extends to include aspects such as officer presence and, 
verbal and postural skills, that are part of Defensive Tactics.  
 
Use-of-force tools: These include all the necessary tools/equipment/techniques that 
could be applied as use-of-force options. For the purposes of this study these would 
include: Firearms, batons, pepper/Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray, Taser/shock sticks, 
unarmed techniques, verbal techniques, canines, posturing and applied body language.  
 
Violence: “Behaviour involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone 
or something” (The Oxford Online Dictionary, 2011). 
 
1.11  LAYOUT AND STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION  
This dissertation has been structured to systematically provide the reader with an 
overview of the subject matter and research findings. Relevant information and trends 
identified from the literature review are outlined in Chapters Three to Seven. Chapter’s 
Eight to Ten provide the research findings and recommendations. The basic structure 
and core content of the dissertation is as follows: 
 
 Chapter One: provides an introduction to the subject, the rationale behind the 
research and an introductory discussion of the core foundational concepts. 
 
 Chapter Two: provides information on the research methodology and approach 
that was utilised. 
 
 Chapter Three: provides an overview of the private security industry, with 
specific reference, to the industries in South Africa and Queensland. 
 
 Chapter Four: provides a review of relevant research and theories relating to 
aggression, violence reduction, crime prevention and security. This Chapter also 
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includes the core concepts of adrenal management and its relevance to this 
research.  
 
 Chapter Five: provides information on existing use-of-force models and 
continuums and discusses their relevance and application. 
 
 Chapter Six: provides a description of the various use-of-force tools and options 
that are available in the private security industry and discusses their relevance.  
 
 Chapter Seven: provides an in-depth discussion on use-of-force training and 
highlights best practices for the delivery and assessment thereof.  
 
 Chapter Eight: provides a summary of the research findings gained from the 
questionnaire phase of the research.  
 
 Chapter Nine: provides a review of the research findings that were identified 
during the interview and focus group aspects of this research. Many of the 
concepts are similar to issues outlined in Chapters 3-7 but they are discussed 
from the specific point of view of the interviewees and the focus group. 
 
 Chapter Ten: summarises the research findings and identifies 
recommendations. The design and development of the Practical Use of Force 
Training Model is explained. The structure and application of the Practical Use of 
Force Training Model is also explained and the feedback from the test group as 
well as the public comment document is discussed. The findings of the 
dissertation are consolidated into one working model. Recommendations for 
future research are also outlined.  
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Chapter 2 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
______________________________________________________________________ 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The research goal of this project14 was to effectively address the research questions 
and to ensure that the recommendations that emanated from the field research were not 
simply academic, but also practical, i.e. they could actually be applied to solve the 
research problem. It was important that the findings would be a valid contribution to the 
existing body of knowledge in the field of security science. To ensure that this was 
achieved an integrated and holistic research process was adopted. The research 
approach focused on both qualitative and qualitative methodologies. Despite this dual 
research approach the exploratory nature of this research and the practical nature of 
use of force, dictated that the focus of the research was qualitative. In fact, the favouring 
of a qualitative method is a recommendation for research of this nature (Mouton, 2001: 
161). Further reasons for adopting this research methodology included: 
 
 The fact that many persons working in the general security industry fall into the 
category of “poorly educated” and have lower levels of literacy. This means that 
relying solely on complex surveying and questionnaires would have been 
ineffective. 
 
 The controversial nature of the subject itself (use of force) means that in order to 
really understand what is happening on-the-ground, practical fieldwork was a 
necessity. This extended to the need for a focus on face-to-face interviews, 
where probing questions could be asked and clarifications on interviewee 
perceptions could be obtained. 
 
                                                 
14This doctoral research study initially commenced under the auspices of Griffith University, Brisbane, 
Queensland in Australia in 2008, but for various reasons the researcher transferred his candidature, 
with the written approval and permission of the allocated supervisor, Prof. Tim Prenzler, to the 
University of South Africa with a new supervisor. 
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 The complexities and critical nature of “Defensive Tactics” (skills used to protect 
life and limb) means that if a Researcher without a background in the subject 
would attempt to clarify many of the issues, they could easily be confused. 
Should this lack of understanding prevail, it could have a negative effect on the 
interpretation of findings and the subsequent development of a best practices 
model. 
 
 It is also noted that there is a tendency within this male dominated industry for 
security officers to view themselves as “tough guys”. This means that in many 
cases, there is a certain disdain for academics, and they would look down on 
attempts to gain their opinions and feedback. Should a researcher not be able to 
relate personally and create a level of empathy with the target population it would 
be exceptionally difficult to gain their inputs.  
 
To date (November 2011) there is no similar regional or international study on 
Defensive Tactics and Use of force that has been conducted specifically with reference 
to the private security industry. This means that this research is primarily exploratory 
and foundational in nature. It is critical that the research approach, focused on 
integrating the various sub-fields which are related to this research into one consistent 
theme (use of force, private security training, self-defence, regulation, etc.). As the 
research process unfolded, the Researcher identified specific areas of relevance that 
became recurring themes both in the literature review, as well as in the other research 
methodologies, that were utilised.  
 
In order to formulate the research approach, the Researcher worked through an 
extensive list of publications and other academic papers. The majority of literature was 
located via various research databases and library listings. A detailed overview of the 
databases and the key word searches is outlined in section 2.5 of this Chapter. Several 
news article databases and sites were also utilised to locate articles, where so called 
‘excessive use-of-force’, was applied. In order to effectively contextualise the use of 
force in the private security industry, research and case studies from countries other 
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than the two identified focus countries (South Africa and Australia, with specific focus on 
south east Queensland), have also been assessed and where necessary findings were 
included in this dissertation. The methodology of this research process was aimed firstly 
at conducting a thorough assessment of use of force as it relates to the private security 
industry. The next phase was based on the design and development of an 
enhancement tool and implementation of recommendations that could improve the 
professionalisation of the security industry in terms of use-of-force training and action. 
The final phase was piloting and field testing this model to assess its utility. This 
research could therefore be classified as a conceptual analysis followed by an 
evaluation research process. 
 
2.2 VALIDITY, RELIABILITY AND ACCURACY OF COLLECTED INFORMATION 
The requirements for internal validity and reliability, as discussed by Welman & Kruger 
(1999: 100), were applied during all research conducted. Every effort was made to 
ensure that the research information collected was valid and accurate whilst maintaining 
all ethical considerations. This study commenced under the auspices of Griffith 
University and as such, ethical committee approval was obtained which covered the 
research process and questionnaires that were distributed (see Annexure 1 and 2 for 
Coversheet and Questionnaire). Much care was taken during the distribution of the 
questionnaires to ensure that specific samples were focused yet unbiased. A 
fundamental aspect of this research also included the application of non-discrimination. 
The application of non-discriminatory practice was particularly relevant with open-based 
feedback (as utilised in the second concept paper and feedback document distribution). 
An example of this is where interest was expressed by parties who were not initially 
selected in the target population selection but wanted to contribute to the research i.e. 
have their say. In cases such as this all input and feedback was welcomed by the 
Researcher and where applicable, utilised in the findings of this report. 
 
Considerable care was taken in the selection of relevant persons to be interviewed. The 
same interview schedule of questions was applied to each interviewee without the 
interviewer (the Researcher in all cases) influencing the respondent's answers in any 
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way, be it by means of body language, tone of voice or facial expressions or negatively 
formulated or leading questions. In addition, attempts were made to create a relaxed 
interview environment whereby respondents were encouraged to be open and frank in 
their responses. Every effort was made to make the atmosphere comfortable and non-
confrontational. Accuracy and reliability of information received was enhanced in the 
interviews by conducting several interviews with representatives from each sector that 
was identified or until saturation levels were reached.  
 
2.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Ethical considerations in the research were addressed by adhering to the Code of 
Ethics for Research at Technikon SA (Technikon SA, 2002: 128-134). This was 
achieved by emphasizing those aspects of protecting the identity of respondents 
(anonymity) if so requested by them. All respondents gave permission for their names to 
be listed as references. However, certain respondent’s requested that information not 
be quoted or alternatively, not be allocated to a specific interview. As part of the initial 
phase of this research, Griffith University ethics committee approval was established. 
This was done prior to active field work being undertaken and was a tool to ensure that 
the research approach met the highest possible ethical standards.  
 
Respondent participation in the interviews was, at all times, emphasised to be voluntary. 
All respondents were also informed that information received would be treated as strictly 
confidential. In addition, high standards in the research were maintained by means of 
focusing on implementing the proper referencing and acknowledgement of sources of 
information, avoiding plagiarizing of information and obtaining the consent of 
respondents to participate and permission to undertake the research from the relevant 
authorities. These factors all aimed towards increasing the acceptance of the 
information received by respondents, as well as enhancing the validity of the research 
conducted. Throughout the research process the Researcher aimed to eliminate bias 
and minimise the amount of leading questions asked so as to enable respondents to 
effectively give their opinions and thoughts. 
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2.4 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WHILE DOING RESEARCH 
Numerous problems were encountered whilst conducting this research. Certain 
problems were recurrent throughout the research process, whereas others were specific 
to certain areas of the research. Wherever possible, practical solutions that were in-line 
with research-based best practice were applied to ensure that the research was as 
comprehensive as possible. Some of the problems that were encountered are 
discussed below: 
 
2.4.1 Availability of candidates 
Due to the fact that approximately eighty percent of persons interviewed either had 
comprehensive work responsibilities or in many cases ran their own businesses, they 
were not always available or could not attend pre-arranged meetings. Consequently the 
Researcher had to be flexible, and in order to interview certain candidates, several 
dates had to be booked until the interview could finally be conducted. In certain cases, 
for the interview to be completed, up to three meetings had to be arranged and 
rearranged since the candidate was constantly called out to perform work duties. 
 
2.4.2 Geographical difficulties 
Approximately thirty percent of the interviewees operate internationally and it was 
logistically quite difficult to interview them. The Researcher was fortunately travelling 
between South Africa, Australia, the United States and Israel during the research period 
which enabled him to conduct face-to-face interviews with respondents in these 
countries. 
 
2.4.3 Personal training background of respondents favoured during interviews 
It was a common trend for the majority of candidates interviewed to quote only their own 
training experience or their ‘way of doing things’ as the only valid and quality 
benchmark. In many cases interviewees would place excessive value on their training 
and operational perceptions above others, including disregarding other schools of 
thought as perhaps being ‘inferior’. As a result of this, it was left up to the Researcher to 
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analyse and assess the different opinions and views put forward by those interviewed in 
order to gain an unbiased overview of the industry as a whole. 
 
2.4.4 Respondents using differing terminology to describe the same thing 
Approximately sixty percent of the respondents utilised different terminologies that may 
have been applicable or relevant only to the specific operational or training backgrounds 
or the country in which they had served most of their professional life. Background 
reading, as well as the Researcher’s personal experience, assisted greatly in 
eliminating misinterpretation of the information received and standardisation of the 
applicable terminology. 
 
2.4.5 Interviewees straying from the topic 
Approximately sixty percent of the respondents interviewed had vast operational and 
training experience as well as knowledge of other security activities. It was therefore 
often a problem to keep candidates focused on the research agenda. Questions posed 
in an interview often had to be repeated since candidates were inclined to go off on 
tangents and talk about other security issues not related to the specific focus of this 
study. This caused a problem since often interviews took far longer to complete than 
anticipated. It also increased the difficulty of sorting the information obtained into 
relevant themes linked to the study focus and was therefore more time consuming. 
 
2.4.6 Incomplete survey and questionnaires  
There were two sets of quantitative research tools that were utilised. One focused on 
the Crowd Control industry and the other established as a peer review and feedback 
mechanism. In many cases returned forms and data were incomplete. In some cases 
on the first distribution, responses to certain points were illegible and could not be 
utilised. This created a most time intensive process of sorting and vetting in order to 
ascertain which responses could actually be utilised and also diminished the usable 
sample size. 
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2.4.7 Differing focus of use-of-force studies  
Various use-of-force studies were reviewed (please see References for full details). 
Despite the initial assessment, that indicated that these studies would all be useful, 
there were certain disqualifying factors that made several of the studies irrelevant for 
the purposes of this research. Some of these factors included studies that were too 
focused on policing orientated specifics, for example, issues relating to geographic 
location of use of force occurrences. An example of this is: Use of force within a 
neighbourhood context (Reisig and Terril, 2003). Another interesting but non-relevant 
study by Weiner (2006) assesses the global security situation and how threats and use 
of force apply in relation to issues such as global terrorism and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. 
 
2.4.8 Access to experienced use-of-force experts 
The specialised area of use of force is a niche domain. Access to true experts and 
experienced professionals was not always easy to achieve. Many experts are in high 
demand and could not make themselves available for interviews or to join the focus 
group. Twenty acknowledged experts were invited by the International Firearms 
Training Academy (IFTA) which is the largest private sector use-of-force training 
organisation in South Africa. The majority of the invitees stated that they are interested 
but could not spare the time to attend a focus group or interview (even if numerous 
sessions were held). In order to compensate for this problem an integrated research 
approach was implemented. The goal was to use the core group of interviewees and 
the focus group to develop a model that the balance of the experts, could vet and 
comment on, via the public comment document and feedback form.  
 
2.4.9 Limited resources and capabilities in South Africa  
Due to the fact that the researcher was been living in Brisbane, Australia and only 
sporadically visited South African during the research process, it made it very difficult to 
conduct quantitative research such as was conducted in Australia. The difficulties 
involved in accessing the correct target population, distributing and collecting 
questionnaires made this process in South Arica untenable. In order to overcome this 
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issue targeted interviews and a focus group were conducted. The aim was to gain a 
birds-eye perspective of the research topics and industry perceptions in South Africa. 
This was not the case for the Questionnaires in south east Queensland where the 
researcher was based during the research process.  
  
2.5 APPROACH TO THE LITERATURE REVIEW  
The aim of the literature review was to consolidate all applicable research and previous 
findings into a workable synopsis. The core objective was to gain a holistic overview of 
the subject matter. As a result of the lack of direct research in this field, the focus was 
been centred primarily on studies that were closely related. This has included a wide 
range of existing studies and literature relating to the law enforcement community, use 
of force, Defensive Tactics, the night time economy, the private security industry, etc.  
 
In order to conduct a thorough review, the Researcher implemented the steps below: 
 
 Meetings were held with the Griffith University Librarian to gain guidance and 
assistance in accessing the correct databases and library archives. 
 
 Thorough searches using various relevant key words and phrases were conducted. 
The searches made use of several research databases (informit, Criminal Justice 
resources, etc.) – see next section of this Chapter (section 2.5.1) for more 
information. 
 
 A general internet review using standard search engines (Google, Yahoo, etc.) was 
also conducted. This review was particularly useful in terms of accessing newspaper 
and other media perspectives on the private security industry and on Crowd 
Controllers in particular; 
 
 A specific review of existing textbooks and manuals was conducted. Due to the fact 
that use-of-force training has been an interest of the Researcher for many years, a 
database of relevant literary material had been accumulated and could be readily 
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and easily accessed. The review of these literary sources also included a review of 
publications that, whilst anecdotal in nature, had significant relevance to this area of 
research. 
 
 A review of relevant legislation from Australia and South Africa was conducted. An 
assessment of use of force as applied by the United Nations and in-line with 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) was also performed. An assessment of 
existing training standards and regulatory requirements for security operations was 
also conducted.  
 
There are also many articles and related publications that provided information on 
police officers and other officials which at first glance appear relevant to this study, but 
after more detailed study were found to not be relevant. An example of this was a study 
by Micucci and Gomme (2005) which was titled: American police and subcultural 
support for use of excessive force. This would seem to have direct relevance, but in 
fact, the study is centred on the racial profiling by police officers and the related differing 
levels of force applied according to race, and as such, did not add value to the 
requirements of this study. 
 
2.5.1 Keyword searches and databases  
The following databases were utilised to conduct the review: 
 
 LexisNexis/Butterworths: Legal Databases; 
 Illumina: Criminal Justice Data bases ; 
 Illumina social sciences journals and articles; 
 National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS);  
 Australian Digital Theses Program;  
 Griffith Online Resources (search for Authors); 
 Oxford Journals online; 
 Factiva; 
 Proquest (general database search); 
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 Informit: Australian Criminology database; 
 Proquest Psychology Journals online ; and 
 Google Scholar 
 
The following keywords were first all entered separately for the initial layer of research. 
The second layer involved the words being combined into phrases and then being 
entered into the databases again. All the below keywords and phrases were utilised in 
the various research databases listed above: 
 
 Excessive use of force; 
 Police use of force; 
 Defensive Tactics; 
 Bouncers; 
 Crowd Controllers; 
 Cash-in-transit security: 
 Night club security; 
 Security and self-defence; 
 Private Security;  
 Police Training;  
 Australian Private Security Industry; and  
 South Africa Private Security Industry.  
 
The relevant articles, papers and studies obtained from the above searches were then 
grouped into similar themes, namely: 
 
 Private security industry information;  
 Crowd Controllers and night clubs; 
 Cash-in-transit robberies 
 Legislation and standards;  
 Violence and aggression management; 
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 Training; 
 Use of force;  
 Examples and case studies; and 
 Related information.  
 
The information in these categories was then added to the existing published books that 
were reviewed. These findings were then consolidated and grouped according to 
themes covered in the Chapters that follow. Every effort has been made to avoid 
plagiarism and to correctly reference the appropriate work. In many cases much of the 
literature review became repetitive and repetitive information saturation levels were 
reached. This was taken as an indicator that the relevant sub-topic had been effectively 
reviewed and could thus be summarised and applied to the outcomes of this research 
project.  
 
The List of References/Bibliography has a comprehensive breakdown of all the 
publications (published, unpublished, internet listed, government official reports, journal 
and newspaper articles and conference/seminar/workshop papers) that were reviewed 
during this study.  
 
2.6 THE RESEARCH APPROACH 
In order to effectively answer the stated research questions, an integrated research 
approach that not only assessed the issues of use of force in the private security 
industry but also contributes to the solving of some of the core issues that were 
identified during the research, was used. This integrated approach will be explained in 
the following sections and is detailed diagrammatically below: 
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Figure 1: Diagrammatic representation of research structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Determining of research methodology and structure 
 
Design research tools and confirm target population 
Conduct research: 
Detailed lit review, distribute and collect questionnaires, conduct interviews and 
focus groups  
Consolidate research findings and conduct further research if necessary 
Design best practice model 
Field test best practice model: 
Evaluation Research – Field Test Group and Public Comment document  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consolidate and review best practice model 
(Field test again if necessary)  
Preliminary research: 
Literature review and Interviews 
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2.7 PRELIMINARY RESEARCH: INITIAL LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
INTERVIEWS 
The preliminary research process was conducted in order to determine the focus and 
the scope of the research. This initial research process culminated in the submission of 
the initial research proposal document. The initial research process consisted primarily 
of a basic literature review and several face-to-face interviews. It was clear that after the 
initial research that there were massive holes in this area of research. As such, it would 
be necessary to focus the research on the design, development and testing of a model 
that could be used as a reference point in future. The initial research also indicated that 
due to the dearth of previous research in this field, it would be necessary to utilise 
research conducted in the Law Enforcement community as a primary reference point. 
Furthermore, it was found that there was a plethora of published anecdotal and non-
academic research relating to the field of Defensive Tactics and self-defence. In order to 
gain an unbiased and holistic view of the topic many of these publications were 
reviewed and were of much benefit in contributing to the outcomes of this research. 
 
2.8 DETERMINING OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, DESIGN OF RESEARCH 
TOOLS AND CONFIRMATION OF TARGET POPULATION 
After completion of the initial research phase, it was determined that an integrated 
research approach should be adopted. This research approach had at its core the need 
to answer the stated research questions and to collect as much relevant data as 
possible. In order to achieve this, the following research methodologies were selected: 
 
 Face-to face Interviews;  
 Participatory Action Research (PAR); 
 Focus group;  
 Questionnaire distribution; and 
 Evaluation Research (field testing and peer review). 
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2.8.1 Face-to-face interviews 
A total of 31 face-to-face interviews were conducted. The average duration of an 
interview was approximately 30-40 minutes (although some lasted up to several hours). 
The interviews were structured in such a manner as to ensure that candidates were put 
at ease and were encouraged to share information and experiences throughout the 
interviews. The problems that were relevant to this phase of the research were outlined 
earlier in this Chapter (see section 2.4 of this Chapter). See Annexure 3 for the 
Interview Guideline.  
 
2.8.2 Participatory Action Research (PAR) 
Mouton (2001: 150) states that Participatory Action Research (PAR) is often utilised for 
“exploratory and descriptive or action-related research”. This is directly relevant to this 
study where the nature of use of force is a physical and practical concept. As a result of 
the Researchers’ extensive and on-going involvement in the global private security 
industry, he has had extensive experience in terms of training, Defensive Tactics and 
use of force. The direct benefits of this experience to the study were particularly relevant 
once all the findings had been analysed and the need to construct a model and 
explanatory guidelines was confirmed. Every effort was made by the Researcher to 
ensure that the best ethical practice was applied. This had specific relevance in terms of 
ensuring that no bias was applied during the research. The issue of bias extended to 
the potential for the Researcher to prompt interviewees during the interview process. 
Based on the feedback from interviewees and the data obtained, it appeared that the 
problem of Researcher bias was effectively managed. 
 
Some of the Researchers’ experience and credentials that are relevant to this study 
include the following: 
 
 Over 25 years of Martial Arts training;  
 
 Holds two 6th Degree Black Belts in Hisardut (Survival Jujitsu) and Ninjitsu and a 
2nd Degree Black Belt in Taekwondo 
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 Has taught self-defence, Defensive Tactics and use of force to security 
professionals, military units and police officers (including Special Forces) in 
several countries; and 
 
 Has over a decade of operational experience working as a Professional 
Bodyguard (Close Protector at all levels from individual operator to team leader 
and project coordinator) and Private Security Specialist in several countries.  
 
The Researcher has security and related qualifications not only from Australia 
(Certificate III, IV and Diploma15 but also from the United States (ASIS CPP),16 the 
United Kingdom (Security Management and Close Protection Instructor), Task UK, who 
are a leading accredited security training provider accredited by City and Guilds, and 
Edexcel, Israel (Martial Arts, Self Defence and Firearms) and South Africa (PSIRA-
registered Grade A security officer, Bodyguard and Instructor). The Researcher is also a 
founding partner and Director of the Dynamic Alternatives Group and as such was able 
to access the business diverse offerings for the purpose of this research. This included 
piloting the developed Practical Use of Force Training Model on one of the companies 
training courses. 
 
2.8.3 Focus Groups 
Due to the Researchers limited time and capacity in South Africa, it was identified that a 
Focus Group would be an excellent way to gain the opinions of a wide range of experts 
in a short period of time. Twenty well known private security training, use-of-force 
experts were invited to attend a half-day workshop in Johannesburg. The primary aim 
was to discuss the four research questions. Due to the specialist nature of the subject 
matter there are not many recognised experts. A kind offer by IFTA to assist in 
contacting such persons was graciously accepted by the Researcher which was a great 
help as the Researcher was based in Australia through this research process and only 
                                                 
15 The Certificate IV and Diploma in Security Risk Management was obtained from Australian Security 
Academy in 2008 and the Certificate III in Security Operations was obtained from the National Security 
Training Academy in 2010. 
16 The American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) issues several qualifications the premier 
qualification is the Certified Protection Professional (CPP). 
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infrequently made visits to South Africa. Out of the twenty individuals that were invited 
to attend six actually attended (an attendance rate of 30%). Due to the difficulty of 
gaining access to these people it was suggested that the remaining experts be reached 
via a comment document as it was unlikely that they would be able to attend face-to-
face sessions or avail themselves to telephonic interviews. With those who attended the 
focus group was very successful, primarily due to the calibre and experience of the 
attendees (please see in List of References for more details of participants). Not only 
were the research questions discussed in-depth, but it was also possible to extract the 
foundational concepts for the critical aspects of a use-of-force training model for the 
private security industry. Concepts relating to the implementation of the model and 
specific curriculum inclusions and exclusions were also discussed (see Annexure 4 for 
Agenda). Findings from the focus group will be discussed in Chapter Nine.  
 
2.8.4 Questionnaire distribution  
There were two sets of questionnaires distributed at different phases of the research. 
The first questionnaire on use-of-force issues in the Crowd Control sector was 
distributed to two hundred security officers, in the early stages of the research process 
and was utilised as a tool to gain specific insight into the Crowd Controller sector of the 
Queensland private security industry. Based on feedback from the Queensland security 
regulators authority during the preliminary research phase it was identified that it would 
yield better results to focus the qualitative component in south east Queensland as this 
is where more than a third of the Queensland population live (Queensland Department 
of Treasury, 2011: 17) and where the majority of security operators are based (Woods, 
2008). Several Australian security firms in south east Queensland assisted with the 
distribution of the questionnaires. These questionnaires were focused on the 
operational low level field operator. A return rate of just over thirty precent (this will be 
outlined in more detail in Chapter Eight) occurred. As outlined in the section covering 
research difficulties (2.4) the researcher was unable due to lack of resources and limited 
access to the low level operators, to distribute the same questionnaire in South Africa.  
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The second questionnaire was accompanied by a summarised research information 
and findings document. See Annexure 6 for an overview of the summary document and 
Annexure 7 for the feedback questionnaire. These documents were sent out via direct 
email as well as distributed via various security networks and associations such as the 
ASIS Chapters in South Africa and Queensland and the South African Institute of 
Security (SAIS). These documents were then distributed for comment and feedback 
through channels willing to assist. Since the documents were distributed openly and 
several associations and organisations were asked to assist’ it is impossible to ascertain 
the exact number of persons to whom it was distributed. A realistic assumption would 
be that it was sent to approximately five hundred security professionals. The response 
rate for the second set of questionnaires was a much lower four per cent. It is believed 
that this could primarily be attributed to the fact that respondents were required to read 
the summarised research findings document first, which was nineteen pages long and 
perhaps included too much detail. Certain persons contacted the Researcher stating 
that they would have liked to participate but did not have the time to read the document. 
The aim of this second questionnaire was three-fold. Firstly it was used to measure the 
validity of the research and the use-of-force training model that emanated from the 
research by assessing if it was accepted and approved by the industry. Secondly it was 
used as a further platform for industry experts to provide information and insights into 
the topic. Lastly the public comment feedback form was utilised to gain comment from 
the industry on specific suggestions for scenario-based training at various levels of 
security industry (See Annexures 6 and 7 for details). 
 
2.8.5 Field testing and evaluation of the research 
According to Mouton (2001: 159), ‘Evaluation Research’ is best applied when “research 
is aimed at assessing whether interventions have been well conceptualised and 
properly implemented”. This concept of assessment was the basis for this phase of 
research. Once the best practice model had been developed it was piloted on a 
voluntary group of private security officers. In order to ensure that bias was effectively 
managed during this process, candidates from various backgrounds were invited to 
attend and the training sessions were delivered on a voluntary attendance basis. After 
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the completion of this training, the group functioned as a focus group (please see 
References for details on this group) and discussed the feedback agenda (See 
Annexure 5 for details). The findings of this group were then used as the basis for 
designing and the public comment feedback form that was discussed in the last section. 
The field testing and public comment feedback were designed as controls for each other 
to assess the use and practicality of the model in practice as well as in theory. 
 
2.9 DESIGN OF RESEARCH TOOLS AND CONFIRMATION OF TARGET
 POPULATION 
Research tools were designed to be as user friendly as possible, whilst providing a 
platform for the Researcher to gather as much data as possible from the selected target 
audiences. Please see Annexures 1-6 for samples of the research tools that were 
utilised. The following target groups were identified and examined to gather information 
for this study: 
 
2.9.1 Security Training Agencies (STAs) and Registered Training Organisations
 (RTOs) in the Private Security Industry 
South Africa: 
In South Africa a focus group structure was utilised in order to gain input from the 
correct target segment in the South African private security industry. To add to this and 
to fill in gaps that were identified after correlating the focus group research, several 
targeted interviews with industry role-players were also conducted. The Researcher has 
extensive experience conducting research in South Africa and as such identifying the 
key role-players as well as understanding the legislation, was far simpler than in 
Australia. 
 
Queensland, Australia: 
In Queensland, Australia STAs were targeted by email correspondence and/or 
telephone. A comprehensive internet search was conducted and the various STAs in 
Queensland were identified. An introductory email was sent to over ten STAs informing 
them of the research and requesting interviews. Wherever possible interviews were 
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conducted on face-to-face basis. Allowances were also made for interviews take place 
telephonically when face-to-face interviews were not possible. STAs in Australia are 
referred to as Registered Training Organisations (RTOs). A minimum goal of 
interviewing at least three RTOs was set. Despite the lack of feedback from the general 
industry, three RTOs and trainers from two other RTOs, were interviewed, all in in their 
individual capacities. 
 
2.9.2 Security providers and officers 
Various security providers in both South Africa and Queensland were interviewed. The 
selection of these providers was based on their prominence in the industry and their 
willingness to take part in this study. See List of References section at the end of this 
study for a list of interviewees. As a result of being based in Queensland it was possible 
for the Researcher to access the low level security operators for the Questionnaire 
distribution. Unfortunately, due to limited resources and capacity in South Africa it was 
not possible to access a similar target population (see Section 2.9.4). 
 
2.9.3 The various security associations and related organisations  
A comprehensive web based search was conducted to identify key organisations. From 
this telephonic and email contact was made. There were very few associations that 
replied to the request for an interview. It was intended that the focus for Australia was to 
interview an official from Australian Security Industry Association Limited (ASIAL) which 
represents over eighty-five percent of the Australian industry and to Interview persons 
from the South African Institute of Security (SAIS). Both of these objectives were 
achieved. Interviews were also held with representatives’ from the following 
organisations: 
 
 South African Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA); 
 South African Safety and Security Sector Education and Training Authority 
(SASSETA); 
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 Construction and Property Services Industry Skills Council (CPSISC): the 
CPSISC is responsible for the design of all security industry training standards in 
Australia ; and 
 Queensland Department of Justice and Attorney-General/Fair Trading – the 
department is responsible for licensing and compliance in the private security 
industry.  
 
2.9.4 Prominent Defensive Tactics trainers 
Defensive Tactics and use-of-force trainers from military, law enforcement and the 
private security industry backgrounds were interviewed. This included representatives 
from South Africa, Australia, Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
2.10 CONSOLIDATION OF RESEARCH, DESIGN AND REVIEW OF BEST 
PRACTICE MODEL 
Once all data had been collected it was either coded and correlated (for questionnaires) 
or grouped into common themes/categories (for the literature review, interviews and the 
focus group). After the completion of these tasks, a best practice model and curriculum 
were designed and tested on a group of willing participant’s. The participants were 
attending a twenty eight days specialist security training program at the time. The field 
testing of the model was run under the auspices of the specialised security consultants’ 
and training programme of the company Dynamic Alternatives (Pty) Ltd17, based in 
Centurion in South Africa. The participants were from a cross spectrum of backgrounds 
and portrayed a diverse level of initial skills. There was also one female respondent who 
participated in the process. All participants agreed to participate in the testing and 
contributed much useful feedback and comments on the conclusion of the field testing 
(see Annexure 5). In order to remain objective the Researcher was not the primary 
trainer or competency assessor on this course. Once this data was collected, it was 
merged with the feedback from the second questionnaire and summary document to 
provide a detailed review of the developed model and its shortcomings. This data was 
                                                 
17 The Researcher is a Director of this company which made it achievable to integrate this pilot into the 
training program. 
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then incorporated and minor modifications were made to the manner in which the model 
was explained.  
 
2.11 SUMMARY 
A comprehensive mixed-methods research approach was applied to gather the relevant 
data required to answer the identified research questions. This research approach 
incorporated both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Due to the practical nature 
of use of force, a hands-on research approach, which included in-depth, and often 
lengthy, face-to-face interviews, was identified as a critical component to gathering the 
relevant data. These various research methodologies were applied as part of a research 
and concept development strategy that has successfully enabled the Researcher to 
achieve the following: 
 
 Conduct a comprehensive literature and online review of the topic; 
 Conduct 31 face-to-face in-depth interviews with representatives from various 
security companies, training organisations, associations and regulatory bodies;  
 Distribute, collect and correlate questionnaires to the Crowd Controller subsector 
of the security industry;  
 Distribute, collect and correlate questionnaires and research summary 
documents to selected groups within the global security industry;  
 Conduct a focus group of specialist security and use-of-force trainers; 
 Incorporate Participant Action Research into the design and development of the 
model; 
 Conduct a field-based assessment (evaluative research approach) of the 
designed model and curriculum, that were outcomes from the first phases of this 
research; and 
 Review feedback from the field-based and peer review research (application of 
feedback from the evaluative research approach) and modify the model and 
relevant explanations accordingly. 
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All of the above research-based activities were conducted with the utmost attention to 
ethical best practice. The core fundamentals of validity, reliability and accuracy of 
collected data were applied throughout the data collection process. Respondents and 
interview participants were educated regarding best practice of anonymity and were 
given the option of anonymous response if they deemed it necessary. Despite these 
efforts there were many difficulties experienced and which needed to be overcome 
within the research process. The Researcher was consistently aware of the need to 
eliminate bias. During all interviews and focus groups, the Researcher ensured that no 
leading questions or personal bias was applied.  
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Chapter 3 
THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY  
______________________________________________________________________ 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
A well-established model utilised by psychologists and developed by the world-
renowned psychologist Abraham Maslow is the so-called Hierarchy of Needs. This 
hierarchy of needs provides a tiered explanation for the manner in which humans 
address their needs. It commences with the fundamental requirements for survival (food 
and shelter) usually referred to as the physiological needs stage and moves through, 
security needs, social needs, esteem needs and finally onto self-actualisation. Second 
only to the fundamental needs for physiological requirements, such as food and water, 
is the need for safety (Maslow, 1943: 370-396). Maslow expands his ‘Safety Needs’ to 
include the following: personal security; financial security; health and well-being and a 
safety-net against accidents/illness and the adverse impacts thereof. 
 
In essence, it is the function of security to create safety, i.e. security is any aspect, 
technique, piece of equipment or human deployment that is used to create safety. 
Safety is defined as: “The condition of being protected from or unlikely to cause danger, 
risk or injury” (The Oxford Online Dictionary, 2010).  
           
ASIS International, the world’s largest association of Security Managers defines security 
as:  
The condition of being protected against hazards, threats, risks, or loss; Note 
1: In the general sense, security is a concept similar to safety. The distinction 
between the two is an added emphasis on being protected from dangers that 
originate from outside; Note 2: The term "security" means that something not 
only is secure but that it has been secured (ASIS International online library, 
2010). 
 
Therefore, we can extrapolate that a security officer is an agent whose core 
responsibility is to ensure the safety of persons and/or property. In essence security 
officers provide various levels and tiers of protection. Swanton (1993: 1) defines 
protection as “controlling risks involving those things we value, such as our bodies, our 
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families, public peace, integrity traffic safety and flow, personal belongings, state 
security and so on.”  
 
3.2 BACKGROUND ON THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY  
It is generally accepted that the core function for ensuring the safety of a community is a 
function that has traditionally fallen to government agencies (Minnaar, 2004 and 
Prenzler, 2005). Agencies such as federal and municipal police departments are 
responsible for the safety of citizens within the borders of their countries. Military 
structures are for the protection of the interests of countries externally or from external 
threat. The deployment of private security providers to supplement traditional policing 
structures and even military functions is now commonplace. This can be seen in 
countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan where civilian contractors are utilised for a wide 
variety of support services and even protective services such as military base 
protection. In a recent survey of the security industry in the United States, Strom, 
Berzofsky, Shook-Sa, Barrik, Daye, Horsteman and Kinseny (2010: 1) stated that: 
 
The private security industry is a crucial component of security and safety in 
the United States and abroad. Today, private security is responsible not only 
for protecting many of the nation‘s institutions and critical infrastructure 
systems, but also for protecting intellectual property and sensitive corporate 
information. 
 
Over the past few decades there have been many studies that summarised the 
evolution and development of the industry. An excellent overview of this subject was 
compiled by Minnaar (2004) in his work titled ‘Private-public partnerships: Private 
security, crime prevention and policing in South Africa’. The modern-day reality is that it 
is a combination of policing and private security functions that ensure the safety and 
wellbeing of a community (Minnaar, 2007; Strom et al, 2010). By implication, the fact 
that we need police and private security means that there are inherent risks to which a 
community are exposed. Whilst there are certain differences, the term ‘private policing’ 
is often used synonymously with that of the security industry (Minnaar, 2004: 4-5) and 
as such no direct distinction will be made between these terms. At its core, protectors of 
society must be able to defend the people they protect from possible attack. The ability 
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to defend others is not possible unless one is able to effectively defend oneself. In 
extreme circumstances this defence may include the use-of-force to protect oneself and 
others (even though the use-of-force may be a daily occurrence for some security 
officers). According to the United States Bureau for Statistics, approximately sixty 
percent of fatalities among Security officers in 2007 were caused by assaults and 
violent acts (BLS, 2009: 80). 
 
In the developed societies of most first world countries such as Australia, and to a 
lesser extent South Africa, the basic physiological needs of the vast majority of its 
citizens are met. In other words, the majority of people living in these countries are not 
too concerned with the activities required to fulfil basic survival needs such as hunting 
or gathering food. This creates a reality whereby the next level of needs becomes the 
key concern (namely safety needs). This is primarily where the demand for private 
security services comes into play (Mead-Niblo, 1995: 8-12).  
 
There are various reasons that explain in detail the motivation for the need of private 
security. This reasoning and the associated historical motivations are beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. However, the key consideration is the reality that there is the need 
for security services to protect the wellbeing of people and assets. For further 
information on the development of the private security industry, the following references 
provide more detailed information: Bruanig, 1993; King, 2001; Mead-Niblo; 1995, 
Minnaar 2004 and Prenzler & Sarre, 2000. The reality is that the private security 
industries in most countries are showing consistent growth (Prenzler and Sarre, 2009, 
Minnaar, 2007 and Strom et al, 2010). Despite the fact that in the United States growth 
may have slowed down in last few years (Strom et al, 2010) due to the of global 
economic recession, the security industry seems to have weathered this situation far 
better than other industries (Kotwica, 2009).  
 
The reasons for development and expansion of the private security industry are a well-
documented reality (Prenzler, Sarre & Earle, 2007; Prenzler, 2005; Minnaar, 2004). The 
majority of research resources on the topic of use-of-force seem to favour research into 
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policing over research into private security, this despite the fact that in most worldwide 
locations, the security industries have a far larger manpower capacity then their policing 
counterparts (Prenzler and Sarre, 2008). Two global examples are as follows; the 
International Institute of Security and Safety Management believe that there are five 
times as many security officers as policemen in India. Minnaar’s (2004) research 
estimates that there are three times as many security officers as there are police 
officers in South Africa. Prenzler and Sarre (2009: 16) highlight the Australian 2006 
census which illustrated that there were 226 police and 266 private security officers per 
100 000 people in Australia.  
 
From a macro perspective, the realities of information-based technology and ease of 
access to the internet have had a dramatic effect on the manner in which modern 
societies function and the proliferation of technology-based security solutions (internet-
based CCTV, alarm signals sent direct to mobile phones, etc.). However, regardless of 
the sophistication of modern society, certain levels of crime and violence seem to be an 
on-going reality. This in turn creates an on-going need for private policing to counter 
and prevent these issues. The concept of private policing is not new and is utilised 
interchangeably with the roles and duties of Security officers whilst they fulfil certain 
functions of the private security industry. The specifics of the Queensland and South 
African private security industries and the services they provide will be discussed later 
in sections 3.7 and 3.8 of this Chapter. 
  
3.3 THE EVOLVING SCIENCE OF SECURITY  
The delivery of security services and the art of protection are constantly evolving. 
Leading academic institutions such as the University of South Africa and Edith Cowan 
University in Australia began referring to the study of security issues as the field of the 
“Security Sciences” (www.unisa.ac.za, 2009 and www.ecu.edu.au, 2011). The scope 
and development of the Security Sciences has dramatically transcended the mere 
provision of manpower (ASIS Foundation, 2009; Minnaar, 2007d). The world’s largest 
association of security professionals; the American Society for Industrial Security 
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(referred to as ASIS international) now has over 37 000 members around the world 
(ASIS, 2010).  
 
As a result of the outcomes of a meeting of security experts in 2008, wherein it was 
stated that in defining security there were 18 core elements that had to be identified. 
According to the ASIS Foundation (2009: 3-4), these 18 elements are subfields in their 
own right but include the following: 
 
1. physical security; 
2. personnel security;  
3. information systems security;  
4. investigations; 
5. loss prevention;  
6. risk management;  
7. legal aspects; 
8. emergency and contingency planning; 
9. fire protection; 
10. crisis management; 
11. disaster management;  
12. counter-terrorism;  
13. competitive intelligence; 
14. executive protection;  
15. violence in the workplace;  
16. crime prevention;  
17. crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED); and  
18. security architecture and engineering.  
 
As can be seen by the comprehensive nature of subjects included in the above-
mentioned list, there can be little doubt that the field of Security Science is in need of 
further research. The nature of the industry is constantly growing and expanding as 
technology, terrorist and criminal activities evolve. This expansion and development is 
also mirrored by the improvement in training standards and the formulation of more 
technical and sophisticated training. 
 
3.4 USE OF FORCE AND PRIVATE SECURITY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
We exist in a global economy where businesses operate without borders. This is also 
happening in the security industry. An example of this is the increasing global concern 
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aimed at private security companies that offer military-type services in high level conflict 
zones (which are not necessarily ‘war zones’). It has been well documented that the 
delivery of security services in countries that may be considered ‘war zones’ is creating 
much deliberation from a best practice and ethical standpoint (Aguirre, 2007; De 
Nevers, 2009; Minnaar, 2007; Stoddard, Harmer & DiDomencio, 2008).  
 
The issue of security companies providing military-type services is not a new issue. 
There is a common misconception that all private security personnel operating in foreign 
conflict zones are mercenaries. This is not an accurate perception as many contractors 
are employed by legitimate governments and as such are bound by the laws and rulings 
of the countries in which they operate. However, with cases of excessive use of force 
having occurred on a semi-regular basis and the consequent media exposure of many 
of these incidents, a public outcry for answers and accountability has been created 
(Stoddard et al, 2008). 
 
According to De Nevers (2009: 170) the issue of use of force by such companies which 
have become known as PSCs or PMCs (Private Security Companies/Private Military 
Companies) has become a priority for governments utilising their services including the 
USA and UK. An example of an incident of this kind was discussed in point 1.3.3 above. 
Many governments have chosen to utilise the services of PSCs for numerous reasons, 
including the lack of manpower and capacity within their existing armed forces as well 
as the political deniability that the use of outsourced security provides. In recent times, 
the issue of use of excessive force by private security contractors working in Iraq was 
exacerbated by a legislative glitch that basically enabled security contractors to utilise 
whatever force they believed was necessary without any criminal or civil consequence. 
 
The importance of these macro issues to this study is that whilst there is no focused 
use-of-force studies for the domestic private security industries in South Africa or 
Australia, use of force by private security officers is considered a large scale problem by 
many independent research organisations (Aguirre, 2007; De Nevers, 2009; Minnaar, 
2007; Stoddard, Harmer & DiDomencio, 2008). This problem is not limited strictly to the 
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use of force but extends to a lack of oversight and reporting or non-reporting of 
misconduct. In many countries such as Australia, South Africa and the United Kingdom 
the private security industries have been regulated by government authorities. This 
regulation and oversight is commonplace but does differ in shape and form from region 
to region (Minnaar, 2006b). 
 
 An overview of the application and implementation of the legislation and subsequent 
regulation for this industry in both South Africa and Australia (with specific focus of 
Queensland) will be discussed in the next section of this Chapter.  
 
3.5 REGULATORY STRUCTURES  
In order to assess the regulatory levels of a country, Schneider’s (2005: 33-37) model of 
regulatory classification in the private security industry, will be utilised. This model can 
be applied to specific sub-sectors of the private security industry. As an example the 
sub-sector of Crowd Controllers will be discussed. This approach basically identified two 
key areas that an industry must have in place to be considered ‘regulated’ namely, a 
training regulatory structure that sets standards and ensures that training is delivered 
effectively and a regulatory/licensing authority that ensures compliance and best 
practice among firms and security officers that work in the industry.  
 
The table below, which has been modified to fit the specifications of Crowd Controllers, 
illustrates this model of regulatory explanation. According to the model, the Queensland 
Crowd Control industry could be defined as a regulated industry. In contrast, the South 
African Crowd Control industry, would accordingly be defined as partially regulated. The 
status of being ‘partially regulated’ can be attributed to the enforcement and monitoring 
of legislation not being effectively applied. It is difficult to assess countries such as 
Australia with its six federal states (Prenzler, Sarre & Earle, 2009: 408-412). Even more 
so the United States where each state has its own licensing structures and 
requirements (Strom et al, 2010: 68). In assessing the private security industry as a 
whole, it is clear that it has come a long way from self-regulation. Despite this 
consideration it has been stated that: “Until ‘smart co-regulation’, where governments, 
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professional associations and operatives work together to create the highest possible 
standards in security work there will not truly be an efficient industry” (Prenzler, 2007: 
37).  
 
Figure 2: Table of regulatory considerations for the Crowd Controller industry 
 
REGULATORY 
OPTIONS 
CRITERIA 
Regulated  Industry accepted minimum competency standards 
 Industry supervision and regulation by oversight body 
 Crowd Controllers must re-register and re-train (demonstrate 
competency) with the regulatory body within a given period (e.g. once 
every three years) 
Partially 
regulated 
 There may be regulation but not specifically for the Crowd Controller 
industry (usually regulated within the security industry as a whole) or: 
 There may be training standards with no enforcement by a licensing or 
regulatory body 
Non-regulated   No accepted industry or training standards  
 No set regulatory or licensing bodies 
 
3.6 THE POLICING/PRIVATE SECURITY CROSSOVER  
Despite the differences (geographic and government mandated authority) between 
private security and public law enforcement, their missions are not in conflict, but in fact 
are complementary, and often closely related (Strom et al, 2010: 57). One of the 
fundamental differences between police and private security is the motivation behind 
the delivery of services. The state policing organisations are government funded and 
therefore paid for by the country’s citizens via their taxes. The focus of their service is 
therefore generally considered to be centred on the delivery of a service that is in the 
best interests of a community. On the other hand, private security functions as a 
business and as a result focuses on the remuneration for services and the profitability of 
contracts (Strom et al, 2010:14). The lack of ‘official power of arrest’ makes the roles of 
private security different in many ways from those of state authorised Police officers 
according to Mead-Niblo (1995: 14-18) and Swanton (1993: 1).  
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A wide range of private security offerings may be directly related to high levels of violent 
crime and even welcomed by Law Enforcement agencies (Minnaar, 2005: 85) This is 
especially prevalent as a result of the comparatively high crime rates in South Africa 
(SAPS, 2010). With reference to the Australian security industry Prenzler, Earle and 
Sarre (2007: 1) state that: 
 
Police necessarily retain the major role in enforcing the law after crimes have 
been committed and offenders have been apprehended. However, given that 
public sector policing draws heavily on equipment and personnel services 
supplied by private providers, and that public Police officers have many 
offenders handed over to them by the private sector, private security could be 
considered ‘the primary protective resource’. 
 
Market demand is a driving force in the development of a country’s private security 
industry. Minnaar (2004: 4-6) alludes to this concept but differentiates between “private 
policing” and “guarding” as related yet separate concepts. There are many reasons why 
the growth of a specific private security industry may be stifled or demonstrate dramatic 
growth based on the relevant police structures and their performance. Minnaar (2008: 
132) states that: “It is a given fact that the ‘privatisation of crime control’ in the last few 
years has become more evident”. There is a clear and direct correlation to a 
government’s ‘moonlighting’ policies and the size, scale and development of a country’s 
private security industry. The Police’s attitude to ‘moonlighting’ may also play a role in 
the relationships and cross over between the private security sector and police 
agencies. ‘Moonlighting’ refers to the activity of sworn law enforcement officers working 
in the private security industry after hours or when off-duty (the utilisation of a typical 
shift schedule of four days on and four days off by public policing agencies creates the 
opportunity for such moonlighting by police officers to occur). Strom et al (2010: 66), 
state the following with regard to moonlighting activities in the United States: 
 
Moonlighting poses some problems, especially in issues of liability. For 
example, if an officer makes a mistake, the police department and the private 
company must determine who should be responsible. They must also decide 
who pays for sick or disability leave. Some states have enacted statutes that 
determine the officer‘s duty to act while off-duty; others without such 
legislation must rely on judicial interpretation. 
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3.6.1 Overall performance of the police in delivery of a safe environment  
The more effective the police are at creating and maintaining a safer environment the 
lower the levels of violent crime (Bratton & Kelling, 2006; Minnaar, 1997; Minnaar & 
Ngoveni, 2004; Minnaar, 2005). This would mean that there would be very little 
requirement for high level tactical-type private security. The converse of this is also true. 
The two regions (Queensland and South Africa) selected as comparisons are 
pronounced examples of this. In South Africa, a wide range of tactical-based security 
solutions are available to the general public. These tactical offerings include services 
such as armed response, armed residential guards, 24/7 CCTV surveillance and control 
room services and even tactical vehicle tracker (by satellite) and recovery units (such 
units respond and recover hijacked or stolen vehicles).  
 
All of these services (with the exception of CCTV surveillance) are unheard of in the 
Australian market and many of them are illegal in terms of the Australian security 
legalisation. This is a clear example of how in a less secure environment, the more 
requirements there are for a broader range of security offerings and a larger private 
security industry. The South African security industry is said to have between three 
hundred and four hundred thousand active registered Security officers (PSIRA, 2010; 
Minnaar, 2007b and 2007d) the Australian industry at last census in 2006 had 113 867 
(Prenzler & Sarre, 2009: 21).  
 
3.6.2 Private security-policing partnerships  
The growth of partnership arrangements between the police and private security 
agencies often referred to as private-public partnership (PPP) initiatives between police 
agencies and the private security industry is proving to be a very well accepted tactic 
(Strom et al, 2010; Minnaar, 1997, 2004 & 2005; Minnaar & Ngoveni, 2004). In the year 
2000 there were 60 private security-policing partnership programs in the United States. 
In 2009 such projects have grown to over 450 initiatives (Strom et al, 2010: 62). 
Minnaar (2004: 9) highlights the benefits of Private Public Partnerships (PPPs) and 
provides the following list of examples where PPPs in the South African private sector 
generally apply: 
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 Responding jointly to crimes in progress; 
 Investigating crimes; 
 Sharing of crime intelligence; 
 Joint crime intelligence gathering (for example by means of joint surveillance 
teams or CCTV operations); 
 Sharing of expert knowledge (for example on the latest technology (private 
sector) or training methods (police); 
 Accessing of and supplying official crime information; 
 Joint planning and policing of special events; 
 Assistance with training (for example in computer forensics by the private sector 
companies or in collecting and correct control of evidence at a crime scene by 
the police); and 
 Crime prevention advice (sharing of risk analysis and audit information). 
 
Minnaar (2004: 37), however, also warns that there are complications and problems 
around PPPs, particularly on issues such a vicarious liability. The most notable 
Australian initiatives in this line were PPPs during the Olympics held in Sydney in 2000 
that were hailed as being highly successful based on the high number of security 
officers deployed and the comparatively low number of incidents that occurred 
(Prenzler, Earl & Sarre, 2007: 409). Whilst the PPP approach seems simple, there are 
many issues to address in terms of the so called animosity between police agencies 
and private sector companies. As Swanton (1993: 7) states: “Police and private 
protection communities lead largely separate existences and a degree of tension exists 
between them, more so from the former toward the latter”.  
 
3.6.3 Barriers to entry in the security industry  
Governments pass laws to control their private security industries. Examples of this are 
the South African Governments revision of the Foreign Military Assistance Act (Act 51 of 
1998) with the new Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain 
Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Bill (Bill No. 27, 2006), which many believe is 
designed to stop South Africans working for PSCs abroad (Le Roux, 1998; Minnaar, 
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2007). Another example is the Indian government’s policy that any company providing 
physical security services in India must be 51% Indian owned.18  
 
These laws and policies create barriers to entry into the security industry for many 
companies or individuals. This should not to be confused with general licensing and 
regulation, which focus on the registration of persons or companies required to operate 
in the private security industry and designed to enhance the safety of all. An example of 
this is the fact that persons who have been guilty of certain crimes in a period of ten 
years prior to their application may be denied permission for a security officer licence in 
Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General, 2008g). 
 
3.7 THE AUSTRALIAN PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY  
As a whole the security industry in Australia is a critical component to national security, 
which protects key government installations, assists with loss prevention in business 
and enhances the safety of Australians and their possession’s (Prenzler and Sarre, 
2009: 1-8). This section will provide a fundamental understanding of the Australian 
security regulatory structure as well as the industry as a whole. The definition by 
Prenzler and Sarre (2009: 4) to describe ‘private police’ will be utilised: 
 
Private police are those persons who are employed or sponsored by a 
commercial enterprise on a contract or ‘in-house’ basis using public or private 
funds, to engage in tasks (other than vigilante groups) where the principal 
component is a security regulatory function. 
 
A useful consideration when assessing the viability of studies that focus on the 
Australian private security industry is the reality that the private security in Australia, as 
in many other countries, is growing at a rate that exceeds expectations. In Australia, the 
manpower within the private security industry already outnumbers that of the police 
(Prenzler, 2005; Prenzler, Sarre & Earle, 2009). In order to understand the way the 
security industry now operates it is useful to consider the service offerings that are 
available within the industry. To provide a more detailed understanding of the titles, 
                                                 
18  Information on the Indian government company set-up requirements was obtained from V Lakhani & 
Co based in Pune, India, who specialise in the setting up of foreign businesses in India. 
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roles and duties within the private security industry, Prenzler and Sarre have subdivided 
and explained them in the Table below. It should be noted that whilst these are used to 
describe the Australian industry they would be applicable to almost any other country’s 
private security industry: 
 
Figure 3:  Table of the main security positions and functions 
 
POSITION FUNCTION 
Inquiry Agent Obtain evidence for court cases, search for missing 
persons. 
Guard/Security officer 
 
Provide protection through static guarding, patrol, call 
out, screening (as at airports), and cash-in-transit. 
Crowd Controller Protect patrons in places of entertainment. 
Bodyguard Protect individuals. 
Consultant 
 
Conduct security audits and advise on security needs. 
Provide advice on security equipment. 
Security Manager Oversee all aspects of security within an organisation. 
Equipment: Manufacturer 
& Distributor 
Research, production, marketing and distribution of 
security equipment. 
Equipment Installer Install and service security equipment including locks, 
alarms and CCTV. 
Control Room Operator Monitor security cameras, access control and alarm 
systems. 
Trainer Teach security competencies. 
(Prenzler & Sarre, 1998: 2) 
 
To be more specific, the Security Industry in Queensland as a whole is best classified 
by the licensing categories or classes mandated by the licensing authority, which in this 
case is the Department of Justice and Attorney-General’s, Office of Fair Trading (OFT). 
These categories are divided into two license classes and are outlined below: 
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Class 1 licence: A licence to perform one or more of the following functions:  
– Bodyguard; 
– Crowd Controller; 
– Security officer; 
– Security officer: Unarmed; 
– Security officer: Cash-in-Transit; 
– Security officer: Dog patrol; 
– Security officer: Monitoring; and 
– Private investigator. 
 
Class 2 licence: A licence to perform one or more of the following functions: 
– Security adviser 
– Security equipment installer19 (Department of Criminal Justice and the 
Attorney-General, 2008a-k). 
 
Out of the private security industry categories, Crowd Controllers and Security Guards 
account for the majority of the industry (Prenzler & Sarre, 2005: 13). This is consistent 
with findings in the United States. Strom et al (2010: 38) found that the security industry 
in the United States employs about one million guards and the guarding sector (armed 
and unarmed) amounts to over fifty percent of the service offerings of the industry. From 
these classifications, with specific reference to use of force, the vast majority of security 
officers that have the maximum exposure to potentially violent incidents are Crowd 
Controllers (Prenzler, Sarre & Earle, 2008: 412). This is in-line with findings from 
research conducted in similar countries such as the United Kingdom (Winlow, Hobbs, 
Lister & Hadfield, 2001). The research for this study clearly identified that from an 
Australian perspective, priority needs to be given to the Crowd Controller sub-sector. It 
for this reason, that Crowd Controllers, their training and use of force best practice will 
be utilised as one of the example groups throughout this paper. 
 
As of November 2011, Australia has no federal licensing system in place for the private 
security industry. The implications of this are that each state enforces its own licensing 
requirements and standards. There are moves to standardise the licensing 
requirements and regulatory models between states via the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) (COAG, 2009). There has however, been no clear indication of 
when this will actually take place. At this stage, licensing of security companies and 
                                                 
19 More details of on these classifications can be found on the OFT’s website: www.fairtrading.qld.gov.au. 
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officers in Queensland (as outlined above) is managed by the Office of Fair Trade 
(OFT). As an example of how this regulatory structure is rolled-out, the requirements to 
become a licensed Crowd Controller are provided below: 
 
The OFT mandates that persons who perform any of the following tasks (or whose 
duties may include any of these tasks) need to be registered and licensed as a Crowd 
Controller: “screening the entry of people into a place; monitoring or controlling the 
behaviour of people in the place and removing people from the place” (Department of 
Justice and Attorney-General, 2008e). No direct guideline for the use of force by 
licensed security officers could be located in the various documents and legislation that 
govern the industry in Queensland. 
 
In order to be eligible for a Crowd Controller license, a person must meet the following 
requirements: 
 
 be 18 years or older; 
 have no recorded conviction of a disqualifying offence within the previous 
10 years, or; 
 an unrecorded finding of guilt of a disqualifying offence in the previous five 
years  
 not be considered a risk to public safety; and 
 have successfully completed the training (Department of Justice and 
Attorney-General 2008e). 
  
There are also mandated pay scales (referred to as industry awards) which should be 
paid to qualified and compliant Security officers. The hours that they are legally allowed 
to work as well as many relevant issues regarding working conditions are also governed 
(Fair Work Australia, 2011: 1).  
 
Every state in Australia has a set security regulatory structure. Whilst some states 
require more training and compliance from the companies and individuals that are 
operating there, others are more lax. It should be noted, that there is a federal ruling 
that states should recognise licences issued in other states. This has created a loophole 
where many officers get licenses in states that are less stringent and then they apply for 
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mutual recognition in the state that they would like to work in. At some stage in the 
future, a countrywide security regulatory structure for Australia may be instituted. In the 
majority of the States, companies and individuals are required to become licensed 
before they can operate. These requirements often include membership of an 
accredited security association for companies and on-going pre-qualifications for 
individuals (Department of Justice and Attorney-General Queensland, 2008). Regulation 
and licensing in Australia has by no means been a smooth process and there are still 
many issues to be resolved. On the subject, Prenzler, Earle and Sarre (2007: 8) outline 
that:  
The introduction of licensing was driven by a series of scandals including a 
long-term problem of assaults and negligence by Crowd Controllers, recurring 
allegations of incompetency and poor training, convicted criminals accessing 
security courses, fraud in alarm and patrol services by major firms and a 
trade in confidential information between private investigators and public 
servants. 
 
3.7.1 Crowd Controllers: The Australian area of concern  
The fact that the Australian private security industry (like similar industries in many other 
countries) is constantly showing signs of growth and development as well as a 
broadening of service offerings to meet public demand (Mead-Niblo, 1995; Prenzler, 
Earle & Sarre, 2005 & 2009; Prenzler & Sarre, 2002 & 2008) means that studies 
pertaining to the industry are of critical importance. Despite the fact that much of this 
growth is leaning towards improved technology (electronic security monitoring, CCTV 
surveillance, etc.), it does not remove the reality that as mandated by legislation, 
venues serving liquor must employ security officers referred to as ‘Crowd Controllers’. 
The term ‘Crowd Controller’ is synonymous with that of ‘Bouncer’ as used in South 
Africa and the United States or ‘Door Supervisor’ as used in the United Kingdom. It is 
also commonly accepted that in all likelihood as a part of their normal job descriptions, 
Crowd Controllers will have to deal with drunk and sometimes violent patrons (Graham 
& Homel, 2008 and Prenzler & Hayes, 1997). There are many reasons for violence in 
this male dominated subsector of the security industry including alcohol and narcotic 
drug consumption, male ego or “honour”, sexual tensions, etc. (Linstead, 1997). Some 
of these issues will be discussed later in this dissertation. The issues associated with 
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violence and Crowd Controllers have been listed by Prenzler and Sarre (2009) as one 
of the major problems facing the security industry in Australia. In fact, in their inventory 
of problems facing the industry the following statement is second on the list; “Serious 
assaults by Crowd Controllers and their failure to protect patrons in licensed premises” 
(Prenzler and Sarre, 2009: 226). 
 
The need for an effectively functioning but regulated private security industry is well 
accepted (Minnaar, 2007; Prenzler & Sarre, 2009). Since the primary focus of the 
security industry is to enhance the safety of persons and the environment in which they 
operate, it is logical that they need to be skilled and trained to do so. In certain cases, in 
order to protect their own and others wellbeing, security officers may need to utilise 
certain restraining and subduing techniques that require the use physical force. Since 
the nature of private security is protective and not offensive it stands to reason that the 
tools and techniques utilised by these officers need to be defensive in nature. These 
‘tools and techniques’ are thus referred to as Defensive Tactics. The positive effects of 
better regulation and enhanced training are not new concepts within the Australian 
private security industry (Prenzler and Hayes, 1997) but the reduction of violence in this 
critical sector of the private security industry is of on-going concern. There are a number 
of reasons why Crowd Controllers and use of force are a high priority group in Australia. 
These include: 
 
 The reality that Crowd Controllers have to interact with many members of the 
general public on every shift, creates a higher level of risk than security jobs that do 
not involve such a high level of interaction. 
 
 The reality that Crowd Controllers are usually employed in or at venues where 
people can, if so inclined, consume excessive quantities of alcohol. Such patrons 
may be more prone to violent behaviour. 
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 The fact that Crowd Controllers in the private sector are one of the only security sub-
divisions whose employ, in many countries is mandated by legislation (this 
legislation is usually included in the liquor acts of the relevant countries or in the By-
laws of individual municipal areas). 
 
The above primary reasons, along with several other factors mean that when compared 
to the rest of the general security industry, Crowd Controllers are most often involved in 
physical confrontations (Winlow et al, 2001). It is well documented that issues such as 
sexual tension, the male need to prove masculinity by fighting and general tensions 
caused by overcrowding, service by staff, etc. all contribute to physical confrontations 
within the Crowd Controllers work environment (Graham & Homel, 2008; Linstead, 
1997; Scot & Dedel, 2006). This may be directly linked to the fact that the environment 
in which Crowd Controllers work, proportional to other security-related environments, 
experiences larger numbers of intoxicated persons. With the links between alcohol and 
violence being well known (Tomsen, 1997; Tomsen, Homel & Thommeny, 1991) it 
would make sense why there is a higher likelihood of violent encounters expected in 
Crowd Controllers’ working environments. This means that in Australia, Crowd 
Controllers are the primary class of security officers where the use of Defensive Tactics 
and related skills is of critical importance. This is of particular relevance when referring 
to the need to minimise excessive use of force when applying restraining or subduing 
tactics on drunk or rowdy patrons who themselves might turn violent. Over and above 
this, there has been much negative media around what are termed “Bouncer Bashings” 
whereby Crowd Controllers are involved in alleged excessive use of force cases (see 
section 1.3 of Chapter 1). As a result of these factors this study includes factors 
regarding the training, deployment and work requirements of Crowd Controllers with 
regard to the use of force and the appropriate Defensive Tactics training that they 
receive. 
 
3.7.2 Security training in Queensland  
In order to understand the specifics of security training in Australia it is important to 
have a basic understanding of the Australian vocational qualifications training structure. 
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Australia has a national qualifications training framework which enables recognition of 
qualifications countrywide. The framework is referred to as the Australian Qualifications 
Training Framework (AQTF). Each industry has a Skills Council that is responsible for 
the design and development of training packages. A training package is comprised of 
many units of competency that combine to form qualifications. The security industry falls 
under the Construction and Property Services Industry Skills Council (CPSISC) 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009: 1). Training packages can only be delivered by 
Registered Training Organisations. A training package is explained by the 
Commonwealth Government as follows: 
 
A Training Package is an integrated set of nationally endorsed competency 
standards, assessment guidelines and Australian Qualifications Framework 
(AQF) qualifications for a specific industry, industry sector or enterprise. 
Training and assessment using Training Packages must be conducted by a 
Registered Training Organisation (RTO) that has the qualifications or specific 
units of competency included within its scope of registration, or else works in 
partnership with another RTO as specified in the Australian Quality Training 
Framework Standards for Registered Training Organisations. 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009: 71-72).  
 
RTOs are regulated on a state by state basis but as of July 2011 a new National 
Regulator for Vocational Education and Training will come into effect (Department of 
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, 2011). In Queensland, the training 
authority is the Department of Education, Training and the Arts (DETA).  
 
3.8 THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY  
The South African Security Industry is the third largest employer in the country with the 
vast majority of services focused on the guarding sector (PSIRA, 2010). At first glance 
South Africa appears to meet the requirements of a regulated industry (utilising the 
regulatory model outlined earlier in section 3.5 of this Chapter). It has a clearly defined 
security licensing body as well as a training regulatory body. The licensing and 
oversight body in South Africa is the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 
(PSIRA). The core functions of PSIRA are listed in the Private Security Industry 
Regulations Act (No. 56 of 2001). PSIRA’s primary objective is to regulate the private 
security industry. PSIRA is responsible for exercising effective control over security 
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service providers in the public and national interest of the private industry itself and for 
that purpose, subject to the Act to: 
  
 Promote a legitimate private security industry which acts in terms of the 
principles contained in the constitution and other applicable law(s); 
 Ensure that all security service providers act in the public and the national 
interest in the rendering of security services; 
 Promote a private security industry which is characterised by 
professionalism, transparency, accountability, equity and accessibility; 
 Promote stability of the private security industry; 
 Promote and encourage trustworthiness of security service providers; 
 Determine and enforce minimum standards of occupational conduct in 
respect of security service providers; 
 Encourage and promote efficiency and responsibility with regard to the 
rendering of security services; 
 Promote, maintain, and protect the status and interests of the occupation of 
security service provider; 
 Ensure that the process of registration of security service providers is 
transparent, fair, objective and conducted timeously; 
 Promote high standards in the training of security service providers and 
prospective security service providers; 
 Encourage ownership and control of security businesses by persons 
historically disadvantaged through unfair discrimination; 
 Encourage equal opportunity employment practices in the private security 
industry; 
 Promote the protection and enforcement of the rights of Security officers 
and other employees in the private security industry; 
 Ensure that compliance with existing legislation by security service 
providers is being promoted and controlled through a process of active 
monitoring and investigation of the affairs of security service providers; 
 Protect the interests of the users of security services; 
 Promote the development of security services which are responsive to the 
needs of users of such services and of the community; and 
 Promote the empowerment and advancement of persons who were 
historically disadvantaged through unfair discrimination in the private 
security industry (Department of Safety and Security, South Africa, 2002: 8-
9). 
 
PSIRA provides a more complex category breakdown for licensing then the OFT in 
Queensland. In fact, PSIRA has just proposed amendments whereby the licensing 
categories below are set to be implemented in the coming years. Several of these 
categories are the equivalent of the Security officer category in Queensland but in South 
Africa they are subdivided into various sub-grades based on training and qualification:  
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 Categories or grades of Security officers as defined under the Sectoral 
Determination; 
 Reaction Officers;  
 Event Security officers; 
 Assets-in-transit Officers; 
 Specialist security services; 
 Close protection Officers; 
 Security service providers required to carry firearms; 
 Persons required to install, service or repair security equipment; 
 Persons monitoring images or signals from electronic security equipment;  
 Locksmiths; 
 Private investigators;  
 Persons required to handle service dogs;  
 Persons providing security training and instruction to a security service 
provider or prospective security service provider;  
 Persons advising on the protection or safeguarding of a person or property 
or type of security service or on the use of security equipment; and 
 Persons managing, controlling or supervising the rendering of a security 
service (Department of Safety and Security, South Africa, 2009: 12). 
 
Over and above the regulatory structure of PSIRA, training standards are enforced by 
the Safety and Security Sector Education and Training Authority (SASSETA). The 
SASSETA was appointed by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) on 1 
July, 2005 as the new authority replacing the older Police, Private Security, Legal, 
Correctional Services and Justice Sector Education and Training Authority (POSLEC 
SETA). SAQAs authority is mandated by the Skills Development Act (Act 97 of 1998). 
The South African training system is very similar to the Australian system. It is 
structured according to the National Qualifications Authority – similar to the AQTF – 
which designs and registers training standards and qualifications that are registered by 
SAQA. These qualifications and standards fall within the scope of various Sector 
Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) such as SASSETA. SETAs will then 
accredit training providers (the equivalent of RTOs) who will provide training against the 
relevant SAQA unit standards (equivalent to Australian Units of Competency) or 
qualifications that they have been accredited to train under (BSD, 2003). On 5 October 
2006 SASSETA and PSIRA signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding stating that 
the quality assurance function of all training conducted in the private security industry 
would now be the domain of the SASSETA. 
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PSIRA also implements a Code of Conduct relevant to all registered officers both in and 
outside of the country (PSIRA, 2010; Minnaar, 2008). The Code of Conduct clearly 
specifies that: “A security service provider may only use force when the use of force as 
well as the nature and extent thereof is reasonably necessary in the circumstances and 
is permitted in terms of law” (Department of Safety and Security, South Africa, 2003: 9). 
From a legislative and mandate point of view South Africa exhibits all of the structures 
necessary to effectively regulate the industry. One of the substantial differences 
between the South African private security industry and the industry in Queensland are 
the sheer amount of armed private security officers in South Africa (PSIRA, 2010 and 
Minnaar, 2008).20 The plethora of armed private security officers with the capability to 
utilise lethal force raises many issues of concern. In essence it implies that private 
officers are subject to many of the use-of-force guidelines and legislative considerations 
that are applicable to South African Police officers21 (Minnaar, 2008; Moodley, 2009).  
 
3.8.1 Cash-in-Transit officers South Africa’s high risk sector 
Cash-in-Transit (C-I-T) robberies are an ongoing problem in South Africa (SAPS, 2010). 
This is not necessarily because of their frequency but because of the high levels of 
violence that are associated with such attacks. “Every single day violent and heavily 
armed robbers attack at least two cash-in-transit vehicles and their crew in South Africa, 
fleecing the country of millions of rands” (Hosken, 2004: 1). This has led the South 
African Police Service (SAPS) making the combating of such attacks a priority as far 
back as far back as 1999. Hennop (1999: 1) in a circular for the Institute of Security 
Studies stated the following:  
Due to its violent nature [C-I-T Robbery] and the prominent media attention it 
receives, it has been declared a priority crime by the SAPS. As such, the 
SAPS give it specialised attention and channel resources towards 
investigating and preventing it. In most of cash-in-transit robberies assault 
rifles (e.g. the AK-47, R4 and R5) are used. 
                                                 
20 A good example of this is the category of Armed Response Officer which is non-existent in Australia but 
is so common in South Africa where almost every residential and business estate as well as many 
private homes make use of these services.  
21 The most important legislative source is Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and the 
subsequent amendments thereof. 
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The task of C-I-T security falls on the private security industry. The risks of such 
attacks are real and the use of heavy weaponry makes this the most dangerous area 
for security officers to work in, in South Africa. The threat is ongoing. A recent 
warning released by SBV Services, who are South Africa’s largest C-I-T company 
stated that: “Businesses and the public are requested to be vigilant as the festive 
season approaches. This comes after another Cash-in-Transit heist on 9 November 
2011 in Orange Farm in Gauteng” (SBV, 2011: 1). 
 
3.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
Worldwide, the security industry has become a vital component to ensure the safety of 
people and their assets. The field of Security Science is an ever evolving specialist area 
of research and is becoming acknowledged globally as a niche area of expertise. In 
many cases the industry could be seen to fulfil the roles of ‘private police’ due to the 
cross-over of services now offered by the industry. There are many different sub-
divisions of tasks and roles within the security industry that were defined in this Chapter 
such as manned guarding, investigation, monitoring or bodyguarding. Globally there is a 
concern among research-based NGOs on the use of force by private security 
companies in war-torn environments. The primary concern is centred on whether or not 
these private security companies are applying “offensive”22 use-of-force actions. The 
application of offensive – as opposed to purely ‘defensive’ – use of force would be in 
contravention of international human rights legislation (Aguirre, 2007; De Nevers, 2009; 
Minnaar, 2007; Stoddard, Harmer & DiDomencio, 2008). 
 
In most countries private-public partnership initiatives have been undertaken to ensure 
that community safety is increased. This has occurred for many reasons and has seen 
the private sector take on many traditional policing functions. This has, in turn, led to the 
regulation of the industry by legislated government agencies. The two core 
requirements that were identified as necessary for a country’s private security industry 
to be considered regulated were licensing and regulatory oversight and training 
standards structures. These structures monitor the industry as well as regulate that the 
                                                 
22 ‘Offensive’ in terms of aggressive, attacking, violent. 
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delivery of quality training and maintenance of standards within a country or region. In 
Australia, whilst training standards are national, regulation and licensing is conducted at 
state level. The state of Queensland’s private security industry can be considered a 
regulated industry since it has the following in place: Consistent training standards and 
a training regulatory structure; a mandated licensing and oversight body, as well as the 
provision for the need for refresher training and annual or triennial re-licensing. 
 
The South African industry, whilst appearing to be fully regulated, is in reality only 
partially regulated, due partly to the limited capability of legislative enforcement, i.e. 
staffing, registration and financial constraints at PSIRA (see Minnaar, 2007), which has 
led to high levels of non-compliance. A further reason for this non-compliance is the fact 
that currently there are no requirements for re-certification and skills refresher training in 
the South African industry. Whilst South Africa displays many of the requirements for a 
regulated private security industry for some reason it does not regulate its Crowd 
Controllers at all as a specific sub-group. One of the reasons for this is that they are 
considered a lower risk level than many of the armed security functions (PSIRA, 2010). 
As opposed to Crowd Controllers in Australia, C-I-T has been identified as the area of 
highest risk for private security officers in South Africa. The level and nature of violent 
attacks may be why PSIRA in its Code of Conduct for security officers provides 
guidance on the use of force whereas OFT does not highlight specific requirement for 
the use of force. 
 
The South African industry, whilst still protective in nature, offers many “tactical” 
services that would be considered illegal in Australia. This is born out of the necessity to 
tackle the country’s comparatively high levels of crime, specifically violent crime and 
such new crime categories as ‘house robberies’. Services such as tactical armed 
response units would be illegal in Australia but are so common in South Africa that 
many residential homes (especially those who can afford these services) make use of 
such services. 
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Chapter 4 
CRIMINOLOGICAL, VIOLENCE REDUCTION AND RELATED THEORIES 
______________________________________________________________________ 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The primary focus of this study is centred on the necessary ‘Defensive Tactics’ needed 
to manage violent situations that may occur within a security officer‘s working 
environment. Certain job areas within the private security industry such as Crowd 
Controllers are often exposed to continuing levels of aggression and violent behaviour 
as part of their job description. Furthermore, security officers operating in hostile 
environments may face life or death attacks on a semi-regular basis. There is a need to 
assess aggression and violence from both the perspective of the potential attacker as 
well as defendant (security officer). An understanding of how and why people respond 
to violent attacks in the manner that they do is also a critical aspect that needs to be 
explored before a best practice use-of-force model can be developed and applied.  
 
The very nature of criminology seeks to understand the root causes of crime in order to 
apply measures to prevent it from occurring or manage it effectively should it occur. This 
is very closely associated with the core functions of the private security industry, i.e. 
protecting property (including access control functions), assets, people, infrastructure or 
intellectual property. The basis of criminological understanding stems from existing 
research and theories primarily propagated by eminent psychologists, sociologists and 
criminologists. The focus of this research on the effective use-of-force application and 
training is synonymous with many of the principles of violence minimisation. The 
relationship between the aims of this research and the primary aims of the vast majority 
of criminological theories are therefore compatible.  
 
4.2 THEORIES OF VIOLENCE REDUCTION AND AGGRESSION MANAGEMENT  
Previous research into violence, and the management thereof, is directly tied to the core 
of this research project. The need to assess the existing body of knowledge for aspects 
that are relevant to this study is important in order to enhance and build on the existing 
body of knowledge. As with other aspects of this study the area of aggression and 
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violence management has not really been researched from the specific point of view of 
the private security industry. The tactical options (both legal and physical) available to 
law enforcement personnel when managing violent attacks may differ from what is 
available and/or legal for an officer in the private security industry. However, many of 
the physiological and psychological aspects that apply when dealing with violent and 
potentially violent attack are, to a great extent, the same for all persons regardless of 
the intricacies of the job they conduct. Prior research that is applicable to human 
reaction under stress extends to research conducted in the field of sports psychology, 
and any type of research that has focused on effective physical performance under 
stress. The complexities associated with this for security officers involve the realities of 
violence and crime that are often unpleasant issues to discuss or assess. The aim of 
this section is to provide the reader with an overview of the mental, physical and even 
emotional issues that are applicable to managing violence and handling aggression in 
the private security industry.  
 
Dror (2007: 267-271) identified many of the issues associated with how risk affects 
decision-making and the consequences which inherently link to the effective 
performance of a security officer under attack. This is critical as the wrong decision 
could have very serious consequences. These consequences could involve personal 
injury for any of the parties involved (the officer, civilian bystanders or the attacker). It is 
also necessary to assess what the psychological side-effects are for persons who may 
have constant exposure to violence or be faced with lethal and potentially lethal attack. 
Grossman (2009: 3930-4133) highlights the complexities of dealing with lethality from a 
soldier‘s point of view in his comprehensive work ‘On killing’ which has become the 
basis for a new field of study labelled ‘Killology’ (Grossman, 2010). The basis of this 
research is directly transferable to security officers at the top end of the industry who 
operate in a hostile environment or operate under confirmed threat. It is also vitally 
important that all of the concepts explored below are linked to the manner in which 
Security officers are trained and prepared for the risks of their jobs. This view is shared 
by Helsen and Starkles (1999: 7) who state that: “The goal of training must be to 
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increase the probability of correct decisions made in real world circumstances by 
training situations that impose similar conditions/constraints.”  
 
4.3 UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE  
In essence the role of persons who uphold the law and provide protection to persons 
and assets is intrinsically related to the potential exposure to violent attacks. The mere 
fact that a person, object or structure requires protection means that there is a likelihood 
of a potential attack (violent or other). A basic understanding of the nature of violence is 
important in order to ascertain how to avoid and manage violence should it occur. The 
very nature of violence (as defined in section 1.10 of Chapter 1) is to cause harm, i.e. 
have an adverse effect on the safety of someone or something. Since the role of 
security personnel is inherently to enhance the safety of whatever it is they are tasked 
with protecting (people, assets, property, etc.), we can then extrapolate that the very 
nature of a security officer‘s job is to prevent or manage the incidence of violence within 
their designated workspace. It would be impossible to manage or prevent something 
from occurring unless an understanding of what needs to be prevented is achieved. 
Unfortunately, violence is a very difficult subject to understand. The vast majority of 
people learn about violence from television and movies which are designed primarily for 
entertainment value and not to create and educational platform for students of violence 
and the consequences thereof (Grossman, 2009: 287-289; Grossman and Christensen, 
2009: 229; De Becker, 1997: 207). 
 
It is possible to assess the response and action to violent attacks based on a spectrum 
ranging from aspects such as physical presence and verbal skills at the low-end, to 
lethal force at the high-end of the spectrum. The use of various force options to manage 
violence is broadly acknowledged by a wide variety of sources including: Alpert & 
Macdonald, 2001; Bailey, 2001; Dynamic Alternatives 2002, 2007; Mroz, 2003; Nowicki, 
2001; Parsons, 1980; Petrowski, 2005; Troto, 2000; and Tuckey 2004. The different 
functions of the security industry intersect when discussing violence. At the lowest end 
of the response to violence spectrum, a security officer must simply be able to 
recognise the violent action and ensure that he/she stays calm enough to report the 
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incident they have observed. In the middle of the spectrum the officer may need to 
restrain violent suspects until more qualified help arrives. Lastly, at the top end of the 
spectrum is the need to apply lethal force. Grossman (2009: 3930-4133) explains the 
complications of applying lethal force even when the consequences of action or inaction 
may be life or death for the defender. He outlines that the application of lethal force is 
an exceptionally difficult thing for humans to do, even in self-defence, and as such there 
is much training (both physically and mentally) that officers need to undertake in order 
to survive lethal encounters.  
 
Whilst all humans are automatically programmed to manage violence via our flight-or-
fight instincts, gaining the skills and capabilities to predict and manage violence within 
the law (and a company’s operating procedures) is a complex task for a security officer. 
There are many reasons for this but one of the primary considerations is the very short 
time frames that an officer has to identify the attack, assess its nature, determine the 
correct response and implement the response (Siddle, 1995: 61-85). Much on-going 
training is required for an acceptable level of competency to be achieved and 
maintained. Furthermore, the mere concept of violence is considered unpalatable for 
the majority of the general public even though many experts believe that we are 
programming our youth with a previously unprecedented acceptability of violent 
behaviour (Grossman and Christensen, 2009: 229-260 and Grossman 2010: 3930-
4133) This does not necessarily translate into the skill set of a private security officer, 
who may in the course of carrying out their duties be faced with a violent attack (BLS, 
2009: 79-81).  
 
There is not an extensive base of academic research available regarding the ability to 
predict violent behaviour. Most experienced law Enforcement officers, career soldiers 
and seasoned martial arts veterans seem to have achieved the skill of assessing their 
environment and the persons in that environment to ascertain who may pose a threat 
(inclusive of reading body language to gauge ‘intention to commit such act’). The 
contributions of De Becker (1997: 159-162) to this field have been widely 
acknowledged. He identified what he referred to as ‘Pre-incident Indicators’ (Pins) and 
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provided practical tools such as the use of intuition and observation to assess potential 
attacks. These tools are relevant for both the private security industry as well as 
civilians and can be applied in order to predict violent behaviour.  
 
4.4 UNDERSTANDING AGGRESSION  
‘Aggression’ is often used interchangeably with violence and anger but the concepts, 
whilst related, are inherently different. As with the evaluation of violence the realities of 
aggression management may not appear complex within a purely theoretical context. 
Much the same as for police officers, the realities of aggression management, do 
become exceptionally complicated within the dynamic interactions that a security officer 
may be exposed to (Dror, 2007: 265-268). Aggression does not necessarily involve a 
physical act (which violence almost always does). It can simply be a feeling which may 
or may not lead to violent behaviour (Kay, 2011: 45). Aggression has a positive 
connotation in terms of being ready and prepared to confront someone (Asken, 
Grossman & Christensen, 2010: 43-93). This state of readiness is a critical 
responsibility for any private security officer who may work in an environment where the 
potential exposure to violent attack is part of the job (Waddington, 2007: 249). Kay 
(2011: 45) cautions that “aggression should not be confused with assertiveness” and 
describes two broad categories of aggression, namely: 
 
 Hostile, affective, or retaliatory; and  
 Instrumental, goal orientated, or predatory. 
 
A security officer‘s ability to assess and determine the nature of aggressive behaviour is 
also an important skill. This is because aggression may simply be manifested as verbal 
assault or physical intimidation both of which, if managed effectively, may not actually 
lead to physical violence (Kay, 2011: 45). Advanced Combat Training (2008: 5) outlines 
the concept as follows: “In terms of self-defence there are really only two types of 
aggression: Non-physical (intimidation, verbal insults, threats, etc.) and physical 
(grabbing, striking, pushing, etc.)”. 
  
From the point of view of a security officer needing to themselves employ aggression, a 
further two distinct subdivisions of aggressive behaviour can be identified, one positive 
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and one negative. The ability for an officer to manifest and display controlled aggression 
is vital. In many cases, in order to restrain or stop an attacker from inflicting harm, a 
security officer may have to hurt the attacker and this is very difficult to do without 
controlled aggression. Controlled aggression refers to the application of attitude, 
behaviour and physical action in such a manner that it minimises the negative 
consequences of an altercation such as injury to the attacker or bystanders (Advanced 
Combat Training, 2008: 5 and Dynamic Alternatives, 2010: 202). On the other hand, 
uncontrolled aggression (the unfocused manifestation of aggressive behaviour) is 
without doubt a negative response and will not only see persons getting unnecessarily 
hurt but may have reputational consequences for the officer (Asken et al, 2010: 43-93), 
his/her company or the client.  
 
The need for security officers to demonstrate controlled aggression in terms of their 
ability to manage a violent attack is a critical skill. This needs to be developed and 
focused in training to improve an officer’s ability to manage, and indeed survive 
potentially lethal attack (Asken et al, 2010: 43-93). Moreover, the ability of a security 
officer to effectively display controlled aggression when dealing with violent or 
potentially violent persons is an important component in effectively being able to de-
escalate such situations. This is particularly true in a Crowd Controllers working 
environment where if they do not speak with confidence and demonstrate their ability to 
take physical action when necessary, they are very likely to get assaulted or attacked 
whenever they have to get involved in potentially violent or violent incident (Hobbs, 
Hadfield, Lister & Winlow, 2002: 352-370). Since incidents such as these are 
commonplace in their work environment, (Winlow, Hobbs, Lister & Hadfield, 2001: 536-
548) these skill sets would need to be readily available.  
 
4.5 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS  
Situational awareness refers to the skill of knowing what is happening around you at 
any given time (Dynamic Alternatives, 2010: 235). The ability to manage violence and 
aggression would be impossible without the skill to apply effective situational 
awareness. There have been several useful models incorporating aspects of situational 
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awareness that are widely used within the tactical training industry. The two most 
common models are the Colour Code Model (Grossman & Christensen, 2008: 30-50 
and Mroz, 2003:37) and the Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action (OODA) 
Loop Model (Boyd, 1977 as cited in Hammond, 2001).23 Cooper’s (1989) Colour Code 
Model (as can be seen below) usually consists of four colours but sometimes has black 
as a fifth colour (Ayoob, 2007). Each colour represents a state of alertness and 
situational awareness. By applying the model effectively, it is possible to know when to 
raise and lower awareness levels. The need to raise and lower levels is very important 
as it is impossible to maintain an exceptionally high level of awareness at all times. 
Together with the colour codes the OODA loop is used as a model to teach students a 
systematic approach to situational awareness. The OODA loop is particularly relevant 
when a security officer would need to react to, and manage violent or potentially violent 
situations. 
 
Figure 4: Illustrations of the Colour Code System
 
 (Marrs, 2009) 
 
  
                                                 
23 The Researcher was unable to gain access to Boyd’s directly authored works which are archived by 
The United States Air force 
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Figures 5:  Illustration of Boyd’s OODA Loop 
 
(Marrs, 2009) 
4.6 FLIGHT-OR-FIGHT AND INSTINCTIVE RESPONSE TO AGGRESSION AND 
VIOLENCE  
Aggression and violence are most often associated with the ‘flight-or-fight’ (FoF) 
instinct. This instinct refers to the automated response that is pre-programmed into the 
survival instincts of humans (Thompson, 1999a: 18-19). These responses have been 
developed over thousands of years and the primary focus of their functioning is centred 
on the innate instinct that humans possess for self-preservation (Honig and Lewinski, 
2008: 133). Thompson (1999a: 18-19) explains that the FoF instinct has developed over 
a period of thousands of years and dates back to when the primary activities of humans 
revolved around hunting and gathering activities. The majority of threats that humans 
faced whilst conducting such activities were from predatory animals. Since predatory 
animals were usually larger and stronger, it was usually in the best interests of a human 
under attack to run (flight) away from a potentially lethal encounter with a predator, as 
opposed to fight which in many cases had a greater likelihood of failure (which generally 
would mean death). As a result of this on-going exposure to threats of this nature, the 
FoF instinct evolved to the point where today, we are well prepared to run away from an 
incident that takes us by surprise but not equally prepared to stand and fight. Almost all 
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persons are wired to be flight dominant, i.e. they would rather run away than have to 
deal with a violent attack (Advanced Combat Training, 2008: 5; Thompson, 1999: 65-
77). 
  
The physiological action related to the FoF response is triggered initially by the release 
of adrenaline. Several experts including Thompson (1999: 77-83), Asken et al (2010: 
27-92) and Siddle (1995: 61-108), have subdivided this release into various tiered 
stages based on the intensity and triggers of the adrenal release. At the bottom-end of 
these tiers is, what is referred to as, ‘adrenal trickle’, which is a slow release of small 
amounts of adrenalin over a period of time (maybe days or even weeks). On the top-
end, is adrenal dump which is what takes place during violent situations and aggressive 
encounters and involves a huge injection of adrenaline into the system in one go. 
 
An adrenal dump involves various physiological and psychological signs and symptoms. 
These signs and symptoms have both positive and negative effects on the way in which 
someone will respond to attack. These considerations have been drawn from a variety 
of sources and summarised for the reader. The sources included: Asken et al, 2010; De 
Becker, 1995; Grossman and Christensen, 2009; Honig and Lewinski, 2008; Siddle, 
1995; Siebel, 2010 and Thompson, 1999 & 1999a. The signs and symptoms are 
outlined and explained below: 
 
4.6.1 Positive effects 
 Directed focus: The ability to focus on one specific aspect is enhanced;  
 Enhanced speed: Under survival based response, blood flow is directed into the 
large muscle groups making faster movement possible; 
 Enhanced strength: Under survival based response, blood flow is directed into 
the large muscle groups making a person physically stronger; and  
 Pain reduction: Along with adrenaline there are various other chemicals and 
hormones that are released. Included in this release is cortisol which is known to 
act as a pain killer and numbing agent. 
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4.6.2 Negative effects 
 Tunnel vision: Peripheral vision is dramatically reduced which makes the ability 
to gain a comprehensive situational assessment almost impossible; 
 Auditory exclusion: Hearing is either disrupted or distorted during the intensity of 
an adrenal dump; 
 Verbal inability: The centres of the brain that control complex speech patterns are 
shut down so that base survival instincts can take over. Consequently the ability 
to effectively verbalise and communicate is dramatically reduced;  
 Time distortion: The perception of how long or how short something takes is 
dramatically altered;  
 Space and distance distortion: Spatial orientation and the ability to perceive 
distance are altered and often inaccurate; 
 Memory distortion: How we remember an incident as well as what we remember 
to do during an incident are altered; 
 Loss of fine motor skill and proprioception: Whilst gross motor skills improve, fine 
motor skills and the feeling of touch are dramatically reduced; and 
 Heart rate increase and fatigue (This will be discussed in sections 4.7 and 4.8 of 
Chapter 4). 
 
There are also many other related side effects such as the loss of bladder control, 
intense sweating, loss of facial colour, etc. Since many of these issues are not directly 
related to the actual direct performance of a person experiencing adrenal dump, they 
have not received the same level of attention as the aspects outlined above. Grossman 
and Christensen (2008: 8-121) spend much time explaining these signs and symptoms, 
and cover others such as the loss of bladder and bowel control among soldiers in battle, 
and how common and natural this response is, when faced with life or death 
altercations. Honig and Lewinski (2008: 134-135) summarise their findings on the 
effects of stress on perception and memory as follows: 
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 When stress levels are low, the mind maintains a soft focus across the senses 
as well as on internal thoughts and feelings; 
 Failure to perceive what would otherwise appear to be obvious is caused by 
unintentional blindness and auditory exclusion; 
 Physiological arousal interferes with perception and memory at all levels, 
including the ability to receive, retain, and recall information. This is particularly 
true of information that is deemed “unimportant”; 
 The system is predisposed to focus all of its resources on responding to the 
detriment of conscious thought; 
 The ability to turn off the adrenaline response is critical to maintaining conscious 
thought and control; 
 Emotion activates the amygdala or old brain, increasing recall of central details 
at the expense of peripheral details; and 
 The ability to accurately perceive and process information is a perishable skill. 
It is important that these instinctive responses are recognised and understood by all 
parties involved in the security industry (students, trainers, experienced officers and 
even regulators). A lack of understanding of these effects would make it impossible to 
realise the complexities involved with the effective use of force. The practical nature of 
use of force means that these issues cannot be ignored. On the subject, Honig and 
Lewinski (2008: 7) state the following: “Under high stress, the focus and processes of 
the brain shifts from one of thinking to one of reacting”. The realities of violence and the 
psychological methodologies that could be applied in terms of preventing violence are a 
logical extension of this school of thought.  
 
4.7 CONTROLLING ADRENAL RESPONSE AND ENHANCING PERFORMANCE
 DURING SURVIVAL BASED ACTIVITIES  
Once researchers were able to identify the effects and consequences of adrenal release 
related to survival based reactions, it was then necessary to commence researching 
how best to minimise the negative consequences associated with an adrenal response. 
Siddle (1995: 87) refers to this process as “survival stress management”. Indeed, whilst 
the goal of maximising positive factors and minimising negative reactions has received 
a good deal of attention, it is still a comparatively under-researched field. The 
management of adrenal response is critical knowledge for many reasons including the 
fact, that a person may freeze or panic when faced with an intense situation, that they 
are not prepared for. This reaction (freezing or panicking) is sometimes referred to as 
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the state of ‘Hyper-vigilance’ (Siddle, 1995: 89). In a life or death situation, hyper-
vigilance could have very serious consequences for all parties involved. The term 
‘stress’ is usually utilised to describe any external factors that trigger an adrenal 
response (Asken et al, 2010:43; Honig and Lewinski, 2008: 133; Grossman & 
Christensen, 2008: 132-137). Stress is not necessarily negative as inducing stress in 
training has numerous positive outcomes.  
 
Early forerunners who studied the effects of stress on performance and the 
management of these effects such as Levitt (1972) and Sage (1984) identified what has 
become known as the ‘reverse or inverted U hypothesis’ also referred to as the Yerkes-
Dodson Law (Asken et al, 2010: 29; Siddle, 1995: 42). The inverted U hypothesis states 
that as a person’s stress rates increase so will their performance (the upside of the 
inverted U). This increase in performance outputs continues up to a point whereby if the 
state of arousal can be maintained the maximal performance will be achieved (the slow 
peaked curve at the top of the inverted U). However, should the stress and physiological 
responses such as increased heart rate continue, then the performance levels will start 
to decrease (the downward side of the inverted U). The inverted U hypothesis is 
illustrated diagrammatically in graph format below:  
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Figure 6:  Illustration of the Inverted U Hypothesis 
 
 
(Asken et al, 2010: 29) 
 
The concept of the inter-related manner in which arousal and performance network was 
then further developed by Siddle (1995: 42-50) whose’ research into the influence of the 
Sympathetic Nervous System on perceptual processing, cognitive processing, motor 
performance and memory was a great leap forward in the science of understating how 
to deal with stress and manage violence. Dror (2007: 265), in his research regarding 
Police officers and decision-making, states that “the decision to use force is the pinnacle 
of a complex cognitive process”. Building on his original research Siddle together with 
Grossman, designed a model that related this concept back to a person’s heart rate and 
associated the relevant signs and symptoms of adrenaline with the various stages of 
arousal, as illustrated in Asken et al (2010: 31). Their contribution has become the basis 
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for what most tactical trainers now apply in terms of managing adrenal effects to 
achieve optimal performance in extremely stressful (even life threatening) situations. It 
should be noted that even though this model can be used in conjunction with external 
awareness models such as the colour code system (Grossman & Christensen, 2008: 
30-50; Mroz, 2003:37), it is not a tool for external awareness but rather a tool for 
trainers to teach their students how to best manage stress and arousal. It is also a 
practical tool to help individuals understand how to best perform in potentially life 
threatening situations. Grossman and Siddle’s model is illustrated in the following 
diagram: 
 
Figure 7:  Diagram illustrating the Model of arousal and peak performance  
  linked to heart rate 
 
(Grossman and Christensen, 2008: 31)  
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As can be seen from the diagram above, Grossman and Siddle’s research clearly 
indicates that for persons to operate most effectively under stress, the goal would be for 
a person to keep their heart rate between 115 and 145 beats per minute. Asken et al 
(2010: 52), assert that stress is based on perception and that a response to a stress 
situation is actually comprised of four components: 
 
 The objective situation;  
 Appraisal (perception) of the situation;  
 Emotional response; and 
 The behavioural, psychological and physiological consequences. 
 
In taking this concept further, one may be able to reduce or increase one’s heart rate to 
maintain the optimum range for best performance. There are additional aspects and 
tools that can be applied to maximise performance. Dynamic Alternatives (Pty) Ltd 
(2010) and Advanced Combat Training (2008) teach four primary techniques for 
managing of intense stress and adrenal function. These techniques should be applied in 
conjunction with what Asken et al (2010: 122) refers to as stress inoculation training, i.e. 
training that prepares Officers to deal with the realistic stresses that they will face ‘on 
the job’. Honig and Lewinski (2008: 143) agree and state that “Inoculation training helps 
an officer compensate and respond under conditions of physiological and psychological 
arousal”.  
        
4.8 THE FOUR PRIMARY TECHNIQUES FOR MANAGING ADRENAL 
RESPONSE  
The outline of the four techniques has been made available courtesy of Dynamic 
Alternative’s (Pty) Ltd and Advanced Combat Training. They are covered in their 
Security Awareness and Defensive Tactics training modules. The basis for developing 
this training was a combination of field research and information obtained through 
training sessions attended with persons such as Dr Dennis Hanover and Maj. (rtd) 
David Sharp. These techniques (or similar ones) are recommended and utilised by 
experts in the field, such as Gavin De Becker, Loren Christensen, Geoff Thompson, 
David Grossman and Massad Ayoob. Dynamic Alternatives and Advanced Combat 
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Training also state that there were many more influencers that may not have been 
directly credited for their inputs. The four techniques are described below. 
 
(Unless otherwise referenced these techniques have been drawn from Dynamic 
Alternatives, 2010 and Advanced Combat Training, 2008 and summarised by the 
Researcher). 
 
4.8.1 Realistic training and practical experience  
The concept is that a person fears most what they do not understand or have not been 
exposed to. There is no true substitute for experience but in many cases this may be 
difficult to come by (such as experience in managing armed lethal assault). Realistic 
training provides a person with a frame of reference in which to orientate and prepare 
them for managing violent attack and use-of-force situations. Through rigorous and on-
going training which consists of both theoretical and practical components, persons can 
familiarise themselves with stresses associated with almost any activity that causes 
them stress and which they wish to be able to overcome.  
 
4.8.2 Visualisation and mental role-play  
A part of our subconscious mind does not differentiate between what we visualise and 
what we experience. Therefore, by becoming proficient in mental role-play and 
visualisation, a person can prepare themselves for managing situations that may cause 
them stress. For visualisation to have a direct and effective impact on performance, it 
needs to be kept realistic. Therefore, a basic frame of reference is required in order to 
ensure that visualisation is as accurate as possible. This frame of reference is usually 
obtained during training and re-training sessions. Visualisation is a very effective tool for 
officers within the security industry, especially those working in the tactical or close 
protection environments where working hours may be very long and where there may 
be periods of inactivity between operations (Schneider, 2005: 205), but still have only 
minimal time to train and re-train (Asken et al, 2010: 94-124).  
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4.8.3 Tactical breathing  
Tactical breathing refers to the manner in which we breathe under stress. Since heart 
rate increases with stress, the need to breathe and oxygenate one’s system is critical. It 
has also been proven that when a person is taken by surprise or is under intense stress 
their breathing patterns become irregular (i.e. sharp inhalations, holding one’s breath, 
etc.). The skill needed to regulate one's breathing is critical in order to slow down the 
heart rate and perform optimally under intensely stressful situations (Asken et al, 2010: 
112-120; Siddle, 1995: 104-106; Grossman & Christensen, 2008: 322 and Thompson, 
1999: 66). The Researcher has noted that over the course of delivering hundreds of 
scenario-based training sessions, the most common instruction given to improve 
student performance is simply to remind them to breathe. 
 
4.8.4 Fitness and physical conditioning 
Whilst not exactly the same, the effects of intense physical exercise, are similar to those 
of an adrenal dump. This is particularly relevant with aspects such as heart rate 
increase, tunnel vision and loss of fine motor skill. As a result of these similarities a 
person who is used to the effects of intense physical exercise will be more accustomed 
to some of these signs and symptoms. They will therefore find them less traumatic and 
accordingly will be less likely to freeze or panic when faced with an intense situation that 
causes an adrenal dump (Asken et al, 2010: 21-26 and Mroz, 2003: 3-5). 
 
4.9 STRESS MANAGEMENT  
According to Grossman and Christensen (2008: 302-339) stress identification and 
stress coping are some of the most important skills that a professional security operator 
needs to have in their arsenal. Many persons working in the security industry are 
exposed to aggressive behaviour and violence as part of their everyday activities. It has 
become commonly acknowledged that there is a need for law enforcement officers 
(Scrivner, 1994) and Soldiers (Grossman, 2009) to undergo some sort of counselling 
after exposure to violent interactions. It is a critical component required for them to 
come to terms with what they may have had to do or with what they have witnessed. 
The concept of managing work-related stress, particularly when it involves violent 
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interactions, is critical. Thompson (1999: 181-184) discusses what he refers to as the 
‘black dog’. The black dog is the emotional and psychological backlash that often occurs 
after exposure to violent incidents. It involves periods of self-doubt and emotional 
instability which in itself causes additional adrenal response. Thompson and others 
(Grossman and Christensen 2008: 292-310) further hypothesise that if people are not 
trained to manage this physiological and psychological backlash, they may very well 
begin to experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  
 
Whilst the need to train persons in the law enforcement and military fraternities to 
effectively identify and manage work-related stress is well noted by Grossman and 
Christensen (2008: 292-310), it appears simply to have bypassed the private security 
industry. It has been established how the roles of policing and even military operations 
are now merging with those of the private security industry. As such, it should be a 
logical extrapolation that best practice applications such as psychological evaluation, 
counselling or group therapies are applied within the specific subsectors of the private 
security industry that are regularly exposed to violence and associated stress.  
 
4.10 SECURITY AND CRIMINOLOGICAL MODELS AND THEORIES  
The key benefit of much of the previous research is that it directly relates to managing 
crime and violence before it occurs. Proactive prevention is obviously the preferred 
option when it comes to crime and violence reduction. The prevention, reduction of 
crime and management of crime are directly linked to the primary goals of the private 
security industry. The reduction of violence has a direct relation to the enhancement of 
safety for all parties responsible for ensuring it (primarily law enforcement and private 
security). In general the majority of aggressive acts of violence are criminal in nature. 
Felson (2009: 24) states that “I propose a dual conceptualization of violent crime. Since 
violent crime is both violence and crime, theories of aggression and deviance are 
required to understand it.”  
 
By assessing the utility of some of the better known criminology theories and relating 
them to the context in which security officers operate, the Researcher aims to provide a 
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holistic grounding for the basis of this research. The scope and depth of the criminology 
is beyond the focus of this research project. Further information and excellent 
summaries of this field can be found in texts such as ‘Oxford Handbook of Criminology’ 
where Farrington (2002) provides a comprehensive overview of the subject. A 
summarised overview of some of the prominent criminological theories and concepts 
will be provided in sections 4.11-4.14. 
 
Potential exposure to violence has long been considered a normal aspect of law 
enforcement and military activities (Grossman and Christensen, 2008: xix-xxiii) but there 
is little doubt that it now also extends to the private security industry as well. As a 
consequence of the realistic levels of violence that security officers may face, it is useful 
to outline an evaluation of relevant theoretical models. Models that relate specifically to 
violence reduction and crime prevention are the most relevant. Whilst it would be 
impossible to provide reference to every existing model or theory that can be tied back 
to the topic, a range of several models and applications has been selected to provide an 
overview of the body of knowledge and relevance to this research. Some of the findings 
of eminent researchers in criminal violence and crime prevention will also be cited and 
discussed. From an Australian perspective these models will then be tied back to areas 
and venues where Crowd Controllers operate (pubs, nightclubs, etc.). From a South 
African perspective a look at the effects of these models as applied to armed security 
personnel in high risk environments will be applied. By applying these two examples, a 
rounded perspective will be put forward. The importance of this dual perspective is 
critical, as Crowd Controllers who usually operate unarmed and usually do not face 
lethal attack and C-I-T officers operating armed and are usually confronted with 
potentially lethal attacks, cover both spectrums of violence that affects officers in the 
global security industry. Additional examples and comparisons are provided in 
Annexure 8). The realities that affect C-I-T officers in South Africa are very similar in 
terms of threat and lethality as those faced by operatives conducting high-risk security 
activities in hostile environments (HEs) like Iraq or Afghanistan. What tends to change is 
the modus operandi of the attacker, i.e. C-I-T attacks in South Africa are often executed 
with military precision by highly armed attackers not unlike an ambush in an HE). 
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4.11 THEORIES OF EMOTIONAL SELF-REGULATION, VIOLENCE AND CRIME 
Of particular relevance is the research conducted by Bandura (1973 and 1991) and 
Felson (1978, 1994 and 2009). Felson (2009: 24) states that violence and crime are 
inherently over-lapping domains. He emphasizes that “if we are interested in criminal 
violence, we should be trying to explain why people want to harm others or do not mind 
harming others, as well as why they are willing to break the law”. Much of Bandura’s 
work focuses on his ‘Social Cognitive Theory’ which explains some of the issues 
regarding an individual’s emotional self-regulation, aggression management and the 
social pressures created by the external environment. Use of force involves human 
interaction. This interaction in an industry that is male dominated involves ego at many 
levels (Linstead, 1997: 1115-1142). The concept of ego (often referred to as ‘saving 
face’) is applicable to both the security officer and the offender who in some cases may 
feel that they need to resort to violence to ‘save their honour’. 
 
What is particularly pertinent to this study are Bandura’s (1973: 11-52) thoughts on the 
complexities that go into why a person behaves aggressively. These concepts 
combined with Bandura’s (1973: 53-60) other inputs on decision-making, directly link to 
the realities that many security officers experience on a daily basis (i.e. is this person 
really going to attack me; is that person carrying a concealed weapon and are they 
likely to commit a crime, etc.). Bandura’s (1991: 248-287) final contribution relevant to 
this study is centred on interpersonal interactions and the way these influence our 
socialisation behaviours, and the effect they have on the security industry, are most 
relevant. An example of this in the security industry is the role of Crowd Controllers and 
the huge amount of social interaction that their job entails. By understating people’s 
decision-making processes, a security officer may be able to stop violent incidents 
before they occur. This is consistent with the goals of most criminology Researchers, 
i.e. how to stop crime from occurring. Homel et al (2005: 2), state that: 
 
The twin challenges [of crime prevention] are of course to identify exactly 
what it is in individuals, families, schools or communities that increase the 
odds of involvement in crime, and then to do something useful about the 
identified conditions as early as possible. 
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 As a progression of ‘Social Cognitive Theory’, Felson (2009: 28) asserts that: 
“Aggression and violence, then, are based on basic social psychological processes. 
People harm others because it gets them something they want at not too great a cost.” 
Felson (2009: 24) further suggests that a ‘Rational Choice’ model is effective enough to 
explain why people commit acts of violence. The ‘Rational Choice’ model translates to a 
basic risk versus reward equation that almost all offenders will undertake and calculate 
before violence is committed (sometimes this occurs in a split second). With extensive 
training and experience, it is possible for a well-trained security officer to influence this 
risk versus reward decision by applying many different strategies. Unfortunately, once 
alcohol or other drugs are added to this equation logic is often not applied as effectively 
as it would be by a sober person. The effects of alcohol and drugs within the Night Time 
Economy (NTE) are well addressed by Researchers such as Homel and Clarke (1994), 
Tomsen (1997) and Tomsen, Homel & Thommeny (1991).  
 
In addition, Felson’s (1978: 205-213 and 2009: 28) particular contributions of direct 
relevance to this study are the concepts of an ‘intimate handler’ and the role of ‘capable 
guardians’. This concept can be directly related to the role of a security officer and in 
particular a Crowd Controller or Events security officer. In support of this concept and 
with relevance to the human factors applied in security, Prenzler (2007: 36) states that 
despite the improvements in the technological aspects of private security, “we need 
more human guardians to deter offenders, to call for help and to intervene.” Officers 
performing activities such as these often play the crucial role in the resolution of 
disputes between parties. The security officer’s role in dispute resolution is based on the 
cross-over and implementation of private public partnership initiatives between the 
police and private security agencies (Strom et al, 2010; Minnaar, 2007; Prenzler & 
Sarre, 2009). This concept will be discussed further under the heading of the Routine 
Activity Theory (section. 4.12.1 of this Chapter). Effective training in this manner of 
conflict management can be utilised to dramatically reduce the occurrence of violence. 
Simulations and role-plays are a very effective training tools to assist in this and will be 
discussed in section 7.5.6 of Chapter 7 (Helsen & Starkles, 1999; Minnaar et al, 2001; 
Bennel & Jones, 2003).  
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4.12 THEORIES OF CRIME PREVENTION AND VIOLENCE REDUCTION 
Graham and Homel’s (2008: 30-37) book: Raising the Bar, provides an excellent 
summary of aggression and violence reduction theories. Although they focus primarily 
on the security issues associated with the NTE which is primary employment stream for 
Crowd Controllers, there is a high level of transportability to the general security sector. 
Whilst there are many other theories that could be associated with this study, outlined 
below are three theoretical perspectives that relate directly to the private security 
industry and the officers who operate therein:  
 The Routine Activity Theory; 
 Situational Crime Prevention Theory; and 
 Responsive Regulation Theory. 
 
In order to provide a dual perspective, the applicability of these three theories will be 
explained in the context of Crowd Controllers (Australia’s highest risk subsector) and C-
I-T officers (South Africa’s highest risk subsector) in the sections that follow below as 
well as in Annexure 8. These subsectors are deemed high risk, as officers in these 
fields are most likely to experience more frequent, and higher levels of violence, when 
compared to other job descriptions within the respective private security industries of 
South Africa and Australia.  
 
4.12.1 The Routine Activity Theory 
The ‘Routine Activity Theory’ was first put forward by Cohen and Felson (1979) who 
explain that: “Crime occurs when there is a meeting of a motivated or likely offender, a 
suitable target or victim and the absence of a capable guardian” (cited in Graham and 
Homel, 2008: 31). This theory helped to explain and categorise the components 
required for crime to occur. Once these components are identified, it is than possible to 
ascertain more readily how criminal activity can be prevented or at the very least 
managed should it occur.  
 
In the context of Crowd Controllers, a practical example of this model could be 
explained in the following example compiled by the Researcher:  
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A drunken male patron (Suitable Target) bumps into the girlfriend of another 
drunken male patron (Motivated Offender) in a nightclub and does not 
apologise. This aggravates the boyfriend (Motivated Offender) who looks 
around and does not see any bouncers (Capable Guardians) so decides to 
confront and push the first male patron.....  
 
This theory can be readily applied within the environment that Crowd Controllers 
operate. The significance of this theory as described by Graham and Homel (2008: 31) 
is that “it provides a useful link both (to) why aggression occurs in drinking 
establishments’ and how it can be prevented”. Any theory that relates to aggression and 
drinking environments (the NTE) is directly relevant to Crowd Controllers and how 
effectively they perform their duties in a work environment. 
 
In terms of the C-I-T industry, a practical example of this model is very easy to explain. 
The very nature of requiring security to transport valuable goods is ancient. It can date 
back to the need for soldiers to accompany shipments of gold and other valuables to 
protect them from robbery and banditry (Minnaar, 2005d). In this modern era, the 
sophistication and military precision in which attacks against officers are carried out is 
well noted (SAPS, 2010). The core concept is that without C-I-T officers (capable 
guardians) there would be almost no deterrent for criminals, 
 
4.12.2 Situational Crime Prevention Theory  
The Oxford Law Enforcement Dictionary (2009) defines Situational Crime Prevention 
as:  
An approach to crime reduction developed during the 1980s in which the 
environment of crime hot spots is altered by measures such as physical 
security, property marking, surveillance, and the design of buildings, 
walkways, cars, etc.  
 
In terms of Situational Crime Prevention in its basic form, it has a direct relationship with 
Crowd Controllers and their environment. For example, a clean and safe environment 
where patrons know they are being watched by well-trained Crowd Controllers who will 
get involved should an incident occur, is very likely to reduce the opportunities for 
aggression and violent behaviour in the NTE. This concept is further expanded by 
Graham and Homel (2008: 32), who explain that a perceived environment is more 
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critical than the actual environment. This is applicable not only as a justification of 
behaviour because opportunities, risks and benefits are properties not only of the 
situations, but also of how the situation is viewed and interpreted by potential offenders. 
 
Graham and Homel (2008) go on to discuss research done by Wortley and others 
regarding situational precipitators. They state that:  
 
Although Wortley (2002) applied this theory to prevention of crime and 
violence in prisons, the notion of situational precipitators is particularly 
relevant to drinking establishments because of the interactional dynamics of 
the licensed environment often involve many kinds of precipitators of 
aggressions amplified by intoxication (Cited in Graham and Homel, 2008: 33). 
 
The concept of Situational Crime Prevention becomes critical when relating it to the C-I-
T officers’ environment. It is common practice for C-I-T officers to try and select routes, 
embus and debus points that are considered less risky. An example of this is where C-I-
T officers attempt to drive on highways wherever possible as it is more difficult for a 
vehicular ambush to occur on highways than it is on smaller quieter streets (Dynamic 
Alternatives, 2010: 176-182). C-I-T officers also apply the concepts of Situational Crime 
Prevention in the manner in which they physically secure pick-up and drop-off points.  
 
4.12.3 Responsive Regulation Theory  
‘Responsive Regulation Theory’ conceived by Ayers and Braithwaite (1992: 2) outlines 
the concept that an interactive system that enables all regulatory role-players to ‘buy-in’ 
to the regulatory concept is more effective than basic oversight and compliance models. 
Further studies have been conducted into the application of the Responsive Regulation 
Theory within the NTE (Graham & Homel, 2008: 36) which extol this approach. The 
concept of adjusting regulatory practices in response to the unique nature of an industry 
is particularly relevant for security officers (Prenzler, 2005: 61-62) and defensive tactics 
training. It is vital for security officers to provide feedback on the risks and threats that 
they have to face and manage as part of their daily job functions. One of the many 
reasons that this is needed is to ensure that effective training programs are designed 
and delivered to new entrants to the industry. 
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4.13 SECURITY AND CRIME PREVENTION MODELS 
In addition to the three theories of crime prevention outlined above, the literature review 
yielded several other models and theories that seemed to be of particular relevance. A 
further four theories and models were selected from the criminology and security 
management fraternity. These were selected in order to add value to the foundational 
knowledge relating to accepted models and their application within the framework of the 
private security industry. Whilst certain facets of these theories may be partially 
embedded in the previous three theories outlined in the last section, the benefits of 
elucidating further on them will provide a more solid understanding of the link between 
private security, crime prevention, policing and use of force. The additional models and 
theories selected are as follows: 
 The Defensible Space Theory; 
 The Four D’s of Crime Prevention; 
 The principle of Defence-in-depth; and 
 The Broken Windows and Zero Tolerance Theory. 
Further information and examples of the application of these theories in the Crowd 
Control and C-I-T officer environments are outlined in Annexure 8. 
 
4.13.1 The Defensible Space Theory  
The Defensible Space Theory was developed by Oscar Newman in the 1970s. It is 
often associated with the concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
(CPTED). Whilst this theory is generally related to physical and geographical security 
considerations (housing, infra-structure, architecture, etc.), it has been successfully 
applied within policing contexts, i.e. Queensland Police (QPOL) have a dedicated 
division to advise on CPTED and there are also published government 
recommendations on the topic (QPOL, 2011). It transfers directly to the private security 
industry and the concepts as applied by Newman can have a dramatic effect on the 
safety of private security officers, and by extension, the need for them to use or not use 
force in defence of self or others. Newman (1972) originally identified four key aspects 
that form the backbone of this theory. Later Researchers such as Saville and Cleveland 
(2011) expanded and took these concepts further but still based their core on 
Newman’s original four points (Saville & Cleveland, 2011: 3). The four points are: 
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 Territoriality: the idea that one's home is sacred;  
 Natural surveillance: the link between an area's physical characteristics and 
the residents' ability to see what is happening;  
 Image: the capacity of the physical design to impart a sense of security; and 
 Milieu: other features that may affect security, such as proximity to a police 
substation or busy commercial area.  
 
4.13.2 The four Ds theory  
Whilst there is no standard model of security practice that should be applied in all 
situations, a well-accepted model known as the “four Ds” is often utilised. This model is 
sometimes referred to as the “three Ds” when it excludes the concept ‘delay’ (Training 
Dynamics Africa, 2007: 83). Although this model is generally related to physical security 
interventions, it can be quite easily applied in the Crowd Controller or C-I-T officer’s 
environments. Arrington (2007: 35) cites The National Institute for Crime Prevention’s, 
(NICP) four D’s as “Detect, Delay, Deter and Deny”. In other words, the goal for security 
solutions is to first detect an intruder, then delay or deter them and finally deny them the 
capability or opportunity to commit a crime. (See Annexure 8 for examples).  
 
4.13.3 Defence-in-depth  
A model often taught in security training is the concept of Defence-in-depth. Defence-in-
depth is also referred to as the ‘principle of layers or cordons of protection’ (Dynamic 
Alternatives, 2010: 13). The concept is built on the basis of providing layers of security 
measures which have a compound effect of making it very difficult to access a specific 
target. This theory would apply to the security industry in its entirety since failure to 
apply this theory, may increase the vulnerability of a specific target. This vulnerability 
means that an attack is more likely to occur and therefore there is a greater likelihood 
that an officer may have to use force to protect themselves. 
 
The core concept of this theory is that the more barriers placed between a potential 
target and the potential attacker, the less likely it is that the attacker will succeed in 
accessing the target (Dynamic Alternatives, 2010: 13). In terms of security practice, 
barriers refer to any security measure that acts as a deterrent or hindrance to a potential 
attacker. In the following diagram the concept is applied to physical security (building, 
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infrastructure and environmental) but can easily be applied to use of force and to the 
security officer.  
 
The example below was modified from Schneider’s (2008: 17-40) explanation of a 
Close Protection Officers’ tools and options:  
– Layer 1 of Defence: The physical presence of officers; 
– Layer 2 of Defence: The professional attitude and appearance of the officers; 
– Layer 3 of Defence: The awareness and observational capacity of the officers; 
– Layer 4 of Defence: Unarmed combat ability; 
– Layer 5 of Defence: Alternative weaponry; and 
– Layer 6 of Defence: Firearms. 
The application of defence-in-depth to an armed security officer for a physical facility is 
illustrated in Figure 8 below: 
Figure 8:  Illustration of the principle of Defence-in-depth 
 
(Hosie and Smith, 2004: 93) 
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4.13.4 The Broken Windows and Zero Tolerance theories  
The core concept of the Broken Windows Theory lies in the principle that by adopting an 
attitude of effective intervention to even the smallest wrongdoings, over time the 
benefits will extend to cover all criminal activities (Dixon, 2000: 1). The Oxford 
Dictionary of Social Sciences (2007) defines the Broken Windows Theory as: “A 
criminological theory associated with James Wilson and George Kelling that holds that 
criminality operates on a continuum that reflects perceptions about the breakdown of 
the social order.” 
 
Proponents of the Broken Windows Theory argue that the prevention of minor crimes 
(such as vandalism) and the encouragement of physical maintenance of properties and 
neighbourhoods leads to an effective reinforcement of the social order that deters more 
serious crime. The Broken Windows Theory has been widely applied in recent 
community policing projects in American cities and in the turn against “quality of life” 
crimes. It is often credited with contributing to the decline of crime in American cities 
since the early 1990s, although this continues to be a matter of debate among 
sociologists and policymakers (Scott & Marshal, 2005: 708).  
       
Whilst there are antagonists of this theory, the concept was successfully applied by 
William Bratton the former New York Commissioner of police and was considered a 
great success as crime rates dramatically dropped in New York during his tenure. 
Bratton was appointed by the former Mayor of New York city. As a result of this, the 
Broken Windows Theory is often closely linked to what has become known as ‘Zero 
Tolerance Policy’ which was the agenda of the former mayor of New York, Rudolph 
Giuliani (Bratton and Kelling, 2006: 1). Despite the fact that much criticism for this 
Theory exists, it is not difficult to see the application of the Broken Window Theory 
within the private security industry.  
 
4.14 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A fundamental understanding of violence and aggression is a critical requirement in 
terms of formulating a sound platform to discuss use of force in the private security 
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industry. This needs to include an understanding of the adrenal response as well as of 
the flight-or-fight instinct. Whilst there are many positive and negative reactions 
associated with the flight and fight instinct, the most important is to identify management 
techniques that enable an officer to minimise the likelihood of freezing or panicking at a 
critical juncture. The fact that violence and aggression are commonplace in many 
sectors of the security industry means that we cannot avoid these issues. By 
understanding the very nature of these responses, as well as how Security officers are 
likely respond to attack, it is possible that we may be able to better train and prepare 
them for the realities of their working environment and threats they may face.  
 
De Becker‘s (1997: 159-162) contribution in terms of predicting violent behaviour via the 
application of pre-incident indicators was of vital importance in helping to extol myths 
that violence could not be predicted and identified before it occurred. Situational 
Awareness refers to the crucial ability to understand and act on what is happening 
around you. Two of the most common models used to teach Situational Awareness are 
the colour code systems and Boyd’s OODA Loop. Researchers from fields such as 
sports psychology assisted greatly in creating a platform for understanding how 
performance and arousal affect each other. The ‘inverted U hypothesis’ and the 
subsequent development of Grossman and Siddle’s (Grossman and Christensen, 2008: 
31) model which ties heart rate management to arousal and performance were 
identified as useful tools for understanding how to better train and prepare officers to 
deal with work-related stresses and violent attacks.  
 
Whilst there are many concepts, ideas and techniques that may be applied to effectively 
manage adrenal response, these can be divided into four basic technical groupings. 
The primary aim of these techniques is to avoid the response of hyperactivity (freezing 
or panicking) when an adrenal dump occurs. These four groupings are: 
 
 The need to undergo realistic training and gain experience; 
 The need to apply effective visualisation and mental preparation; 
 The need to apply tactical breathing; and 
 The need to maintain adequate levels of fitness and physical conditioning.  
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The realities of exposure to violence related stress as part of a security officer‘s job was 
identified as a problem, and the need to implement stress management into an officer’s 
lifestyle is a critical component to ensure that they do not develop PTSD (Grossman & 
Christensen, 2008: 326-329). There are many tools to assist in managing stress that 
could be applied but it was identified as critical for trainers to educate their students on 
these tools and the realities of violence-associated stress and the management thereof. 
It is important to understand the fundamentals of how violence, aggression and the 
management of the response to these issues have developed. By understanding the 
core issues of these concepts, we can better prepare officers in utilising the correct 
tools associated with stress management. This is relevant for trainers as well as for 
individual officers. The concepts of effective training and use-of-force tools will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 7 as well in the research findings and 
recommendations in Chapters 8-10. 
 
Aspects regarding the development of certain key criminological approaches and how 
they relate to this research were outlined in this Chapter. Concepts relating criminal 
activity to violence and the security industry were also explored to provide a framework 
for this research project to build on. Research conducted by eminent experts such as 
Graham and Homel (2008), have summarised the findings of various studies specifically 
related to the NTE. These studies are directly transferable to the greater security 
industry. Several of these studies make mention of the importance of training for 
security officers. However, they all stop short of prescribing a workable and efficient 
model of defensive tactics training that would enable officers to effectively manage 
situations. The situations that are particularly relevant are those requiring restraining or 
subduing action by the utilising of use of force, i.e. exerting control over a situation using 
the most appropriate methods proportional to the situational violence being exhibited.  
 
Various theories and models relating to crime prevention and aggression management 
were discussed in this Chapter. The models and theories that were discussed in this 
Chapter were:  
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 The Routine Activity Theory; 
 Situational Crime Prevention Theory; 
 Responsive Regulation Theory; 
 The Defensible Space Theory; 
 The Four D’s of Crime Prevention;  
 The Defence-in-depth Principle; and 
 The Broken Window’s and Zero Tolerance Theories. 
 
The benefits of providing an overview of the above concepts extends to the fact that a 
platform of knowledge needs to be established in which to assess the environment, 
risks and threats that security officers face, as well as the theoretical and practical 
schools of thought that have been developed to understand and manage these issues. 
By providing this platform, the framework of use of force and the relevant training for 
security officers can be evaluated more efficiently. 
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Chapter 5 
USE-OF-FORCE MODELS AND RELATED THEORIES 
______________________________________________________________________ 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
No research or studies related to the application of Defensive Tactics training with 
reference to the use of force in either the Australian or South African private security 
industries were found. However, several useful use of force and related studies that are 
specific to the Law Enforcement community were identified. These studies, with a focus 
on the Law Enforcement environment, have both positive and negative implications for 
this study. The focus on the Law Enforcement community does inherently limit some of 
the applicable material relevant to this study. Concepts such as ‘rights of arrest’ and 
legislative enforcement as well as equipment that a police officer is able to carry are 
often different from the options and legal limitations that apply to officers in the private 
security industry. Policing’s fundamental goal of apprehending suspects as opposed to 
the more traditional security functions such as protection of property or crowd control 
create certain inconsistencies between the methodologies in the private security and 
policing environments. The private security industry should become more current with 
best practice use-of-force policies. Waddington (2007: 249) explains the need for use of 
force in the private security industry as follows: 
 
…..Police enjoy a ‘monopoly of legitimate force’ over their fellow citizens. That 
orthodoxy (police having the monopoly on use of force) has increasingly been 
criticised in the face of the obvious fact that bouncers, store detectives, security 
guards of all kinds, and many others also exercise ‘legitimate force’ in ejecting 
drunken customers from pubs and clubs, apprehending shoplifters, and 
defending Cash-in-Transit, to name only a few. So, if police ever did have an 
exclusive ‘monopoly’ over the use-of-force, they no longer appear to do so. 
 
By focusing on issues of relevance from Law Enforcement and related use-of-force 
studies, an excellent platform for understanding the existing use-of-force research can 
be extrapolated. In support of this and with specific reference to Crowd Controllers, it 
has been stated that: “although crowd controlling does not include the full range of 
police duties, there are numerous similarities” (Prenzler and Hayes, 1997: 108). The 
need to identify and evaluate existing use-of-force models is central to the focus of this 
study. In this Chapter the more common models will be discussed and a basic 
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evaluation will be conducted to ensure that the reader is able to specifically recognise 
the applicability to use of force and the nature thereof. This is critical from a best 
practice point-of-view of security operations as well as training methodologies used to 
prepare security officers for the industry.  
 
5.2 USE-OF-FORCE CLASSIFICATIONS FOR THE PRIVATE SECURITY 
INDUSTRY  
As described in Chapter One (see section 1.4), for the purpose of this research project, 
all deployments within the security industry will be classed into four categories. Whilst 
this categorisation is not a fool proof model for grouping of security officers, it does 
provide for a basis to group officers according to job description, equipment carried, 
likelihood of using force and the forecast skills needed to utilise force. It is accepted that 
the primary role of private security is to observe and report any suspicious activity or 
crime in progress directly to the police for their response (Minnaar & Ngoveni, 2008: 
58). Exceptions to this would obviously be on a client’s private property where legally a 
security officer can respond accordingly – all within the law – in terms of arrest and use 
of force, etc. However, the use of force in terms of arrest and intervention is usually 
designated as the role of law enforcement officers (Petrowski, 2002: 24-26).  
 
Conversely, the reality is that security officers are usually the ‘first responders’ to an 
incident and this often occurs because they are the closest to the incident when it 
occurs (Hobbs et al, 2002: 352-370) whereas the police still need to be notified and 
respond. This alone means that security officers may have to defend themselves from 
criminals that want to escape after being noticed. In the case of Crowd Controllers, the 
attack or criminal action (usually assault) may be directed specifically at the officer in 
which case they have an immediate need to defend themselves (Winlow et al, 2001: 
536-548). Furthermore, officers operating in hostile and high crime rate environments 
are usually seen as a barrier that must be overcome by attackers (whether they intend 
to commit terrorist or criminal acts). As such officers may be directly attacked as the 
initial barriers that need to be removed to enable these perpetrators to commit the 
actions that they intend (Schneider, 2005: 70-72). The traditional role of the security 
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officer, that of observing and reporting, is for the most part changing as the private 
security industry develops (Mains, 2006: 1-3). 
 
(The majority of officers working in the industry fall into a low risk category but in order 
to contextualise this, a breakdown or system of categorisation is required. The 
Researcher has designed a system which consists of four categories as described in 
Section 1.4 of Chapter One. For more details and information on the subdivisions and 
specifications of each category see Annexure 9) 
 
5.3 COMMONALITIES OF POLICE USE OF FORCE STUDIES 
The need for skills and training in use of force is well stated by Dalton (1998: 1), a 
research analyst with the Australian Institute of Criminology, in her report on Police 
shootings, wherein she reports that:  
 
Australia’s Police Services and Governments need to maintain their level of 
commitment and training to assist police in dealing with these [use of force] 
incidents. Police must be provided with the necessary defence and negotiation 
skills and weapons training necessary for dealing with irrational, armed and 
violent offenders. 
 
The consistent themes radiating throughout this literature review included the following: 
 
1. The need for use-of-force training and policies to be initiated at grass roots level 
within organisations (i.e. from initial recruit training). 
2. The need for officers to undertake on-going training and assessments in use-of-force 
skills. 
3. The focus on the ‘decision-making’ phase of use-of-force encounters in addition to 
physical and hard skills. 
4. The need for effective and standardised implementation of use-of-force 
documentation (incident registers, reports, etc.) and systems is often outlined and 
seems to be a constant area of concern for various departments. 
5. The need for independent oversight in so-called excessive use-of-force incident 
investigations (Adang et al, 2005; Alpert and Macdonald, 2001; Aveni, 2003; City of 
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Portland, 2009; Dalton, 1998; OPI, 2009; Moodley, 2009; Minnaar et al, 2001; 
Tuckey, 2004; and Waddington, 2007). 
 
The issue of whether or not the police are the most efficient benchmark for use of force 
and Defensive Tactics is still a standing question, based on expert opinions, such as 
Aveni (2003) and Wallentine (2009). Whilst there is really no better option to utilise as a 
basis for scientific comparison, policing agencies question the effectiveness and 
currency of their own training. A case in point is cited in the following excerpt: “There is 
little evidence to suggest Operational Safety Tactics training is informed by on-going 
analysis, monitoring or research into the skills required by police to avoid or minimise 
the use of force” (OPI, 2009: 15). 
 
As far as can be determined, Minnaar et al’s (2001) study on the use of force in the 
SAPS was the first study of its kind to be published in South Africa.24 It was 
commissioned by the Independent Complaints Directorate, which serves as the 
oversight body for the South African Police Service. Similarly, the Australasian Centre 
for Policing Research (ACPR) guidelines as compiled by Tuckey (2004) are utilised by 
most Australian policing agencies including the Queensland Police Service. Both 
studies clearly outline the requirement for a comprehensive understanding of 
minimum/reasonable force. In fact, the ACPR guidelines actually prescribe a use-of-
force model which will be illustrated later in this Chapter when the specific variations to 
use-of-force models are discussed. As a result of the need to clearly understand the 
concept of minimum/reasonable force and its applicability in existing use-of-force 
models the next section will focus on discussing these issues in detail. 
 
Minnaar et al’s (2001: 55) study relates the concept of use of force back to human rights 
and United Nations Principles (this is discussed in more detail in section 5.7 of this 
Chapter). It highlights the need for on-going training and re-training as well as the need 
for simulation-based training to take place. In Tuckey’s (2004) study a comprehensive 
                                                 
24 A more recent study on the use of force in the SAPS was undertaken as part of a master’s dissertation 
by Moodley in 2009. But this study focused on one specific area and one group and as such has been 
used as an additional reference as opposed to a foundational reference. 
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list of guidelines and best practice for law enforcement officers to manage conflict and 
respond to use-of-force incidents is provided. The emphasis of the guidelines is the 
need for officer’s to focus on effective communication and conflict resolution skills as 
their primary skills set for managing interactions with suspects. This is much referenced 
approach and is sometimes referred to as ‘Verbal Judo’ (Gold, 2008: 6-7). The core 
concept is clearly outlined in the following extract where Tuckey (2004: v) states that 
police management should: “Promote the policy that the police will use the minimum 
amount of force appropriate for the safe and effective performance of their duties. In 
addition, any force used should be proportional to the level of risk involved”. 
 
5.4 THE CONCEPT OF REASONABLE-FORCE PRACTICE 
Since the vast majority of credible use-of-force research lies within the law enforcement 
and policing environment, it is important to draw on their findings to contextualise the 
specifications of the reasonable-force concept. Within the law enforcement and policing 
framework, the use of reasonable-force is often linked to or described in terms of 
utilising alternative techniques and tools as a first option before the use of firearms. The 
concept of reasonable-force is directly related to the agency and the job description of 
personnel employed by the said agency (Nowicki, 2001d: 35-37). An example of this is 
that, military personnel may aim to kill or capture the enemy (Grossman, 2010: 60), 
whilst a law enforcement officer’s job is to apprehend suspects and prevent crime in 
order to protect the citizens of their jurisdictions (Petrowski, 2002: 24). Some of these 
functions fall into the private security spectrum but generally speaking the role of the 
private security officer is primarily to observe and report (Mains, 2006:1-3). The theory 
is that if an incident of violence occurred, the private security officer would deal with it, 
until law enforcement officials arrived to take over, i.e. manage, but not necessarily 
resolve the situation until police arrive. A further point to note is that it is now 
acknowledged that there is a major policing and/or military functionality cross over. This 
refers to the fact that military structures are now often involved in cross border peace-
keeping deployments and as such, the traditional law enforcement definitions are 
becoming accepted practice for the military sector as well (Grossman & Christensen, 
2010: xix-xxiii).  
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What is, and what is not reasonable-force for policing and private security officers may 
be further complicated. The cross-over between traditional law enforcement functions, 
usually performed by state services (such as apprehension of violent suspects, 
restraining violent attackers or conflict resolution between parties) and private security 
officers, who need to restrain criminals or attackers or defend themselves until police 
officers arrive on the scene, have been frequently documented (See Hadfield, 2008; 
Hobbs et al, 2002; Franks, 2009; Minnaar, 1997, 2004, 2005, 2006b & 2007d; and 
Prenzler & Sarre, 2009).Two acknowledged sources are Professor Anthony Minnaar of 
the University of South Africa (UNISA), (who has conducted several studies and 
authored a number of articles on the cross-over between Police and Private Security) 
and Sarre and Prenzler’s, ‘The Law of Private Security in Australia’ where this concept 
is predated to works in the late 1970s. 
 
There are many definitions relating to use of force (please see section 1.10 of Chapter 1 
for details). Despite the selection of the core definition (Security Beyond Borders, 2011) 
it is useful to not view it in isolation. Due to the critical nature of use of force, i.e. there 
could be very serious consequences for applying either too little or too much force, it is 
useful not to simply select one definition but consider it against others. As a basis for 
comparison, the United States Department of Defence’s (USDOD) definition will be 
examined and superimposed with the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of 
force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Adopted by the Eighth United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 
27 August to 7 September 1990. All three of these definitions have been selected as 
they cover various key points of importance.  
 
5.5 THE USDOD DEFINITION  
Those minimum actions, including the use of armed force, sufficient to bring a 
situation under control or to defend against hostile act or hostile intent. All 
actions must cease as soon as the target complies with instructions or ceases 
hostile action. The firing of weapons is to be considered as a means of last 
resort (United States Department of Defence (USDOD), 2005). 
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From the USDOD definition, several key concepts can be identified, that should 
combine to achieve reasonable-force as per the ‘Security Beyond Borders’ (2011) 
definition (cited in section 1.9 of Chapter 1). The first key term to be unpacked is the 
concept of ‘minimum actions’. The term ‘minimum’ is often a point of debate and is 
frequently based on the defending parties perceptions at the time of the attack. The 
basis of this concept outlines that the least damaging force option be selected, i.e. the 
most ‘reasonable action’. The most common example of US case cited is ‘Graham vs. 
Connor’ which set the basis for the US courts perceptions and decisions regarding 
police use of force and what is considered reasonable and excessive (Petrowski, 2002: 
24). It is also important to note that the word ‘action’ is used which directly infers that 
something must be done. This unswervingly alludes to the fact that ‘in-action’ could 
have serious consequences. 
 
The next key phrase in the definition is ‘bring a situation under control’. The 
fundamental concept of ‘control’ is that it cannot be achieved in half-measures (ASP, 
2010: 10-12), i.e. you either have control of a situation or you do not. This is of vital 
importance in terms of understanding reasonable-force. In many cases, where law 
enforcement officers have been accused of using excessive force, it was as a direct 
result of the belief that they had control of the suspect and/or the situation but still 
continued to apply further force (examples of several cases outlining ‘excessive’ use of 
force where discussed in section 1.3 of Chapter 1).  
 
The third aspect of the USDOD definition that must be taken into consideration is the 
concept that all ‘All actions must cease as soon as the target complies with instructions 
or ceases hostile action’. In most cases it is not the use of force that is controversial but 
the outsiders opinion of what is considered ‘excessive’ use of force (Petrowski 2002: 24-
28). In other words, the continuing application of use of force once the situation is 
deemed to be under control, is undoubtedly the crux of the problem when assessing 
appropriate use of force. This becomes a critical aspect as in many cases, legitimate 
use of force and excessive use of force, may be something as simple as one blow 
thrown at the ‘wrong time’. The concept of ceasing action when compliance is achieved 
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is further described by inserting ‘with instructions’. This insertion directly implies that 
verbal warnings must be issued wherever possible before physical actions are taken 
(Gold, 2008: 6-7). Most law enforcement tactical trainers state that if possible, this 
should be done throughout an altercation, i.e. before, during and after. 
 
The final aspect of the definition that needs to be discussed is the statement ‘The firing 
of weapons is to be considered as a means of last resort’. This clearly outlines that the 
use of firearms should be preceded by all other possible force options. In the 
Queensland private security industry, where only security officers that work with the 
protection and transit of assets may be armed, this has limited relevance (Department 
of Criminal Justice and the Attorney-General, 2008a-k). However, this concept could be 
extrapolated to infer that the minimum-force option must be applied wherever possible 
before other options are implemented, i.e. a Crowd Controller must try to restrain a 
potential suspect before resorting to striking him or her (Franks, 2008: 232-245). In 
terms of the South African context, the reality that using your weapon is the ‘last resort’ 
is directly transferable for all armed security officers (Minnaar et al, 2001: 59). These 
include armed response officers, C-I-T officers, armed static guards, close protection 
officers and special event officers.  
 
5.6 THE UN PRINCIPLES AND USE OF FORCE (IHL) 
The UN Principles generally support all aspects of the above definitions (Security 
Beyond Borders, 2011 and the USDOD’s, 2005) but add in several useful concepts. 
These concepts are more specific to law enforcement and in-line with the requirements 
of the officers operating in the private security industry. As cited below, Principles four 
and five are of particular relevance to this study. The United Nations is often considered 
the benchmark for determining IHL (Swiss Confederation, 2010: 5). Despite the fact that 
the guidelines focus on the use of firearms by officers (the maximum force option) the 
concepts are inherently transferrable to the use of force as a whole (Minnaar et al, 
2001: 12). The relevant principles are as follows:  
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Principle 4: States that law enforcement officials, “in carrying out their duty, 
shall as far as possible apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of 
force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means 
remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result 
(United Nations, 1990). 
 
Principle 5: States that whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is 
unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall:  
 
 Exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of 
the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved;  
 Minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life;  
 Ensure that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any injured or 
affected persons at the earliest possible moment; and 
 Ensure that relatives or close friends of the injured or affected person are 
notified at the earliest possible moment (United Nations, 1990). 
By assessing the UN guidelines as outlined above, much attention is to be given to the 
care of the victim and the minimisation of force wherever possible. The UN principles 
add the context for providing guidelines in case firearms (maximum force) are applied. 
This includes medical care of the injured attackers. This would be directly relevant to 
most categories of the security industry where first aid is a required component of the 
job description. A point of difference between the law enforcement and the private 
security industries is point number four of principle five which states that the principles 
extend to the notification of family members or affected persons after an incident. This 
would have limited applicability in terms of use of force in the private security industry 
where a security officer will hand the incident over to law enforcement as soon as 
possible after an incident has occurred. These concepts are directly related to the ‘Duty 
of Care’ responsibilities if an officer when force is used (Prenzler & Sarre, 2009: 85-92). 
It is important to note that the Swiss Confederation (2010: 8) in the International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Service providers state that actions should be in line with 
the above UN principles. 
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5.7 THE CORE CONCEPTS OF MINIMUM-FORCE 
Further to the terms of ‘minimum-force’ and ‘reasonable-force’ is the term 
‘proportionality’ (Moodley, 2009: 37-38). The term ‘proportionality’ is often used to 
describe what is reasonable and what is not based on the situation and the attackers 
actions. This is coupled to what Minnaar et al (2001: 59) refer to as “degrees or 
gradations of force”. Despite the linguistic differentiations the terms; minimum, 
reasonable and proportional are all used to describe the same core concept. Petrowski 
(2002: 24-15) further outlines that the concept of reasonableness is directly linked to the 
necessity for an action to be ‘legal’. This idea simplifies the other definitions and 
integrates their concepts by implying that without an understanding of what constitutes 
‘legal action’, one cannot apply effective reasonable use-of-force principles. Where use 
of force may have lethal consequences, it is vital to not only examine the academic 
definitions attached to use of force but also assess the practical applications as well. An 
example of applying practical definitions is given by the Denver Police Department 
(DPD). The DPD (Martin, 2003: 1-3) lists four factors that assist in determining 
“objectively reasonable force”. The foundations of all of these factors could be directly 
transferable to the private security industry, albeit from a differing point of departure 
than a police officer’s. According to Martin (2003: 1-3) they include: 
 
 How imminent is the threat to officers or others; 
 How actively is the suspect resisting; 
 How ‘tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving’ the situation is; and 
 How severe the crime the suspect committed is.  
 
The concepts described in the above definitions and the DPD guidelines above have 
been superimposed into several training and explanatory models termed as ‘use-of-
force continuums’. This integration is based on the fact that models are not designed to 
one-dimensionalise or outline that only, one application should only be utilised once, in 
an incident (Aveni, 2003: 24-26). Despite the analysis of these definitions, it is very 
difficult to clearly ascertain what is ‘reasonable’ in every situation. In fact, Petrowski 
(2002: 30) states that “Reasonableness is a concept not capable of precise definition”. 
In the next section, these continuums and the associated models will be discussed. This 
discussion provided the basis for the Researcher to assess the practical utility of the 
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various models built on feedback from the interview respondents, as well as the findings 
of the focus group and test case contributions in Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten. 
 
5.8 USE-OF-FORCE MODELS/FORCE CONTINUUMS  
The importance of use of force and Defensive Tactics training for police officers is 
usually given a high priority. This is done in order to reduce possible cases of litigation 
and enhance officer safety (Nowicki, 2000: 72-77). The benefits of effective training are 
widespread since they not only enhance the safety of officers and suspects but also 
have added benefits such as increased confidence levels and physical health for 
officers (Asken et al, 2010: 17-26 and Nowicki, 2002: 24). Most, if not all of these 
benefits are directly transferable to the private security industry. The majority of systems 
and tools utilised to explain use of force are referred to as use-of-force models or 
continuums. These continuums have primarily been developed over the last thirty years 
as tools that enable police departments and trainers to educate officers in the specifics 
of using force (Aveni, 2005: 77). The core concept of these models was designed to 
provide a guideline of escalation and de-escalation for officers according to wide range 
of variables. Many innovators such as ASP International (2010) modified their models to 
include colour code systems and additional contributing factors so as to provide officers 
with one model that provided all the information required to make use-of-force 
decisions. These initial models could be defined as linear models (Joyner and Basile, 
2007). The linear nature of these models is evident by the way use of force is illustrated 
in a methodical linear approach. Use of force is by nature dynamic, which meant that 
models began too adapt from the traditional linear format. The evolution of linear 
models into a non-linear format led to what are often referred to as wheel models 
(Joyner and Basile, 2007:1-5). Despite the noble attempts of many use-of-force 
innovators over the years, it appears that there is a growing concern regarding the use-
of-force continuums (Aveni, 2005: 3). There are many experts (Aveni, 2003, and 
Petrowski, 2002) who are frustrated with force continua. As an example, Wallentine 
(2009: 4) states that “Force continua present significant practical, tactical and legal 
defects”. 
 
 111 
 
Hicks’ Law states that the more options a person is given to consider whilst determining 
how to react to a situation, the slower their reaction time will be (Siddle, 1995: 80-99). 
Dror, Busmeyer and Basola (1999: 717-721) build on this concept by stating that “the 
higher the risk of the situation the longer a person wants to take to evaluate their 
options”. These concepts are most relevant to use-of-force continuums that have 
struggled to become more inclusive as shortcomings were identified, and as such, have 
actually become more complicated. The complicated nature of many of these models 
(Aveni, 2003: 74 and Wallentine, 2009: 5) means that an officer could pause at a critical 
point in time whilst trying to evaluate the correct reaction, based on the model he/she 
was taught, or even worse not react at all for fear of getting it wrong. There are many 
models that provide an explanation of the force influencing variables and force options 
that an officer has available and may employ. The Researcher was able to identify that 
all manner of models and so called continuums can be generally divided into six main 
groups or classifications, namely: 
 
1. Line-graph models (Linear Model 1); 
2. Ladder models (Linear Model 2); 
3. Matrix models; 
4. Wheel or nonlinear models; 
5. Perceptual or timeline models; and 
6. Informal models. 
 
Each of these models will be illustrated below and then discussed: 
 
5.8.1 Use-of-force continuum: Model 1: Line Graph Model (Linear Model 1) 
The first model outlines the various options in a Line-graph format illustrating the 
increase in force linked to actions taken by the aggressor or suspect. There are 
generally two core points that are simultaneously illustrated in a graphical structure - 
one for the use-of-force tools or options and one for the officer’s response to a suspect's 
action. This model is used by ASP International, Dynamic Alternatives, Stinger Systems 
and other training and Policing agencies.  
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(ASP, 2010: 12) 
 
5.8.2 Use-of-force continuum: Model 2: Ladder Model (Linear Model 2) 
The second model outlines the options in a vertical structure showing levels of 
escalation. This model is often referred to as a ‘Ladder Model’ (Joyner and Basile, 2007: 
2). This is because the higher force options build on top of each other. There are 
variations to this whereby there are branches that come off the ladders. These 
‘branches’ arise mainly due to the adjustments and modifications that have been 
implemented to try and compensate for the limitations of this structure (Aveni, 2003: 
75). This model is utilised by the United States Customs Service, PPCT technologies 
and other police departments. 
Figure 9: Illustration of the first Use-of-force Continuum: The Line-Graph  
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Figure 10:  Illustration of the second Use-of-force Continuum – The Ladder 
  Model 
 
(Troto, 2000: 2) 
5.8.3 Use-of-force continuum: Model 3: Matrix Model 
The third model utilises a matrix type structure, which whilst similar to a line-graph 
model does not always illustrate use of force in a linear structure. This use-of-force 
model was designed to be a prescriptive guideline for officer response based directly on 
suspect actions (Mesloh et al, 2008: 10).  
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Figure 11:  Illustration of the third Use-of-force Continuum: The Matrix Model 
 
(Orange County Sheriff’s Office Use of Force General Order 470, as cited in Mesloh et 
al, 2008: 12) 
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5.8.4 Use-of-force continuum: Model 4: Wheel Model 
The fourth model is considered by many to be the next evolution of traditional line-
graphs and ladder models (Joyner and Basile: 2007: 1-3). In an attempt to take into 
account the dynamic nature of a use-of-force incident, the officer is placed in the centre 
of the various options. This model is often referred to as a wheel model (Aveni, 2003: 
75). It was first used by the Ontario police force and as such is sometimes also referred 
to as the ‘Ontario Wheel’ (Aveni, 2003: 76). The non-linear wheel model is illustrated 
below: 
 
Figure 12:  Illustration of fourth Use-of-force Continuum: The Wheel Model 
 
 
(Tuckey, 2004: Annexure 1)  
 
5.8.5 Use-of-force continuum: Model 5: Perceptual/Time Line Model 
The fifth model is what is referred to as a time line or perceptual model. This model 
does not advocate specific techniques or use-of-force tools but rather responsive 
principles and paths based on the decisions (Aveni, 2003: 76). It is the precursor of the 
informal model. An example of the fourth model is illustrated below:  
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Figure 13: Illustration of the fifth Use-of-force Continuum: The Time Line 
Perceptual Model 
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(Helsen and Starkels, 1999: 4) 
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5.8.6 Use-of-force continuum: Model 6: Informal Model 
The evolution of a sixth model appears to be a move towards informality where there is 
no diagram, chart, and graph or word flow of explanations. Advocates of this approach 
shun traditional use-of-force models. On the issue, Petrowski (2002: 24) states that: 
“force continua perpetuate hesitation and exacerbate the natural reluctance of officer to 
apply significant force even when faced with serious threat”. It is a model whereby 
officers are simply given tools and are well versed in the law and reactionary 
consequences (Aveni, 2003; Petrowski, 2005 and Wallentine, 2009). Officers are then 
‘run through’ scenarios to measure their understanding and capability to effectively 
apply reasonable-force in a variety of situations. This model could be classed as an 
‘informal’ use-of-force model since it has no set structure. Wallentine (2009: 8-9) 
endorses this model and states that it is “applied by the FBI and a few others who have 
removed any mention of the term force continuum from their training material”. He 
explains how the FBI now delivers their use-of-force training:  
 
The Federal Law Enforcement Training Centres’ (FLETC) [in Georgia] 
curriculum bases use-of-force legal training on the force assessment factors 
established by the Supreme Court two decades ago. Trainees are mentally 
conditioned to be prepared to use force, learning that the proper force applied 
proactively often results in less force and fewer suspect and officer injuries. 
Through classroom legal and practical training and scenario examples, 
trainees learn when it is appropriate to use particular force options, such as a 
baton, chemical spray, TASER, or firearm. Trainees participate in multiple 
learning scenarios in which they face role-playing suspects, presenting 
various levels of cooperation or resistance and aggression. They choose the 
appropriate force response to each situation and learn to complete a detailed 
incident report documenting the suspect’s behaviour, statements, and other 
characteristics, as well as the officer’s actions any time that force is used in a 
learning scenario (Wallentine, 2009: 8). 
 
5.9 EVALUATION OF USE OF FORCE MODELS 
Whilst use-of-force continua are very helpful in terms of policy and visual understanding 
of force escalation, they have many limitations when a deeper level of research into 
officer reaction and use of force is applied. This concept is echoed by Mesloh et al 
(2007: 10) who, in the findings of their five year police use-of-force study, state that: 
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Although these continuums are useful for training and policy setting, they 
provide very little information for academics delving into the subject, quite 
simply because there is very little information on the actual levels of non-
criminal resistance that Police officers encounter.  
 
All the above-mentioned models have advantages and disadvantages and it is not 
uncommon practice for several models to be taught to students in order to ensure that 
the subject is thoroughly understood. Most modern research emphasises the use of 
non-linear models over ladder and line-graph models for several reasons. Use of force 
is not viewed as “progressive”, i.e. you do not have to progress from one level of use of 
force before you use a higher one (Aveni, 2003: 74-77; and Wallentine, 2009: 1). The 
application of force is in fact dynamic and not linear in nature (Tuckey, 2004: 10; and 
Joyner & Basile, 2007: 2).  
 
It has also been a concern that officers when taught use of force in a linear structure 
would tend to view their responses in the same linear structure which could have 
serious consequences for all parties. The ‘hesitation factor’ is a major concern as a 
result of officers trying to comply with the particular model they were taught (Aveni, 
2003: 74 and Wallentine, 2009: 5). This concept is well summarised in the following 
quote: “Perhaps the most frightening tactical defect of force continua is the inherent 
tendency for hesitation when, not seconds, but fractions of seconds may determine 
whether an officer lives or dies” (Wallentine, 2009: 5). This hesitation could be tied to 
the officer trying to remember what he/she was taught and what the correct processes 
were according to the continuum they are supposed to apply. 
 
Despite the pros and cons of force continua, the need to conceptualise the use of force 
process and provide a framework for officers to evaluate what force is ‘reasonable’ is 
still critical. Aveni, (2003: 74-77) summarises this concept very well and, he states:  
 
Force continuums have been evolving in the law enforcement community for 
more than three decades. These devices were, and remain for the most part, 
“conceptualization tools”. We use them as a sort of “graphical user interface” 
for unravelling the complex and inflammatory realm in which police are 
tasked with using force with requisite objective reasonableness. They almost 
universally reflect a logical and reasonable progression of force response to 
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what are usually illogical manifestations of non-compliant and/or aggressive 
behaviour. 
 
In terms of the goals of this study, these models help to determine how officers should 
decide on which use-of-force tools to apply but falls short of providing an integrated 
training model. The use-of-force continua assist in the decision making process and 
may even provide a guideline in training for assessors to measure performance. 
However, these models fail to provide a comprehensive guide on how to best train 
officers to make the correct choices under pressure and be able to carry them out under 
the duress of an attack.  
     
5.10 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
The need for an integrated practical use-of-force training program and model for the 
private security industry has been identified as being most important to this research. 
Various use of force by police studies and related studies were evaluated for relevance 
to this research. The key concepts and similarities of the findings of these studies were 
identified and summarised into a few key points. The fundamentals of the reasonable 
force concept were identified and explained, providing the reader with an overview of 
the unique components that would classify an action in-line with reasonable force 
applications. To highlight this concept, definitions and explanations from several 
sources and references were utilised, namely: 
 
 The United States Department of Defence definition of use of force  
 The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials. 
 
The definitions were then related back to the practical nature of use of force and the 
‘Security Beyond Borders’ definition cited in Chapter One (see section 1.9). An example 
of the components utilised by the Denver Police Department to determine levels of 
appropriate force for their officers was identified and discussed. A summary of the 
different models of use of force referred to as force continuums was also discussed. 
There were six groups of continuums that could be identified: 
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1. The line graph model; 
2. The ladder model; 
3. The matrix model; 
4. The wheel or nonlinear model; 
5. A perceptual or timeline model; and 
6. An informal model.  
 
Many best practice concepts applied in the policing realm have direct relevance to the 
private security industry. Therefore, the importance of an integrated use-of-force training 
program as applied by many policing agencies is critical in the private security industry. 
The goal of this Chapter was to introduce the reader to the existing schools of thought 
and models that are utilised for use-of-force training and response development. By 
understanding these models, their pros and cons as well as the evolution of force 
continuums, it is possible to ascertain what might, and might not work, in the private 
security industry. These models form the basis of the existing body of knowledge 
regarding use-of-force processes. 
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Chapter 6 
USE-OF-FORCE TOOLS  
______________________________________________________________________ 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Use of force is often an everyday occurrence for military, law enforcement and private 
security officers. Several of the associated issues such as adrenal response 
management (sections 4.7 & 4.8 of Chapter 4) and use-of-force models (section 5.9 and 
5.10 of Chapter 5) have already been discussed. As such the concept will now be 
expanded to focus on the actual use-of-force tools that an officer may have available. It 
is necessary to create an understanding of what does, and what does not, work under 
the intensity of violent and possibly lethal attack (Honig & Lewinski, 2008: 146-14; 
Nowicki, 2001: 29-30; and Seibel, 2010: 19-23). To emphasise the importance for a 
security officer to possess respectable unarmed combat skills in the United Kingdom, 
Consterdine states the following: 
 
When it comes to the bottom line, you have to be able to fight and remember, 
you are seldom if ever going to be armed, certainly never if you work in this 
country [United Kingdom] and seldom, even if abroad. You are dependent on 
your physical unarmed skills, aggression training and fitness (Consterdine, 
1997: 271). 
 
It is a common misnomer that the Martial Arts and Defensive Tactics are 
interchangeable areas of expertise (Lau, 2001: 1). Both Martial Arts and Defensive 
Tactics provide use-of-force skills. However, they are not necessarily both applicable to 
the private security industry (Mroz, 2003:15). The focus of the private security industry 
is protective in nature and Martial Arts may be sporting orientated or even be too 
aggressive for use in the industry (Ben-Asher, 1983: 74). The terms ‘unarmed combat’, 
‘close quarters combat’ and ‘self defence’ are often used interchangeably with 
Defensive Tactics (Lau, 2001; Mroz, 2003; Nowicki, 2002). For the purposes of this 
research the Researcher has chosen to use the term ‘Defensive Tactics’ as defined in 
section 1.10 of Chapter 1.  
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6.2 LEGISLATION AND USE OF FORCE  
It is necessary to now be more specific regarding the law and use of force. Whilst an 
overview of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) based on the UN Principles was 
discussed in Chapter Five, section 5.7, legislation specific to South Africa and Australia 
will now be examined. The issue of the law and use of force is vital to the way the 
security industry functions. This is because the very nature of use of force may have 
civil and criminal implications (Prenzler & Sarre, 2009: 74-105). Prenzler and Sarre 
(2009: 126) explain how use of force by private security is viewed by the courts in 
Australia in a very negative light, they state that: “actions by private security that are 
deliberately designed to inflict injury on others are never condoned by the courts, even if 
the injured person has been acting illegally”.  
 
As previously mentioned in in Chapter 5 (sections 5.6-5.8), reasonable force is directly 
linked to legal action. It is thus critical that a basic overview of what is considered legal 
action, and what is not, is clarified. Various jurisdictions may have very different 
operational environments and legislative requirements. However, this does not mean 
that the fundamental consequence of what inherently constitutes a legal action is not 
congruent through the vast majority of legal jurisdictions globally (Dynamic Alternatives, 
2010: 34-43). Advanced Combat Training (2008: 2) outlines three universal concepts 
that should be considered when assessing the use of force, namely:  
 
 The application of minimum force; 
 The Reasonable Person Theory; and 
 (understanding) The repercussions of our actions.  
 
Despite international consistencies that seem to transcend jurisdiction, there is also an 
obvious need for officers, trainers, companies and even regulators from any jurisdiction 
to assess their own, unique requirements. Whenever the law is discussed, the concept 
of what is reasonable and what is not, is vitally important. This is often explained as the 
‘Reasonable Person’ Theory. The premise of the ‘reasonable person’ theory is to 
ascertain what would be considered reasonable based on what other similar people 
would have done in a comparable situation (Advanced Combat Training, 2008: 2-3). 
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The difficulty with this concept is ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’ reasonable is open to a wide 
diversity of interpretations (Petrowski, 2002: 25-27). An officer under attack may have 
tremendous time pressure and stress when having to decide what the necessary action 
and response should be, i.e. the concept of ‘split-second decision-making’ (Dror, 2007: 
270-271). As a result of these pressures, it is impossible for an officer to factor in the full 
consequences of any action implemented under duress (Honig & Lewinski, 2008: 140-
141). As such, the onus is on the trainer to educate, and on the employer to prescribe 
practical policy as to what can and cannot be done (Petrowski, 2005: 5).  
 
Despite the application of this concept of forward thinking and advance prescription of 
reaction under attack, the reality of what is possible, and what is prescribed, very often 
differs (Petrowski, 2005: 5). There are many reasons for this. Some of these reasons 
include the following: 
 
 The officer is likely to respond instinctively and thus if responses are not 
instinctively programmed, the officers’ response may not be in line with policy or 
best practice (Honig & Lewinski, 2008: 143-144). 
 Attack situations are dynamic and as such it is very difficult to provide a step by 
step guideline of response in all situations (Seibel, 2010: 21-24). 
 In many cases, the law may be confusing and an officer may simply be unsure of 
what he/she can and cannot do (Moodley, 2009: 40-41). 
 Prescribed techniques or reactions may not be applicable to every situation 
(Hanover, 2008: 171). 
 Prescribed techniques may not be relevant to the officers physical and mental 
capabilities (Siddle, 1995: 112-122).  
 
The issues of accountability (Swanton, 1993: 4) and vicarious liability cannot be 
ignored. This extends to a need for all role-players within the industry to be answerable 
for their inputs, actions or involvement in all aspects of the legal use of force (Prenzler & 
Sarre, 2009: 111). This is important regardless of whether they are directly related to 
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training, deployment or management within the private security industry. It is worth 
noting that liability for excessive use of force may extend to all parties including the 
owner of a venue or organiser of an event (Sarre, 1995: 37). As an example of how this 
concept is applied, Queensland Legal Aid – a government sponsored legal assistance 
provider – states the following regarding Crowd Controllers: 
 
Bouncers are required to use no more than reasonable force in removing 
people from premises. If they use excessive force then they may face civil 
and or criminal action. Their employer may also be liable for their actions. 
Police can be called if a drunk or difficult person refuses to leave a trader's 
premises (Queensland Legal Aid, 2007: 1). 
 
Applying a reactive prescribed set of techniques for officers to utilise when making a 
citizen’s arrest is often not practical, based on the dynamic nature of an incident 
(Petrowski, 2002: 24-27). However, it may be possible to prescribe universal techniques 
that could be used to restrain and control a person while placing them under arrest but 
because situations are dynamic, an officer would need a larger set of skills to ‘manage 
the unexpected’ (Nowicki, 2001d and Sanow, 2001b). Arrestable offences differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This means that the specifics of a citizen’s arrest may also 
differ from region to region. As a point of reference, under common law it is possible for 
security officers to make an arrest when it is necessary to prevent or suppress a breach 
of the peace. Prenzler and Sarre (209: 96) explain this as follows:  
 
Private citizens (including security officers acting on instructions from their 
principals) have no power to detain any person without their consent or 
without legislative authority. They do, however, have the power to make an 
arrest at common law, but only where an arrestable offence has been 
committed, and where the citizen or agent has seen the arrested person do 
the arrestable offence. The arrest is limited to detaining the suspect until the 
police arrive. 
 
From the above quote, we can see that the two main requirements of a citizen’s arrest 
are that an arrestable offence (such as violent crime) has been committed and that it 
has been witnessed by the security officer. The reality of facing an assault or an attack 
often mandates the need for an officer to first and foremost protect themselves 
(Petrowski, 2002: 24-27). The concept of placing the person under arrest is a necessary 
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follow-on that is applied, once the assault or attack has been effectively managed and 
the threat is under control (ASP, 2010: 10-11). As such, the primary motivation for a 
private security officer to utilise or apply force is the reason of self-defence (Dynamic 
Alternatives, 2010: 125). This concept is well summarised by Prenzler and Sarre in their 
research of law and the private security industry in Australia. They explain that self-
defence does extend further than strictly the defence of self or others and can include 
property too. Prenzler and Sarre (2009: 86) outline the concept as follows: 
 
In most states and territories, the common law power of property owners to 
defend their property from uninvited trespassers and not face criminal 
prosecution has been reinforced by statute. The protection is provided by the 
defence of self-defence. Self-defence is generally available to persons who 
use force to prevent an assault on them, or their imprisonment or the 
imprisonment of another, to protect property from unlawful taking, damage or 
interference, or to prevent criminal trespass to any land or premises or to 
remove a person committing a criminal trespass. 
          
From a South African perspective, use of force by the police is inherently tied to section 
49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 and the amendment thereof in 2003 
(Moodley, 2009: 1-10). It appears that even within the police service in South Africa, 
there is still confusion of what is deemed reasonable force and what an officer can and 
cannot do (Moodley, 2009: 189-203). Minnaar alludes to the similarity in application of 
the principles of section 49 to the armed private security industry, stating that: 
 
A final piece within firearms’ usage context is the lack of training currently 
provided to private security officers (who might not necessarily have ever 
received this training since they were not previously members of the SAPS) 
in terms of anything on use of force, firing at suspects and the provisions of 
s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act and self-defence issues on private property 
(Minnaar, 2007a: 19). 
 
This statement demonstrates that there are substantial gaps within the training that 
armed security officers receive in South Africa. Consequently their ability to determine 
reasonable action and apply the appropriate levels of use of force may be in question.  
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6.3 MARTIAL ARTS AND DEFENSIVE TACTICS  
Historically, the initial aim of all combative systems was to train its proponents to deal 
with the harsh realities of life and death combat (Clark, 1987; Dillman, 1995 and 
Hanover, 2008). However, in this day and age, many of these combat systems have 
adapted from their initial functions to become methods of self-development for their 
proponents or sports, with the combative elements becoming secondary. This can be 
clearly seen in the names of arts such as Jujitsu which means ‘gentle art’ being adapted 
by Jigaro Kano in the 1920s to become Judo or ‘gentle way’. While the change may 
seem subtle the focus was on transforming a combat system into a platform for self-
development and sport (Schneider, 2005: 195). 
 
Whilst the general term ‘Martial Arts’ is well known, it is often utilised synonymously with 
a style or system that is familiar, such as Karate or Kung-Fu. It is important that the 
specific factors that differentiate Martial Arts and Defensive Tactics are clearly outlined. 
Martial Arts can be defined as: 
 
Martial Arts encompass both armed and unarmed forms of combat, as well as 
non-combative styles. Though frequently practised for sport or exercise, 
Martial Arts traditionally emphasize spiritual training and the unity of body and 
mind (The Oxford Online Dictionary, 2010). 
 
When comparing this to the definition for Defensive Tactics (see Section 1.10 of 
Chapter 1), we see several key differences. The fundamental difference is that 
Defensive Tactics focus on survival and management of violence within a legal 
framework. The goals of Defensive Tactics are inherently linked to effectively managing 
an attack, or controlling a non-compliant suspect, all according to the law and situational 
best practice. According to ASP International (2010: 10-12), a Defensive Tactic is 
evaluated by “its ability to control versus injure a suspect”. The fundamental value of 
Defensive Tactics training is that it should be reality-based and designed to work under 
non-simulated conditions (Ben-Asher, 1983; Mroz, 2003; Nowicki, 2001 & 2002). 
Concepts such as this are foreign to the vast majority of Martial Arts, which in many 
cases teach techniques that are not governed by the lawful response mechanisms of a 
use-of-force model (Mroz, 2003:13-15). The applicable nature of Martial Arts for 
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Security officers is also in doubt based on the sporting nature of many Martial Arts (Lau, 
2001: 1-3) which does not readily translate to the erratic and diverse acts of violence 
that security officers may encounter. As previously stated, many Martial Arts are sports-
orientated and focus their training on the rules and objectives in terms of competitive 
outcomes (Ben-Asher, 1983: 74). In other words, Jujitsu players may focus on getting 
their opponent to submit and not on managing an encounter occurring in a street 
situation. Rapp and Lesce explain this concept as follows: “Karate schools tend to train 
students for competition, not defence against deadly threat. They also concentrate on 
developing style, rather than quick, economical and disabling blows and holds” (Rapp 
and Lesce, 1999: 23). 
 
Many Martial Arts do include aspects that are directly applicable to security officers 
when managing violent confrontations however it is often difficult to determine what will 
work, and what will not, under the duress of a real attack (Thompson, 1999: 34-71). 
Another point that can be directly extracted from the above definition of Martial Arts is 
that ‘(Martial Arts) traditionally emphasize spiritual training and the unity of body and 
mind’. The long term nature of training to achieve ‘unity of body and mind’ in itself is not 
applicable to the training time frames of security officers (Mroz, 2003: 12-15). The short 
time frames allocated to teach Defensive Tactics is an acknowledged problem for 
police, military and the private security industry (Aveni, 2003:1-3). This is especially true 
since much repetition is required for a technique to become reflexive (Lau, 2001: 1; 
Honig & Lewinski, 2008: 144; and Siddle, 1995: 36) There is also a conflict of outcomes 
between Martial Arts and Defensive Tactics whereby a security officer’s goal is to 
conduct his/her duties in a professional, efficient and safe manner, that has very little to 
do with the harmonisation of mind and body. It would therefore, be fair to say that whilst 
all Martial Arts have certain benefits, not all of them would be applicable for security 
officers, and the environments in which they operate (Lau, 2001: 1). This concept is 
summarised by Ben-Asher who states: 
 
 
 
 129 
 
Day in and day out we hear about Karate, Judo, jujitsu, aikido, boxing, 
wrestling and other methods of defending oneself with or without sidearm’s 
[handguns]. The experts all go to great lengths to explain the merits of each 
system, touting not only its effectiveness in warding off an assailant, but also 
its dignity, its inner discipline, its ability to improve powers of concentration, 
its focus on educational values and consideration for others and its capability 
to instil self-confidence, agility, speedy reflexes, the capacity to withstand 
blows and the ability to respond in kind. It soon becomes obvious, however, 
that these arts of combat are a complete way of life. Martial Arts training 
requires a high degree of specialisation and consistent adherence to a 
particular tradition and approach of each school. A man [woman] must devote 
years of his life before he can hope to reach the level of skill and mastery that 
would render him capable of putting his knowledge to use for his own 
defence (Ben-Asher, 1983: 74). 
 
In order to counter this reality, many Defensive Tactics innovators have formed their 
own systems or avoid using traditional Martial Arts based descriptors in the names of 
their systems. A good example of this is a system utilised by the Israel Defence Force 
(IDF) called Krav Maga, which directly translates into ‘Contact Combat’ (Ben-Asher, 
1983: 74; and Sanow, 2001: 64-68). Another example, is where companies call their 
self-defence systems by concise acronyms. For example, Dynamic Alternatives Ltd 
calls its training ACT, short for Advanced Combat Training (Dynamic Alternatives, 2010) 
while Bruce Siddle, an acknowledged innovator in the field, calls his system PPCT, i.e. 
Pressure Point Control Tactics (PPCT, 2010). 
 
In order to better understand the nature of the various subdivisions available within the 
scope of Defensive Tactics, a detailed breakdown is provided in the next section. The 
original breakdown discussed here has been modified from previous research 
conducted by Schneider (2005: 73-79). Schneider’s research was focused on the Close 
Protection Officer. It should be noted that not all options are applicable to all Security 
officer categories. The use of some of the options is governed by local legislative and 
regulatory practice, i.e. not all options would apply everywhere. In section 10.5.3 of 
Chapter 10, a basic guideline of applicable Defensive Tactics for each security officer 
categorisation will be provided. 
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6.4 USE-OF-FORCE TOOLS AND OPTIONS  
There are many accepted use-of-force options (Mesloh et al, 2008: 22-35). The options 
would have different levels of applicability across the four categories of security officer 
classification. The aim of this section is to provide a basic overview of the available 
options. These options have been correlated from the following sources: Advanced 
Combat Training, 2008; AELE, 2010; Ben-Asher, 1983; Batts, Steiner and Lembi, 2006; 
Calibre Press, 1987; Clark, 1987; Consterdine, 1997; Dillman, 1995; Dynamic 
Alternatives, 2010; Flesch, 1994; Hanover, 2008; Mains, 2006; Mesloh et al, 2008; 
Mroz, 2003; Real fighting, 2009; Schneider, 2005 & 2009; Siddle, 1995; and Thompson, 
1999 & 1999a. A few points for consideration that apply to this process are as follows:  
 
 The scope and depth of some of the options are extensive and each subdivision 
could warrant its own Chapter. As such only a brief summary of each will be 
provided. 
 Where not stated, the below points were drawn from the above sources as well 
as from the Researchers personal experience as highlighted in section 2.8.2 of 
Chapter 2; 
 Where applicable, specific points or items have been attributed to specific 
researchers or authors; and  
 Options have been placed in ascending order, from minimum force to maximum 
force, as well as including some of the fundamentals or areas of concern 
required to perform any of the techniques.  
The various use-of-force options are outlined below:  
 
6.4.1 Non-physical force options 
 Verbal engagement: refers to the use of warnings and effective communication 
skills to negate a possible violent situation. Verbalisation is a critical skill needed 
through all phases of an encounter (pre-incident, in-incident and post-incident) 
(Gillis, 1999; Gold, 2008; ASP, 2010; Mesloh et al, 2008; and Troto, 2001). 
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 Postural engagement: refers to the way body language and nonverbal 
communication (including body and hand position) are used to influence the 
outcome of a conflict situation. This is often referred to as ‘physical presence’ 
(Mesloh et al, 2008: Troto, 2001; and Tuckey, 2004). 
 
6.4.2 Unarmed combat  
Unarmed combat refers to the use of natural body weapons (e.g. hands and feet) and 
similar defensive strategies to effectively disengage from a confrontation or disable and 
neutralise an attacker. Natural body weapons include any part of the body that could be 
utilised to inflict harm on an attacker (head, hands, fingers, elbows, feet, forehead, etc.). 
It also includes all relevant techniques found in combat-applicable Martial Arts such as 
joint locking, throwing and wrestling. Certain doctrines concentrate on the accessing of 
pressure and nerve points as an effective part of their unarmed combat strategy 
(Dillman, 1995; and PPCT, 2010). The fact that the vast majority of security officers 
globally operate unarmed (Prenzler & Sarre, 2009; and BLS, 2009) means that this 
subdivision will be expanded on throughout this dissertation. A basic breakdown of 
Unarmed Combat is outlined below: 
 
6.4.3 Defensive Tactics Foundational skills  
Foundational skills refer to the basic set of techniques and abilities that would be 
needed by a security officer in order to apply more complex use-of-force options (Mroz, 
2003: 10). Many of these form the underpinning knowledge needed for a person to 
utilise any practical defensive skill (White, 2000). Foundational skills are sometimes 
described as ‘Basics’ (Thompson, 1999: 122-128), as without competency in them an 
officer would not be able to apply many other more advanced concept. In other words, 
without a solid stance to move from, it would be very difficult for an officer to throw a 
strike or defend against one (Ben-Asher, 1983; Hanover, 2008; and White, 2000). 
Foundational skills include aspects such as: 
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 Stance (how to stand so as to enable the maximum use of use-of-force options);  
 On-guard positions (basic positions that provide a level of protection for the 
defender); 
 Turning (moving to face threats that are coming from the sides and back); 
 Covering distance (moving towards or away from an attacker or towards cover); 
 Basic break-falls (how to not injure yourself if you are thrown or fall to the 
ground); and 
 Tactical get-ups (techniques for getting up when you fall or are thrown to the 
ground). 
 
6.4.5 Striking  
Striking refers to any method used to hit an assailant (Thompson, 1999: 110). This 
includes three main points of focus, namely: where to hit (targeting); what to hit with 
(tools); and how to hit hard enough to inflict damage (power generation). Below is an 
outline of some examples: 
 
 Targeting: Targeting is generally divided into two groups, namely; specific and 
non-specific targeting (ASP, 2010: 44-53). Specific targeting focuses on targeting 
to precise points such as the point of the chin or the brachial plexus. Non-specific 
targeting is more general and would focus on larger areas such as the head, 
body, arms or legs, etc.; 
 Striking Tools: hands, elbows, shoulders, head, knees and feet; and 
 Power Generation: refers to the principles that can be applied to generate a 
powerful strike, such as maintaining balance and exhaling during a strike (ASP, 
2010: 30-40).  
 
6.4.6 Defence against strikes and grabs 
In the majority of cases security officers may be caught by surprise when attacked 
(Thompson 1999: 59). Therefore the ability to defend against an assailant who strikes or 
grabs hold of an officer is a vital skill. Some of the relevant defensive options include: 
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 Pre-emptive striking (striking the attacker as a form of defensive action before 
their attack has properly commenced); 
 Blocks (defending an attack once it has actually commenced); 
 Deflections (redirecting an attack once it has commenced); 
 Evasions (avoiding an attack once it has commenced); 
 Parries (steering an attack off course with minor movements once it has 
commenced); 
 Covers (covering with the arms, legs or hands to absorb the impact of a strike); 
and 
 Absorption (when it is not possible to apply another defensive action there may 
be no choice but to actually absorb the strike or attack). 
 
6.4.7 Joint locks and pressure points 
The ability to restrain or escort an assailant by applying pressure to a joint or sensitive 
part of the body is a vital skill for security officers, especially Crowd Controllers, who 
may have to evict unruly patrons (Homel and Clark, 1994: 16-17). In a life or death 
situation, a lock may also be applied with the intention of actually breaking the joint in 
order to incapacitate or disarm and attacker (Advanced Combat Training, 2008: 28-30). 
Some of these techniques are listed below: 
 Finger locks; 
 Wrist locks;  
 Elbow locks; 
 Shoulder locks;  
 Leg locks; and 
 Pain compliance via pressure points.  
 
6.4.8 Neck restraints, strangles and chokes 
These techniques are considered very controversial as they may unintentionally 
seriously injure or kill an attacker, usually as a result of positional asphyxia (Franks, 
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2009: 260-263). However, if applied correctly, they can be very useful techniques that 
enable the incapacitation of a violent attacker with no serious side effects for the 
assailant, regardless of drug or alcohol usage (Force Science Research Centre, FSCR, 
2009: 1-4; and Hanover, 2008: 142-147). It should be noted that from a self-defence 
point of view, these techniques could be used a high level force option or a compliance 
technique (Advanced Combat Training, 2008: 30). They are also particularly effective 
when applied as a team tactic or to assist a fellow officer who is being attacked 
(Thompson, 199: 141-150). The most common form of application in the security 
industry is called a Lateral Vascular Neck Restraint (LVNR) (FSRC, 2009: 1). It focuses 
on applying pressure to the carotid arteries without damaging the attacker’s windpipe 
and is thus considered a ‘safer ‘option then more traditional Martial Arts based chokes 
or strangles.  
 
6.4.9 Restraint and control techniques 
‘Restraint and control tactics’ are those techniques and tools that enable an attacker to 
be subdued without any permanent damage or unnecessary injury being inflicted on 
him/her (Franks, 2009: 258-260). Many of these techniques and skills would be 
absolutely vital for officers working as Crowd Controllers (Franks, 2009; 194-201). This 
is as a direct result of the operating functions performed by Crowd Controllers such as; 
escort and eviction, breaking up fights, etc. Restraining equipment could include 
handcuffs/flexi-cuffs and cable ties. It is legal for most Security officers in Queensland 
(with the exception of Crowd Controllers) and South Africa to carry handcuffs (PSIRA, 
2009 and Department of Criminal Justice and the Attorney-General, 2008a-i). In many 
cases an altercation may end in a citizen’s arrest or detaining of a suspect until police 
arrive. Both situations necessitate the application of restrain and control techniques 
(ASP, 2010: 10). 
 
6.4.10 Stand-up grappling and ground fighting 
This classification of techniques refers to the extreme of close quarters combat. It is a 
well acknowledged fact among experienced Defensive Tactics instructors that the vast 
majority of close quarters attacks land up in a ‘grapple or clinch’ and from there go to 
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the ground (Thompson, 1999: 141-159). The need for officers to have a basic 
understanding of fighting from the ground and being able to get back to their feet is 
critical (Advanced Combat Training, 2008: 30-42). This grouping consists of some of the 
following: 
 
 Redirection of energy (how to utilise an opponent’s force and active resistance 
against them) 
 Unbalancing an attacker (how to move an attacker so that they become 
unbalanced); 
 Escapes and reversals (the need to escape or reverse a position that an attacker 
may have an officer in, is crucial to combat at very close range); and 
 Throws and takedowns (the ability to throw or take an attacker down when 
assaulted is a very important skill for an officer). 
 
6.4.11 Team tactics and multiple attacker considerations  
In many cases, security officers do not operate alone. As such it would be logical to 
train and rehearse various concepts and situations that would take advantage of 
multiple officers (Franks, 2009: 107-112). For example a situation requiring working in 
tandem or approaching to restrain an aggressive person in a straight-line or half-moon 
formation or one member of the team standing ‘point’ to deflect an attack from the side 
or from behind, etc. When done correctly, this vastly reduces the likelihood of serious 
injury for all parties involved in an altercation. Another example of this would be in 
applying the tactic of ‘swarming’, where a large number of security officers literally 
swarm all over the attacker/s, overwhelming them by sheer numbers and weight but not 
actually striking or inflicting injury on the attacker in the process (Schneider, 2005: 75). 
 
The converse of this concept is unfortunately also commonplace. This refers to the 
attack by multiple assailants on a single officer or small group of officers by a much 
larger (numbers-wise) group of attackers. This is a very difficult situation to manage but 
is an ill-fated truth of many criminal attacks (Thompson, 1999; 178-180). It is thus 
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important that the realities of how to manage multiple attackers be taught to security 
officers who may be exposed to such risks.  
 
6.5 EDGED WEAPON COMBAT 
Edged weapon combat applies to the use of bladed or stabbing weapons like knives or 
any other implement that can be utilised in a cutting or stabbing-like motion (screw 
drivers, scissors, etc.) (Mroz, 2003: 75-115). The concept of ‘knife fighting’ as applied to 
the security industry focuses primarily on the capability to defend against edged weapon 
attack (Mroz, 2003: 77-106). It should be noted that in order to effectively defend 
against a weapon, an officer must first understand how it works (Advanced Combat 
Training, 2008: 7). This is vital otherwise there is no way of knowing what to expect and 
it is impossible to defend against something when the methods of application are not 
known by the defender. Even in jurisdictions where it is not considered legal for security 
officers to carry blades or knives, it should be noted that it is commonplace for 
assailants to attack with bladed objects such as broken bottles and other cutting 
implements (Winlow et al, 2001: 537).  
 
6.6 IMPROVISED WEAPON COMBAT 
Improvised weapon combat includes the use of any environmental tool that can be 
utilised to defend oneself in the case of an attack, e.g. pens, sticks or stones/rocks 
(Consterdine, 1997: 149). The unfortunate converse to this is the reality, that many 
attackers may use improvised weapons, to attack a security officer (Schneider, 2005: 
74). Accordingly, the ability for security officers to defend against such attacks is crucial. 
This is particularly relevant for Crowd Controllers, as many of the incidents that occur 
involve them being attacked with objects ranging from beer bottles (both still whole or 
top broken off to provide a jagged sharp cutting edge) to pool cues (Thompson, 1999: 
174-178).  
 
6.7 USE OF ALTERNATIVE WEAPONS 
‘Alternative weapons’ refers to weaponry other than firearms and edged weapons that 
may be utilised by security officers to carry out their work duties (Schneider, 2005: 74). 
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Whilst many of the following listed options cannot be utilised by private security officers, 
most police officers are equipped with the some or all of these alternative weapons and 
tools: 
 
 Solid or extendable baton; 
 Electric Control Devices (ECD’s) such as: stun guns, tasers or stingers; 
 Handcuffs or other restraint and control tools; 
 OC/pepper spray; and 
 Gas Powered Projectile weapons.  
 
A solid understanding of the relevance of these tools, in terms of the application of 
minimum force during self-defence, is important for all security officers facing medium to 
high threats (Schneider, 2009: 22). This is relevant even in jurisdictions where the use 
of these tools is illegal. This is because it would enable the security officer to better 
defend him/herself against such weapons should the need arise as he/she would have 
a working knowledge of how an attacker would effectively utilise such tools (Advanced 
Combat Training, 2008: 5) . Each of the groupings will be briefly discussed below: 
 
6.7.1 Pepper/OC (oleoresin capsicum) spray  
 OC spray is used very successfully in many countries with very few serious side 
effects or long term damage to assailants (FSRC, 2009: 1-4); 
 The carrying and use of pepper spray is illegal in the Queensland private security 
industry and most other jurisdictions in Australia but is legal practice and 
commonplace in South Africa (Department of Justice and Attorney-General 
Queensland, 2008 and PSIRA, 2010); and 
 There has been extensive research and several case studies that illustrate the 
benefits and advantages of pepper sprays over other force options (FSRC, 2009: 
Rappert, 2002; and Adang et al, 2005). 
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6.7.2 Fixed Weapons: Batons/extendable batons 
 Batons are very common tools utilised by Security and Law Enforcement 
personnel (Mesloh et al, 2008: 26); 
 It is now generally accepted that extendable batons such as the ASP are utilised 
in preference to fixed or side handled batons (FSRC, 2009: 1-4); 
 They may be carried by security guards in Queensland but not by Crowd 
Controllers. Any security officer in South Africa may carry a baton (Department of 
Justice and Attorney-General Queensland, 2008; and PSIRA, 2010); 
 There are many benefits to arming officers with batons but the fact that batons 
are impact weapons generally results in assailants being seriously hurt more 
often than when OC or ECD options are deployed (Gervais, Baudin, Cruikshank, 
and Dahlstedt, 1997); and 
 Batons have been determined as the tools that have led to the most injuries 
among officers and suspects (FSRC, 2009: 1). 
 
6.7.3 Electrical Control Devices: Taser/stinger and shock guns/sticks 
 These may not be carried by any private security officers in Queensland but 
could be carried by any officer in South Africa, (Department of Justice and 
Attorney-General Queensland, 2008; and PSIRA, 2010); 
 There have been several studies for law enforcement personnel endorsing the 
use of Taser type projectile shock weapons as a non-lethal force option (Batts, 
Steiner & Lembi, 2006; and Mesloh et al, 2007); and 
 The FSRC (2009:1) reported that the Taser was one of the most frequently used 
tools by Law Enforcement officers but resulted in more injuries to officers and 
suspects than OC or the applications of LVNR’s. 
 
6.7.4 Gas-powered projectile weapons  
 These are gas powered weapons usually in the form of a gun (there are some in 
the shape of a torch) that are gas operated and can fire OC pellets, paint pellets 
or solid projectiles at an attacker (Mesloh et al, 2008: 30-31); 
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 These may not be carried by any private security officers in Queensland but 
could be carried by any officer in South Africa (Department of Justice and 
Attorney-General Queensland, 2008; and PSIRA, 2010); and 
 Studies for law enforcement personnel endorsing the use of pepper-balls have 
been conducted. Such studies have expressed concern that these tools were 
often not as reliable as other options such as OC or ECDs (Mesloh et al, 2007: 
31-33). 
 
6.8 FIREARMS USAGE AND APPLICATION  
In terms of the system for categorisation of security officers, firearms only apply to 
officers in categories Three and Four. The carrying of firearms in Queensland is limited 
to security officers who are conducting asset protection or Cash-in-Transit duties 
(Department of Criminal Justice and the Attorney-General, 2008i). Historically, there 
have been very few incidents of so-called “unjustified” use of force by armed private 
security personnel in Australia. This is not the case in South Africa where in addition to 
C-I-T officers a wide range of security jobs are undertaken by armed personnel (Close 
Protection, Armed Response, Armed Guards, Armed Escorts, stolen goods recovery 
and response, etc.) (Minnaar, 2007a: 19-36). 
 
Globally, the use of firearms in private security situations has become a topic of 
considerable debate and controversy (Aguirre, 2007; De Nevers, 2009; Minnaar, 2007 
and Stoddard et al, 2008). This has huge ramifications for the training of security 
officers as well as the manner in which they operate. When reviewing the instructional 
material, it was found that the use of firearms is treated very inconsistently. This is 
primarily because most manuals are directed towards persons operating in a specific 
environment. As a result, certain manuals concentrate on the use of firearms in great 
detail whereas others leave it out almost entirely. The need for officers to be well versed 
with the relevant firearms (handguns, shot guns, rifles, carbines, etc.) they work with is 
critical (Schneider, 2009: 22-27). In South Africa, there are many complications with the 
implementation of new firearms legislation. Some of the complications include licensing 
delays, ineffectual training and ineffective legislative enforcement (Minnaar & Mistry, 
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2003; and Minnaar, 2007a). As with unarmed combat and alternative weaponry, there 
are various sub-divisions of firearms training and application.  
There are a few considerations regarding these subdivisions and their referencing, 
namely: 
 
 These subdivisions for firearm training skills were initially discussed by Schneider 
(2005: 76-80) and were expanded for this research by including input gained 
from the International Firearm Training Academy’s training materials (IFTA, 
2009).  
 The Researcher has been given permission by Mr Andre Pretorius, the CEO of 
IFTA and a member of the Focus Group for this research to utilise these 
materials as required. 
 Where applicable additional references are also cited. 
The generic subject divisions of firearms and related training are outlined below.  
 
6.8.1 Basic firearm understanding and training 
The key concepts taught under this heading would fall primarily into one of two areas 
namely; safe handling of firearms and maintenance of firearms. The concepts and 
principles taught in this subfield form a foundation for further training to build on, much 
the same as foundational concepts of unarmed combat. An officer armed with a firearm 
has ‘lethal force’ capability. As such an armed officer must possess a high level of 
competency in the safe handling of firearms (Mroz, 2003: 119-162). Schneider (2005: 
191-193) outlines that officers may operate in a diverse range of environments. This 
means that there are several factors that should be included in the training of armed 
security officers: 
 
 Crowds: Working in crowded areas is almost a given for most security officers. 
This means that inaccurate firing of a firearm or over penetration (i.e. bullet going 
right through a target), could harm innocent civilians/bystanders. 
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 Firing and movement: The majority of attack situations utilising firearms involve 
firing and movement, i.e. the officer will have to move and shoot. This is difficult 
to perform unless good training has been received and constant retraining 
(regular practice and/or refresher courses attended) is in place. 
 
 Firing distances: The range (distance) at which the security officers will have to 
shoot often varies, meaning that an officer has to have the necessary skills to 
compensate for sudden changes in range and conditions for example visibility, 
rain, wind, trajectory ‘downhill/uphill’, etc. (Braunig, 1993; Consterdine, 1997; 
Dynamic Alternatives, 2010 and Thompson, 2003). A training video entitled, 
‘Surviving Edged Weapons’ that was made as an instructional tape for police 
officers in the USA, contains examples of knife attacks on police officers 
demonstrated and verified at an approximate range of seven metres or less. It 
was noted by police officers in the video that a committed attacker will be able to 
rush and stab an officer before the officer can draw and accurately fire his/her 
weapon. The implications of this are that at a range of seven metres or less it 
would probably be more beneficial for the security officer to utilise unarmed 
combat or alternative weaponry as a first option and only after that to then 
possibly draw the firearm if the situational variables allowed this action (Calibre 
Press video production, 1987). In support of this concept Consterdine, (1997: 
230) cites FBI research which states that the “FBI summary of officers killed, 
together with police gunfight data has remained consistent - 92% of all fire-fights 
occur within 20 feet”.  
6.8.2 Target shooting skills 
Target shooting skills that are specific to a security officer’s job requirements should be 
a critical component of any firearms training. The example of what is required by Close 
Protection Officers (CPOs) is outlined by Schneider (2005: 77) as follows: 
 
Target shooting refers to the ability of a CPO or team to be able to effectively 
shoot and hit various targets from different positions in different places and 
conditions. This denotes fire and movement, shooting from cover and 
vehicles, as well as implementation of IADs [Immediate Action Drills] with 
firearms. The ability of a CPO to be able to fire quickly and accurately is vital. 
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There are different schools of thought with regard to targeting. Most professionals seem 
to agree, however that the focus of training should be to hit ‘centre mass’ (the centre of 
the human body), with the additional ability to fire accurate head shots being secondary 
(Mroz, 2003: 127). In other words, a well-trained security officer must be able to 
accurately hit the centre mass with multiple shots while moving and implementing an 
appropriate and work-related scenario (Schneider, 2005: 224-226). 
 
6.8.3 Firearm Close Quarter Battle (CQB) skills 
‘Close Quarters Battle’ (CQB) denotes the use of the firearms at extreme close ranges 
in conjunction with unarmed combat. This includes not only firing the weapon but 
striking with it as well as utilising unarmed combat (Howe, 2005: 119-129). As stated 
above in sub-section 6.8.1 of this Chapter, the distance of an attack may vary and 
change very quickly. This, as well as the fact that in many situations security officers 
operate in crowds, means that the capability of a security officer to effectively draw and 
use a firearm25 at close range is an important part of his/her ability to effectively deal 
with attack (Mroz, 2003: 119-162). 
 
6.8.4 Urban movement and tactical skills 
This concept refers to utilising the firearm in combat-related situations that may occur in 
built up areas where the security officer may have to move through obstacles and 
buildings safely (Howe, 2005: 119-129). Whilst this area is generally considered the 
domain of law enforcement and military personnel, it is in many cases, an important skill 
for high level private security officers to possess (Schneider, 2005: 226). The main 
principle focuses on how to keep oneself behind cover but move when necessary (as an 
individual or as part of a team), while still being able to effectively engage and neutralise 
the enemy. Schneider (2005: 78) provides an example of how this skill would be 
relevant for CPOs as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
25 The ability to draw the weapon and engage valid targets as quickly as possible is vital at short 
distances. 
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When looking at this skill in the context of a Close Protector’s role, it is clearly 
not the same as a tactical or intervention operator whose roles may include 
tasks such as engaging in hostage rescue. Rather the CPO may need these 
skills primarily when separated from the Principal who may be under attack 
and the CPO must get to and evacuate a Principal in such a manner that 
would provide the minimum exposure to the existing threat. 
  
6.8.5 Night/low light shooting skills 
The ability to fire accurately in low light conditions as well as utilise torches or 
illumination devices (such as laser pointers or illuminated sights) while engaging an 
attacker is an important skill for security officers (Mroz, 2003: 31-36). One of the 
reasons for this is that they may have to work in varying environments at different times, 
i.e. in a hotel, at an office, at a client’s residence or even whilst in transit (Schneider, 
2005: 78). There has been much technological advancement in the field of low light 
shooting, including red-dot sights, laser sights and torch attachments clipping directly 
onto the firearm (Mroz, 2003: 149-150). In extreme circumstances, even night vision 
scopes are available. However, these would not generally be applicable to the any of 
the security officer Categories except Category Four. 
 
6.8.6 Security team firearm skills 
This sub-field focuses on the use of firearms as related to specific tactical 
considerations and team operations. This involves integrating protective strategies and 
techniques into team and operational structure (Howe, 2005: 119-129). This is important 
as, if officers are not used to working together when responding to attacks, they may 
very well land up shooting each other. Concepts such as clarifying ‘fields of fire’ as well 
as developing and rehearsing immediate action drills (IAD’s) are critical. IAD’s refer to 
the planned rehearsed responses that a team would implement when under attack. 
These drills need to be rehearsed until they are instinctive (Schneider 2009: 140).  
 
6.8.7 Firearm disarming skills 
When considering the huge advantage that attackers will have over security officers as 
a result of surprise, it is vital for a security officer to have the ability to disarm an 
attacker (Hanover, 2008: 162-167). This would include situations where the attacker is 
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pointing a firearm at the officer, at another officer or even at civilians in a crowd. This 
aspect goes hand-in-hand with effective unarmed combat skills (Advanced Combat 
Training, 2008: 165). Competencies should include being able to stop a potential 
attacker from drawing a weapon as well as to disarm an attacker who may already have 
his/her firearm out (Dynamic Alternatives, 2010: 168).  
 
6.8.8 Firearm retention skills 
Retention refers to the security officers’ ability to prevent an attacker from disarming 
him/her (Schneider, 2005: 79). The officer needs to have the necessary skills to 
maintain control of their own firearm whether in the holster position or drawn and in use. 
This skill is also closely linked to the security officer having effective unarmed combat 
ability. As with disarming techniques, the security officer must have the ability to retain 
the weapon when moving through crowded areas while the weapon is holstered (or on a 
sling as is deployment practice in hostile environments), as well as when the weapon 
has been drawn.  
 
Choice of holsters may have a large influence on this. Certain manuals recommend a 
holster with a retention clip for security officers working in crowds. This is because the 
clip would make it more difficult for an attacker in the crowd to remove the firearm from 
the holster, whilst the extra time taken to draw the weapon is negligible (Dynamic 
Alternatives, 2010: 99). The same is true with regards to slings for rifles or shotguns. 
When considering the risks of the firearm being taken from a security officer in such a 
situation, a holster designed to make this more difficult would definitely be an advantage 
for the officer. 
 
6.8.9 Weapon integration skills 
Depending on the threat level and operational environment in which the security officer 
works, they may need to have access to heavier weaponry than pistols, for example 
assault rifles, shotguns, etc. (Schneider, 2009: 27). This is specifically applicable to 
officers in Category Four. In addition to such instances the security officer, if correctly 
trained and equipped, will be also be carrying alternative weaponry (such as batons and 
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pepper sprays) and should be able to switch from weapon to weapon as the situation 
and use of force levels dictate (Bailey, 2001: 87-89).  
 
The key competency when describing weapon integration skills is the ability to transition 
smoothly from one weapon to another while applying the necessary safety and tactical 
movement methodology. This provides for contingencies that may arise and takes into 
account laws governing the use of force, as well as the guiding principle of limiting any 
harm occurring to innocent bystanders in crowded areas (Schneider, 2009: 105). 
 
6.9 THE USE OF CANINES AS A FORCE OPTION 
Mesloh et al, (2008: 34) identified the use of police dogs as an important use-of-force 
option. Since both PSIRA and the OFT have licensing categories for security officers 
who operate with canines, it is an aspect that must be included in this overview of use-
of-force tools (Department of Justice and Attorney-General Queensland, 2008 and 
PSIRA, 2010). The use of canine’s as a force option is not listed on any continuums that 
were reviewed. Mesloh et al (2008: 34) explain why this is the case: “Unfortunately, as a 
biological technology, it does not easily fit into one of the existing categories. As a 
result, most force continuums do not address the police dog as an instrument of force”.  
 
They further explain that this means that the canine operator must determine the level 
of force for his canine which can complicate matters tremendously. Minnaar et al (2001: 
65-66) stated the following regarding the use of canines by the SAPS: 
 
Properly trained and well-controlled police dogs are undoubtedly a valuable 
crime prevention tool, especially when used responsibly and judiciously. Such 
proper use of police dogs, especially in arrest situations, obviate the 
necessity of police officers having to resort to the use of firearms when 
making an arrest or attempting to subdue a violent or dangerous suspect. 
 
Despite the lack of literature referring to the private security industry, this concept could 
be directly transferable from its referencing in the policing context.  
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6.10 REQUIRED ATTRIBUTES  
A solid arsenal of weapons, unarmed skills and equipment are unfortunately not enough 
to ensure that an officer will be able to survive a violent or potentially lethal attack. The 
need to have supporting attributes (skills and capabilities needed to use use-of-force 
tools effectively and safely) to utilise these tools is as important as having the tools 
themselves (Honig and Lewinski, 2008: 129-147). In support of this concept, Grossman 
and Christensen (2010: 159) state that “you need three things to survive in combat: The 
weapon, the skill and the will to kill’. Whilst this is an example looking at the extreme 
end of the violence continuum, it is most relevant for private security officers working in 
Categories Three and Four. The reality of an officer being faced with violent and 
potentially lethal attack comes with many further considerations. These considerations 
include the need for attribute development combined with skills and technical 
capabilities (Advanced Combat Training. 2008: 9). From the definition of an ‘attribute’ 
outlined in Chapter 1 (see section 1.10), we can ascertain that many attributes are 
inherent but it is also true that attributes can be developed and nurtured. Many experts 
believe that the technical aspects of Defensive Tactics are as important as the attributes 
that an officer should have and develop (Hanover, 2008: 116 and Thompson, 1999: 72-
86). Consterdine (1997: 251) reinforces this by outlining the need for fitness and 
scenario training to develop attributes. 
 
Advanced Combat Training (2008: 9) in their manual on unarmed combat state that 
attributes may be physical or mental but that both are vitally important. They provide an 
extensive list of mental and physical attributes, a summarised break-down, is outlined 
below: 
Physical attributes: 
 
 Strength; 
 Stamina; 
 Flexibility; and  
 Conditioning [ability to absorb blows or physical punishment] 
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Mental attributes: 
 
 Aggression; 
 Commitment;  
 Winning attitude;  
 Loyalty; and 
 Focus (Advanced Combat Training, 2008: 9). 
 
In reality, many attributes are both physical and mental. Grossman and Christensen 
(2010: 138-158) cite several case studies of Police officers who were very seriously 
wounded but fought on and survived violent attacks (even gunshot wounds) due to their 
mental conditioning and physical toughness. In fact, it is an accepted point of view that 
mental attributes are even more important than physical ones (Asken et al, 2010: i-v).  
 
6.11 CRITERIA FOR AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE TACTIC 
Whilst potentially not as critical for officers in Category One the remaining three 
categories, need Defensive Tactics skills, in order to effectively and safely carry out 
their work related duties (Schneider, 2005: 189-193). Most security officers receive 
comparatively little initial and almost no on-going training (Strom et al, 2010: 74-77) in 
comparison to their police counterparts (Moodley, 2009: 30-32). This is true despite the 
fact that experts such as Aveni (2003: 1), believe that the use-of-force skills training 
period for police officers, is too short. As a result of limited training times and several 
other variables, the focus of training should then be on practical ‘easy-to-learn-and-
apply skills (Siddle, 1995: 112-125). In order to contextualise and rate Defensive Tactics 
for the security industry, a system (i.e. an integrated set of techniques) or technique 
should meet certain criteria to be considered effective.  
 
Some of these criteria include: 
 
 The techniques must be based on the realities of attack and in-line with the 
modus operandi of how attackers actually engage their victims (Consterdine, 
1997: 261). All too often, techniques taught in Martial Arts systems are based on 
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what the instructor perceives to be real, as opposed to what actually happens, in 
a violent attack (Ben-Asher, 1985: 74). These techniques are usually practised in 
such a controlled and unrealistic environment that they do not resemble the 
actual ‘real life’ situations the security officer needs to be training for (Thompson, 
1999: 181-185); 
 
 The techniques that are taught to security officers need to be simple and 
forgiving and not compromise the officer if the technique does not work (ASP, 
2010: 30). If the techniques are too complicated to learn, the likelihood of them 
being applied in pressure situations is very slim. The concept of applying 
forgiving-techniques is designed, if something goes wrong while performing the 
aforesaid technique, in order not to leave the officer off-balance and open to 
counter attack (Hanover, 2008: 117-118); 
 
 Self-defence techniques need to be able to be integrated into the work 
environment and job descriptions of a security officer (Schneider, 2009: 126-
133). An example of this is that in a crowded environment where there may be 
multiple attackers, it may be very difficult for a security officer to manage the 
situation if they are wrestling with one assailant on the ground (Advanced 
Combat Training, 2008: 7). Therefore, if his/her system of self-defence was 
based on high kicks, it would not be easily transferable into the workplace. 
 
 The security officer may be tired or fatigued and have several attackers to deal 
with at the same time. This must be taken into account when assessing the 
applicability of self-defence techniques or tactics (Advanced Combat Training, 
2008: 5). Fatigue is especially relevant for Crowd Controllers, Close Protection 
Officers (Schneider, 2005: 113) and shift-based security officers who may work 
long shifts late at night ; and 
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 The fact that most criminals and attackers exploit opportunities (Thompson, 
1999: 34-72) means that the security officer is likely to be attacked or assaulted 
when he/she least expects it, often from the sides or back (Consterdine, 1995: 
304-307). As a result of this an effective Defensive Tactics system must include 
the necessary skills to manage assaults that are not ‘head on’. Such a system 
should also be designed to minimise the likelihood of a security officer being 
caught by surprise and ensure that a response to surprise attack will be put into 
action as speedily as possible (Advanced Combat training, 2008: 14). 
 
Previous research into Crowd Controllers and violence (Hobs et al, 2002 and Winlow et 
al, 2001) reinforces the need to be realistic about what works and what does not. It is 
well noted that many socially acceptable and polite techniques do not work when faced 
with a real violent attack (Consterdine, 1997: 275 and Perkins, Ridenhour & Kovosky: 
2010: 11-13). Ben-Asher expands on this concept by explaining some of the factors that 
had to be taken into account when designing the IDF’s system for self-defence: 
 
 Simplicity: The exercises are easy to learn, easy to perform, uncomplicated 
and straight forward; 
 Short-term instruction: The idea is to teach the system within three weeks of 
intensive training; 
 Clarity and purposefulness: There are a definite number of exercises each 
with a definite goal;  
 Use of side arms: Weapons are taught as tools, Soldiers are taught rapid 
reactions in case a weapon is jammed or empty;  
 Adaptability: correct response is taught in a trench, bunker, a field, a 
courtyard, a street – [in fact] anywhere; 
 Techniques: Basic elements have been taken from other arts of self-
defence, adapted to IDF needs; and 
 Proficiency: the only standard to be obtained is the actual performance of 
the exercise and its immediate effect (Ben-Asher, 1983: 74-75).  
 
There is a broad difference between systems that are designed for the sole-purpose of 
being utilised for professionals (military, policing and security personnel) and those with 
a Martial Arts focus (Consterdine, 1997: 203-241). There are, without doubt, massive 
benefits for security professionals who undertake to train in the Martial Arts on an on-
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going basis. The problem is that this training may still not provide them with the crucial 
Defensive Tactics skills needed, to lawfully manage violent altercations, in their daily 
jobs (Mroz, 2003: 15). The realities of a violent attack need to be considered, in terms of 
the manner in which humans tend to respond to and manage such situations 
(Thompson, 1999: 72-97). This leads back to the application of concepts such adrenal 
response management (see section 4.8 of Chapter 4) as well as the application of 
various use-of-force models (see section 5.8 of Chapter 5). In reality the true test of the 
effectiveness of use-of-force tools and options is officer safety (ASP, 2010: 10-12). A 
review of the effectiveness of use-of-force tools was done by the Force Science 
Research Centre (FSRC) (2008: 1-4). The FSRC report covered many issues of 
relevance to this study. A few of the key findings are listed below: 
 
 OC Spray was rated as the safest tool for all parties;  
 Batons were the most injurious; and  
 The second safest tool was the LVNR technique. 
 
6.12 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The use-of-force options available to a security officer vary according to the jurisdiction 
in which he/she operates, based on the laws and specific issues, applicable to that 
jurisdiction. In order to create a platform to assess the applicability of use-of-force tools, 
a basic overview of the legal requirements for a citizen’s arrest was described. The 
primary defence of self-defence would be the core motivation applied when a security 
officer would have to utilise force. This is mainly because the security officer does not 
usually have any more rights than a normal citizen. The topic of legal self-defence was 
briefly discussed and related back to the private security industry and the context in 
which a private security officer would apply force.  
 
A breakdown of the available use-of-force tools was provided based on a grouping 
system. The broad groups that were discussed were as follows: 
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 Non-physical force options; 
 Unarmed combat;  
 Team tactics and multiple attackers; 
 Edged weapons;  
 Improvised weapon combat; 
 Alternative weaponry; 
 Firearms; and 
 Canines.  
 
The concept and importance of the ‘attributes’ needed for Defensive Tactics 
applications was discussed. Attributes could be either mental or physical or both. A 
description covering the differences between Martial Arts and Defensive Tactics was 
also outlined. Many Martial Arts are sporting orientated and thus do not transfer well to 
the requirements of security officers. Conversely certain Martial Arts, may in fact be too 
deadly, and thus would not fit into a use-of-force model structure and be contrary to the 
concept of reasonable force. Martial Arts can be very useful for security officers but they 
should be very clear about what is required in terms of their work operational 
environment.  
 
A breakdown of what would and would not constitute an effective Defensive Tactic was 
also provided in this section. It was noted that Ben-Asher (1983: 74-75), describes 
several points that were important in evaluating what would, and what would not, be 
relevant in a Defensive Tactics system. These include aspects such as simplicity and 
short time frames for learning the skills. Research provided by the FSCR (2008:1-4) has 
shown that the two safest use-of-force tools are OC spray and the LVNR. Furthermore, 
the FSCR highlighted that the most injurious tool is the Baton (both to the officer and the 
suspect).  
 152 
 
Chapter 7 
USE-OF-FORCE TRAINING 
______________________________________________________________________ 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In all of the literature reviewed, the Researcher was unable to source an accepted best 
practice model for use-of-force training. This was true for both the law enforcement 
sector, where extensive research into the subject has been done, as well as the private 
security sector where the topic has largely been ignored. The problem of inconsistency 
or lack of use-of-force training transcends borders as almost every country in the world 
makes use of private security officers. The need to establish what constitutes ‘effective 
use-of-force training’ and how to ensure that effective training is delivered is of critical 
importance to the general security industry. This importance is magnified for use-of-
force training where insufficient or wrongly utilised skills could have fatal consequences. 
The United States Bureau of Labour and Statistics (BLS) 2009 report states that “sixty 
percent of security guard fatalities were as a result of assaults and violent acts” (cited in 
Strom et al, 2010: 80). Schneider (2005: 137) outlines several factors regarding 
effective training of Close Protection Officers. These factors have been slightly modified 
so that they may be applied to the private security industry as a whole and are reflected 
below: 
 
1. The content of the training;  
2. The focus of the training;  
3. The duration of the training;  
4. The trainee’s profile; 
5. The intensity of the training; 
6. The instructor’s skills; and 
7. The materials (protective equipment, gloves, impact shields, etc.) and 
training venues that are needed to deliver effective training. 
 
These seven concepts are closely interrelated. This means that one concept cannot be 
discussed in isolation. For example, without knowing how much training time is 
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available (duration of training), what the job description of the trainee will be (focus of 
the training), the trainee’s profile and minimum level of capabilities (profile and intensity 
of training), etc. it would not be possible to design and deliver an effective training 
program. The issues surrounding effective training delivery should be integrated to 
provide a complete system for delivering use-of-force training (Schneider, 2005: 136-
139). The very nature of effective training relates to the core concept of providing 
trainees with the skills and knowledge to effectively perform their job safely (Aveni, 
2005: 1-4).  
 
Figure 14: Diagram illustrating the components of effective security training  
 
(Schneider, 2005: 137) 
 
In the private security industry, the exposure to potentially violent situations means that 
there is a direct ‘duty of care’ responsibility associated with the education of Security 
officers (Prenzler and Sarre, 2009: 191-192). There is also no doubt that when it comes 
Content
Duration
Focus
Intensity
Instructor skills
Student profile
Materials & venue
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to use of force, errors of judgement or action (witting or unwittingly) may literally cost life 
or limb (Petrowski, 2005: 2-5). The need to integrate operational outcomes together with 
the use-of-force concepts is also of vital importance. Use-of-force tools, legislative 
considerations and best practice need to all be taken into account and imparted during 
training (Petrowski, 2002: 1-4). This Chapter seeks to identify the existing research 
relevant to what is ‘best practice’ in use-of-force training and how it relates back to the 
security industry. These concepts build from the points discussed in Chapter 3 (sections 
3.7 and 3.8). Siddle (1995: 122) summarises the aim of use-of-force training by stating 
that:  
 
Designing any survival system and combat training is not about proving one style 
correct and another wrong. It’s about preparing men and women for combat in 
any method that will ensure their survival. 
 
7.2 WHAT IS EFFECTIVE USE-OF-FORCE TRAINING? 
In terms of the private security industry and use-of-force methods the need to teach 
students not only skills, but also the necessary behaviour needed to utilise those skills 
under pressure, cannot be overstated (Siebel, 2010: 21-24). Siddle (1995: 111) 
summarises the training design process for Defensive Tactics and related training into 
four sequential steps: 
 
1. Identifying predictable stress levels during application; 
2. Technique selection; 
3. Developing basic survival motor programs; and 
4. Developing dynamic training exercises. 
 
The first step as mentioned above is to ascertain how stressful a situation that needs to 
be managed as part of one’s job, would be for a trained officer. An example of this may 
be training people for verbal conflict management which has a lower stress level than 
teaching unarmed edged weapon defence (Gold, 2008: 1-5). By identifying the levels of 
stress, it is possible to then select what techniques may be applied. Whilst often 
considered the most important phase, ‘technique selection’ is simply one of the four 
components of effective delivery (Siddle, 1995: 112-120). Focusing on ‘basic survival 
motor programs’ refers to the need to emphasise the way our bodies naturally react to 
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stressful situations (Grossman & Christensen, 2008: 14-29). The concept of applying 
‘dynamic training exercises’ (scenarios and role-plays) is of critical importance. To 
support the importance of scenario training, a recent study states that: “Good scenario-
based training makes the officers use threat assessment, their verbal skills, and the 
ability to escalate and de-escalate, or apply good sound tactics” (Seibel, 2010: 21-22). 
The concept of what is the core approach to effective use-of-force training is well 
summarised by Siddle (1995: 10), who encapsulates his thoughts as follows: 
 
To maintain consistency in the [use of force] training methodology, remember 
that all survival skills revolve around three basic goals. They include: 
 
1. Identifying the techniques that are compatible to the effects of stress; 
2. Developing training exercises which will enhance survival reaction time; and  
3. Adopting training methods that enhance a student’s confidence, thus 
reducing anxiety and lowering heart rate. 
 
In most countries, there is a minimum age requirement for security officers to operate 
(Department of Justice and Attorney-General Queensland, 2008 and PSIRA, 2010). 
This is normally enforced by licensing and regulatory authorities or via employer 
monitoring, i.e. the onus is on the employer not to employ underage security officers. 
Accordingly, the focus needs to be on ‘adult-based education and training’ (ABET) 
(BSD, 2003: 1-10). Since the training of security officers is normally considered more of 
a technical skill as opposed to an academic qualification (especially at an operational 
level) it is usually classed as a vocational qualification (SIA, 2007 and DETA, 2009). It 
thus makes senses to ensure that the concepts of ABET are applied when delivering 
this training. There are many relevant concepts that are related to ABET – such as 
drawing on students life experience during training, as well as focusing on educational 
methodologies that relate to the adult’s ability to absorb and process information and 
concepts (Schneider, 2005: 119). There is also the core consideration of how to 
motivate adult students to learn and develop confidence during training (Grossman and 
Christensen, 2008: 133-134).  
 
Not all students who attend training may be motivated to learn, train hard and develop 
skills (Siddle, 1995: 131). This may lead to ineffective training delivery and failure to 
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meet training objectives. Regrettably, the consequences of being ill prepared can be 
very serious (Howe, 2005: 45-46). The difficulty with use-of-force training is that, 
students who are not properly equipped with the knowledge and skills that they need to 
survive, may end up hurt, dead. They may also be held liable for the use of excessive 
force and be held to account accordingly (Aveni, 2005; and Petrowski, 2005). Therefore, 
use-of-force training needs to be approached with deadly seriousness and an 
understanding that the consequences of not being equipped with the relevant skills and 
knowledge could be very dangerous. Howe (2005: 17) identifies three key areas where 
he believes tactical trainers often fail their students. These are: 
 
1. Poor classroom instruction;  
2. Poor training exercises; [and] 
3. Poor or no sustainment training.  
      
Howe (2005: 33-40) further explains that the job of a use-of-force trainer is to provide 
students with the skills and behavioural capabilities to avoid, manage and indeed 
survive a use-of-force incident. Regardless of student levels of motivation, in the end it 
generally comes down to the instructor’s experience and teaching abilities to ensure 
that students are adequately prepared (Aveni, 2005: 1-2; and Grossman & Christensen, 
2008: 132-136). Siddle (1996: 11-12) describes this concept as follows: “Instructors, 
who teach survival skills (i.e. defensive tactics, close quarters combat, tactical firearms 
or survival strategies), are still faced with teaching students a physical skill”.  
 
According to Siddle, the level of student proficiency is directly proportional to the 
instructor’s training psychology and system design. The level of education provided to 
students needs to include the capabilities and skill sets that should be applied before, 
during, and after an altercation (Franks, 2009: 231-243). Dynamic Alternatives (2010a: 
3) illustrate the need for reality-based training in the specialist security training that they 
deliver, one of the company’s mottos is: “the aim of training is to get as close to reality 
as safely as possible”. 
 
 157 
 
Generic best practice principles such as the need for effective visual demonstration and 
extensive repetition are critical components that are common to most skills training 
(Honig and Lewinski, 2008: 144). The concepts of an effective Defensive Tactics 
system as outlined in section 6.9 of Chapter 6, all come into play when assessing what 
should be taught, and how it should be taught. The concept of simplicity of technique 
selection is also of critical importance (Lau, 2001: 1; and Howe, 2005: 116). The 
principle of applying stress inoculation training is stated by many to be one of the most 
important considerations for preparing students to survive dangerous encounters (Honig 
& Lewinski, 2009: 130-135; Siddle, 1995: 87-107; and Siebel, 2010; 21-25). Schneider 
outlines this concept in regard to training CPOs as follows: 
Close Protection work is not for everyone and if during training a trainee 
cannot cope with stress, lack of sleep, discomfort and other job-related 
factors, he/she is actually the wrong person for the job. Instructional 
methodology should therefore concentrate on training candidates for the job 
they are going to have to do. This should include all the related stress factors 
and duress related to close protection operations (Schneider, 2005: 136). 
 
There is also an inherent requirement for use-of-force training to focus on preventing 
violence from occurring and minimising the impact should an incident actually occur 
(Nowicki, 2002; and Tuckey, 2004). This extends to all parties involved (the security 
officer, the attacker as well as the general public). Training needs to focus on conflict 
management and communication skills in order for officers to avoid situations (Franks, 
2009: 232-237). It is also crucial that an officer is able to apply force (specifically in self-
defence of him/herself or others) should the situation so necessitate (Petrowski, 2002: 
7). Within the Australian context, Sarre echoes the sentiments above and states that:  
The mere provision of security, of course, is inadequate if it is not backed up 
by adequate training. Security providers must be trained to act appropriately 
in all of the circumstances to minimise violence rather than exacerbate it 
(Sarre, 1995: 33). 
 
7.3 THE CONTENT OF THE USE-OF-FORCE TRAINING  
Training content is normally complied and prescribed by the training regulatory authority 
of a country or region. In South Africa this is governed by the SAQA (SASSETA, 2009) 
and in Australia by each states regulatory authority (DETA, 2009). As an Australian 
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example, the mandated units which relate directly to use of force for Crowd Controllers 
are listed by the Department of Justice and Attorney-General, (2008i) as: 
 
 Control persons using empty hand techniques (CPPSEC3013A); 
 Manage conflict through negotiation (CPPSEC3002A); and 
 Determine response to security risk situation (CPPSEC3003A). 
 
There are additional units for use of batons, handcuffs, firearms and pepper sprays but 
in Queensland, a Crowd Controller may not carry these (Department of Justice and 
Attorney-General, 2008e-i). The above three units form the crux of aggression and 
violence management training that would be given to a Crowd Controller. As an 
example for C-I-T officers in South Africa the following units which relate directly to use 
of force are listed (PSIRA, 2010): 
   
 U/S 120486 Demonstrate physical defensive restraining techniques; and 
 U/S 115331 Move tactically on foot in a team. 
 
Handgun 
 U/S 119649 Handle and use a handgun;  
 U/S 123515 Handle and use a handgun for business purposes; and 
 U/S 123510 Apply tactical knowledge in the use of a firearm.  
 
Shotgun (if relevant) 
 U/S 119652 Handle and use a shotgun; and  
 U/S 123514 Handle and use a shotgun for business purposes. 
 
Self-loading rifle or carbine (if relevant) 
 U/S 119650 Handle and use a self-loading rifle or carbine  
 U/S 123511 Handle and use a self-loading rifle or carbine for business  
 
The difference between Australia and South Africa is based on the number of use-of-
force options legally available (i.e. firearms for C-I-T officers in South Africa). There are 
many consistencies and the generic outcomes of the training units can be described as 
follows: 
 
 To ensure that the competent learner is able to identify any potential problems or 
security risks in advance. This is often referred to as situational awareness or 
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tactical awareness (see Section 4.5 of Chapter 4). The primary concept is on 
enabling a person to effectively scan their environment, understand what would 
pose a potential threat or hazard and recognise what could be done proactively to 
avoid such an issue; 
 
 Wherever possible, these problems should be diffused using verbal conflict 
management skills that avoid violence and ensure that situations are resolved 
quickly and efficiently with the minimum amount of inconvenience for all parties; 
 
 Should situations be impossible to diffuse with verbal communication, the 
appropriate minimum force options within the specifications of the law should be 
utilised to manage the situation as effectively as possible; and 
 
 Incidents should be recorded and reviewed for the purpose of improving 
performance (Department of Justice and Attorney-General, 2008i and PSIRA, 
2010). 
 
These outcomes are consistent with what other literary sources describe (Petrowski, 
2002; Siebel, 2010 and Wallentine, 2009). Petrowski (2002b: 29) summarises the 
fundamental training content requirements of a program in terms of its outcomes as 
follows:  
 
The training model based on threat assessment teaches officers to 
instinctively associate use-of-force with a threat. It conditions officers to 
respond to a threat with appropriate force and immediately cease all force 
options once an arrest is effected and there is no threat. 
 
Whilst not aimed directly at the private security industry, Thompson’s (1999) book: Dead 
or Alive, which is self-described as the definitive self-protection handbook, provides an 
outline of the recommended subject matter that should be covered in a Defensive 
Tactics training program. This outline would be transferable to the content requirements 
of several of the units described above. Below is an outline of his subject listings: 
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 Avoidance and awareness; 
 Attackers and attack rituals; 
 Fear control; 
 Line Ups and fences (pre-fight positioning); 
 Attacking tools; 
 Areas of attack; 
 Hands and elbows; 
 Feet; 
 Knees; 
 The head; 
 Chokes and strangles; 
 Throws; 
 Ground work; 
 Defence against a weapon; 
 Defence against multiple attackers; and 
 Self-defence and the law (Thompson, 1999: 15-222). 
 
7.4 THE FOCUS OF USE-OF-FORCE TRAINING 
The concept of ‘focus’ refers to what aspects of use-of-force training are given the most 
emphasis during a training program (Schneider, 2005: 112). In terms of focus, it is 
exceptionally difficult to place importance on one aspect of DT training over another, i.e. 
a rounded integrated approach is important (Siddle, 1995: 112-122). Despite this 
difficulty, there are several points of focus that best practice use-of-force training should 
take into account: 
 
7.4.1 The realities of violent attack 
The need to base training on genuine situations and to teach students the realities of 
violence and the management thereof is critical (Siddle, 1995: 109-130). Adrenal 
response management measures needs to be taught and practiced by students in order 
to enable them to best manage the effects on themselves and also be able to identify 
them in others, for example co-workers, attackers, etc. (Consterdine, 1997: 155-169; 
Grossman & Christensen, 2010: 31-72; and Thompson, 1999: 72-91). The measure of 
effective training is whether it serves to inoculate the trainee to a degree that they can 
function effectively under attack and recover quickly after an incident (Nowicki, 2001: 
29-30). Asken et al (2010: 122), outline four steps for linking the application of stress 
inoculation training skills to a realistic traumatic situation, they are: 
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1. Preparation for provocation [preparing mentally for the event]; 
2. Impact and confrontation [actual application of the correct technique or 
tactic]; 
3. Coping and arousal [application of adrenal management skills]; and 
4. Review and adjustments [assess performance and mistakes and adjust 
them so as not to repeat mistakes the next time]. 
 
7.4.2 The need for simplicity  
Whilst the scope of Defensive Tactics training is huge, it should focus on generic 
principles and only on a few techniques (Ben-Asher, 1983: 73-75). As Hick’s law (as 
outlined in section 5.8 of Chapter 5) states: The more options people are given the 
slower their response times. It is thus important to not become too focused on 
techniques but to look at the manner in which a person can react and respond to a 
situation. To support this Hanover (2008: 117) states that “the ultimate goal of a 
technique is to control the fight in the way that makes the most of your individual 
strengths and tactics”. The concept of being practical and not overcomplicating the 
selection of techniques and tactics is well summarised by Siddle (1995: 39), who states 
that “In essence, the ideal survival skills should be kept as simple as possible in 
technique complexity, technique response time and theory application.” In support of 
this the acronym of “KISS – Keep It Short and Simple”, is often explained as a critical 
component to effective Defensive Tactics training (ASP, 2010: 28). 
 
7.4.3 Repetition  
In order for skills, techniques and reaction to become instinctive, it is simply not good 
enough for them to be designed around natural stress response (Ben-Asher, 1983 and 
Grossman & Christensen, 2008). Techniques need to be repeated often enough for 
them to become an automated response (Hanover, 2008 and Siddle, 1995). It is critical 
that repetition is done correctly in order to develop the necessary neural pathways that 
is needed to be in place in order to apply techniques and tactics under stress (Honig 
and Lewinski, 2008: 144). Effective repetitive training involves not only imprinting 
techniques and skills on the short term memory but repeating them often enough so that 
they are imprinted into the long term memory too (Grossman & Christensen, 2008 and 
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Siddle 1995). The concept is well summarised by Honig and Lewinski (2008:144) who 
state that “Repetition increases motor memory, mental processing, and intuitive 
decision making under stress”. 
 
7.4.4 Attribute development  
It is not good enough simply to have a ‘tool’. It is equally important to have the skills and 
capabilities to utilise the said tool safely and effectively. These skills and capabilities are 
referred to as ‘attributes’. In the private security industry training time is often limited 
(Prenzler and Sarre, 2009: 218-219). As discussed in section 6.10, attribute 
development is very difficult to achieve when there is only limited training time available 
(Aveni, 2003: 1-3). This limited training time does not mean that students should not 
receive education on the importance of physical and non-physical attribute development 
(see sections 1.10 of Chapter 1 and 6.10 of Chapter 6 for information on attributes). 
Whilst, as a result of training limitations, it may not be possible to conduct enough 
repetitions to create a conditioned reflex, every effort should be made to highlight the 
need for security officers to maintain high levels of physical fitness and mental acuity 
and practice on their own to build the necessary neural pathways (Asken et al, 2010: 
17-42). 
 
7.4.5 Building confidence 
As a result of the short time periods allocated to actual training (Prenzler and Sarre, 
2009: 218-219) and the reality that trainees may previously never have been exposed to 
use-of-force situations (Dynamic Alternatives, 2010a: 3), the need to build students’ 
confidence is critical. A student who completes training with a high level of confidence 
gained through proper training and practice is more likely to perform effectively under 
attack (Howe, 2005 and Siddle, 1995) than those lacking in confidence. Grossman and 
Christensen (2010: 132-135) outline three points to develop training for life or death 
situations: 
 
1. Never ‘kill’ a warrior in training [students should be taught to fight on – no 
matter what];  
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2. Try to never send a loser off your training site [if students cannot get a 
drill correct they should repeat it until they do]; and 
3. As a trainer, never talk trash [badly] about your students, [i.e. denigrate 
‘trash’ them in front of other students, instructors should build and 
develop all of their students]. 
 
7.4.6 Work-related training and simulations 
Research has shown that simulation training dramatically improves use-of-force skills 
and decision-making (Bennel & Jones, 2003; Helsen & Starkles, 1999; Honig & 
Lewinski, 2008; Minnaar, 2001 and Seibel, 2010). The need for instructors to be 
experienced security professionals is important if they are to speak with credibility and 
share practical knowledge with their students. The importance of scenario-based 
training and stress inoculation being related to the working environment is also 
imperative (Asken et al, 2008 and Schneider, 2005). The need to tie training back to the 
work-related threats that an officer may face, is well summarised by Mroz (2003: 56), 
who outlines the following steps to perform under stress: “Understand your threats. 
Assess the likelihood of each of them happening. Be realistic. Be practical. Train 
accordingly”. Along with scenarios and simulations, a very effective method for applying 
particular tactics is through utilising role-play and developing situational response 
accordingly (Helsen & Starkles, 1999; and Seibel, 2010: 21-23). 
 
7.4.7 Need to teach effective conflict management, proactive prevention and
 communication skills 
The core concept of being able to resolve potentially violent situations by identifying 
early warning signs and taking proactive steps to prevent such a situation from 
occurring, should be the basis for all use-of-force training (Petrowski, 2002: 25-28). The 
ability to resolve conflict without resorting to physical violence by utilising effective non-
physical use-of-force tools, has been identified as one of the most important skill-sets 
for a security officer (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009 and Tuckey, 2004). This has 
specific reference to an officer being able to effectively communicate and conduct 
themselves according to best practice conflict management approaches before, during 
and after an incident. The ideal aim for any officer (police or private security) is not to 
have to utilise any use of force at all (Gold, 2008: 1-5). Nowicki (2001b: 23) explains this 
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concept as follows: “Avoidance of using any force is the preferred method versus 
fighting someone. Professional use-of-force instructors stress not only how to use force, 
but how to avoid, if possible, using any force.” 
 
A proactive approach also extends to teaching security officers to identify the early 
warning signs of possible violent action and not to wait for the attack to already be 
under-way before responding (Petrowski, 2002; Seibel, 2010; and Thompson, 1999). As 
outlined in section 4.3 of Chapter 4, De Becker (1997) provides a sound base for the 
development of skills that may indicate the possibility of violent action. This concept 
needs to be expanded and taught to officers as a fundamental component of conflict 
and violent behaviour management. Petrowski (2002: 30) emphasises this and states 
that “the cornerstone of use-of-force training must be threat assessment”.  
 
7.5 THE DURATION OF THE TRAINING 
The duration of training is an area that is not well explained or covered in existing 
literature. Most qualifications and units of competency have a notional learning hour 
formula linked to the credit value of the units (PSIRA, 2009 and Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2009), i.e. SAQA’s formula is 1 credit = 10 notional hours. Prenzler and Sarre 
(2009: 219) state that when compared to the Police, private security officers receive 
limited training. Experts on police training (Aveni, 2005; and Petrowski, 2002) believe 
that Defensive Tactics’ training times for law enforcement officers are too short. From 
this, it is possible to deduce that if private security officers face the same levels of 
violence as law enforcement officers, then training times are an issue of concern. This 
issue will be discussed in section 9.5.2 of Chapter 9 and a guideline for training time will 
be provided in section 10.5.2 of Chapter 10. 
 
 
7.6 THE TRAINEE’S PROFILE 
In many cases, the lower levels of the security industry are often comprised of persons 
who are not able to get other work for a variety of reasons and it is therefore not 
uncommon for literacy and numeracy to be a problem (Strom et al, 2010: 47). The 
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realities of the industry are that in many cases, the lower level guard often cannot get 
into the police or is using the security industry as a stepping stone to get into something 
else (Strom et al, 2010). The military and police generally have body type (height or 
weight) entry requirements for candidates wishing to enter their academies 
(Queensland Police, 2009 and SAPS, 2009). Since private security agencies are usually 
run for profit and do not have a direct governmental mandate most physical entry 
requirements are set by private companies or on the odd occasion by training 
academies and are therefore not general guidelines (Prenzler & Sarre, 2009: 219). 
However, there are some basic fundamental requirements for entry into the private 
security industry (PSIRA, 2009; and Queensland Government, 1993 & 2007). These 
requirements generally relate more specifically to literacy and numeracy (SAQA, 2008).  
 
There are also background requirements – whereby a person with a criminal record or 
prior convictions may not be granted a license to work in the industry (Department of 
Criminal Justice and the Attorney-General, 2008g; and PSIRA, 2009). In many cases, 
jobs within the security industry may preclude persons with physical or mental 
disabilities, i.e. a person in a wheel chair would not be able to operate as a Crowd 
Controller. In spite of this, within the security industry there are opportunities for many 
disabled persons (specifically with the monitoring industry) but for obvious reasons this 
generally does not stretch to use-of-force applications which in most cases, requires a 
person to be fit and able (Mroz, 2003: 3-6). The profile of the trainee is something that 
trainers cannot influence, therefore they need to be able to relate to different groups 
effectively (this will be discussed in section 7.9). Over and above the basic literacy, 
numeracy and physical fitness requirements, there are certain other issues regarding 
the trainee’s profile that should be taken into account (More details are outlined in 
section 9.10 of Chapter 9). A breakdown of some of the core issues are discussed 
below. 
 
7.6.1 Mental stability  
There is little or no testing or verification of mental stability at the training entry level. In 
most cases, all that is done on license applications is a criminal record check 
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(Department of Criminal Justice and the Attorney-General, 2008a-g and PSIRA, 2009). 
Mental stability should include aspects such as substance abuse, including steroids 
(Asken et al, 2010: 22-25). As compared to the policing environment these aspects 
seems to be majorly underplayed in the private security industry. 
 
7.6.2 Decision-making capacity  
The student must have the capacity to make decisions under pressure. Whilst this may 
be less important in terms of Category One officers, as the risk and responsibilities 
increase in further categories and officers are equipped with lethal force capability, 
decision-making becomes a core skill (Howe, 2005 and Seibel, 2010). This lethal force 
capacity requires that a person is effectively able to scan their environment and the 
people in it, assess the relevant threats, and act accordingly and in time (Dynamic 
Alternatives, 2010: 17-19). It is possible that some people just cannot handle this 
pressure and may continually freeze or panic or make the incorrect choices. This is a 
variable that needs to be assessed during training (Dror et al, 2007: 270-271). Effective 
competency assessment cannot be truly conducted without practical scenarios and 
realistic simulations which should be used to verify a person’s capabilities in this area 
(Helsen & Starkles, 1999; and Seibel, 2010).  
 
7.6.4 Motivation of students 
The issue of motivation is a complex one. It is the job of a trainer to motivate their 
students (Siddle, 1995). However, the reality of even the lowest level of security job is 
that it requires a person to be self-motivated, i.e. to a certain degree they must be able 
to manage themselves (Franks, 2009: 109-112). This extends to a person’s levels of 
self-discipline (Howe, 2005). Thus, if a person cannot motivate him/herself and have the 
necessary self-discipline to perform during a training course, he/she is unlikely to make 
a very good security officer. This is usually not the training provider’s issue but the 
employer’s problem. However, by identifying this tendency in training, it may be possible 
for the trainer to correct the motivation problem and assist the student in performing 
more effectively (Howe, 2005: 45-46).  
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7.6.5 Capacity for team work and the ability to follow orders 
Being a team-player is a very important skill in the security industry, as is the ability to 
follow orders and instructions (Franks, 2009: 109-112). At the higher levels, security 
officers may need to be able to show initiative and think on their feet (Howe, 2009). This 
means that the need to follow orders is universal to this industry. The ability to follow 
instructions, as well as work as part of a team, needs to be nurtured and developed 
throughout any training course (Franks, 2009: 109-112). However, the use of practical 
assessments and student feedback reports can also indicate the student’s capability to 
work in a team as well as follow orders. At the higher levels where leadership skills 
become important, a trainer should also be able to identify, and develop them 
accordingly (Howe, 2005: 13-142). 
 
7.7 THE INTENSITY OF THE TRAINING 
The realities of managing a violent attack are very ‘intense’ i.e. require focus, a lot of 
effort and energy and may have serious consequences attached to the manner in which 
an incident is handled. However, depending on the category in which the officer 
operates, there may or may not be a high likelihood of being exposed to such an attack. 
As such, the intensity of training should be sequential, i.e. it gets more intense as the 
Category of operations increase (Siebel, 2010: 19-24). The need to provide officers with 
stress inoculation training has proven to be one of the most effective methodologies in 
preparing them to effectively manage all aspects of work-related stress (Asken et al, 
2010; Aveni, 2003; Grossman & Christensen, 2008; Schneider, 2005 and Siebel, 2010). 
The extreme use-of-force situation is the application of lethal force. The thought of 
having to use lethal force is unpalatable for some but the realities of applying lethal 
force need to be built into the training of officers in Categories Three and Four 
(Grossman and Christensen, 2008: 176-220). Research (Grossman, 2009: 1011-1126), 
has outlined that the resistance to applying lethal force is an inherent mechanism in the 
vast majority of persons. Therefore specific training and mental preparation is required 
to educate persons who may have to apply it (Asken et al, 2010: 43-92). It has been 
proven that officers who mentally prepare themselves and have been trained effectively, 
not only perform far better under attack, but are also far less likely to experience 
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negative after effects and post-traumatic stress disorder (Grossman and Christensen, 
2008: 278-301).  
 
It is this responsibility of the training provider to build up students to the point where 
they can effectively manage the stress of a live attack situation (Howe, 2005: 33-40). As 
discussed in section 6.9 of Chapter 6, the reality of use-of-force skills sets is that it 
requires both physical and non-physical attributes. This requirement means that certain 
persons may not be as capable (either through mental or physical hindrances) to 
effectively develop the required competencies to operate in a high risk environment (see 
previous section 7.7 of this Chapter). Providing an accurate level of intensity during 
training helps students to understand their own capabilities and/or limitations. Identifying 
limitations in training could quite literally save lives in the field. As such it is critical that 
training should seek to mimic operational requirements (Schneider, 2005: 211).  
 
7.8 THE INSTRUCTOR’S SKILLS 
There are several factors that come into play when evaluating the requirements of 
instructors (Nowicki, 2001b: 20-22). Many of these factors are relevant to instructors of 
all categories within the security industry. The basic fundamental concept is that an 
instructor must have a level of subject matter expertise, before they are able to teach 
someone else (Schneider, 2005: 133). In reality, subject matter knowledge alone is also 
not enough, as a trainer must also have the necessary teaching skills to pass the 
relevant knowledge onto students and ensure that they are taught the correct skills 
(Howe, 2005; 33-47). Schneider (2005: 133) provides the example of instructor 
requirements for Close Protection trainers: 
 
On analysis of the problem [ineffective instructors], two related aspects were 
identified as probable causes for any close protection instructor-related 
problems. These were either the instructor/s possibly not having the 
necessary operational experience to train candidates effectively and/or they 
were not trained in effective instructor methodology [teaching skills]. 
 
Both South Africa’s and Australia’s training and security regulatory authorities have 
identified these weak points and implemented systems to manage them (DETA, 2009 
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and SASSETA, 2009). The accreditation process includes a verification of service 
provider details and infrastructure; an assessment of the providers’ quality management 
system; learning materials; policies and procedures and an evaluation of all training 
venues available to such a company or individual. To maintain accreditation, the 
SASSETA requires updates on all of the above-mentioned aspects, as well as the right 
to inspect training and operations in their sole discretion (SASSETA, 2010). This 
process was extracted and modified from Schneider’s (2005: 134) example of Close 
Protection trainers in South Africa: 
 
 A candidate must complete a generic assessor’s course and then register 
with the relevant SETA. (This would be the SASSETA). 
 The registration will include evaluation of the candidates’ resumé and prior 
experience in order to establish if he/she has the necessary credentials to 
be considered a Subject Matter Expert (SME). 
 In order to qualify as a trainer, the candidate would have to undergo a Train-
the-Trainer course recognised through the Education, Training and 
Development Practices Sector Education and Training Authority (ETDP 
SETA). 
 For an instructor to deliver training in the private sector, he/she would have 
to operate through a SASSETA accredited training provider. In order for a 
company or individual to be accredited, they would have to undergo quite 
an extensive accreditation process. This process would ensure that a 
provider has the ability to offer high quality training as well as maintain 
effective records of such training. 
 
This process is similar in Australia where a candidate needs to have a minimum of a 
Certificate IV in Training and Assessment as well as having the relevant qualification in 
the area they would like to be able to teach, i.e. before an instructor can teach a 
Certificate III in Security Operations, they must first have the qualifications themselves 
(DETA, 2008). Certain jurisdictions have identified the need for further requirements for 
persons wanting to be security trainers. An example of this is Western Australia (WA) 
which requires the Police Commissioner to sign off on any Security Training Officer and 
company before they can legally operate. Individuals are required to operate through an 
RTO and submit a CV and copies of qualifications to illustrate their experience (WA 
Police, 2010).  
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Over and above the qualifications and competencies of an instructor, the instructor 
needs to motivate and provide guidance to students. It is a commonly acknowledged 
fact, that instructors become role models and set the standard for future officers in 
terms of best practice (Howe, 2005: 33-40). With this heavy burden placed on 
instructors the responsibilities are far reaching (Grossman & Christensen, 2008: 136). 
The ability for an instructor to set a good example and provide an effective set of best 
practice examples for officers to apply is very relevant (Howe, 2009: 45-65). This 
concept alludes to the reality that an incompetent instructor may, in fact, pass on bad 
habits to their students, whilst the converse of this is also true (a good instructor will 
pass on good habits). The consequences of ‘bad habits’, when it comes to use-of-force 
training could have very serious consequences. This is not limited simply to when and 
when not to use force, but applies to the safe handling, storage and maintenance of 
weaponry as well (IFTA, 2009).  
 
It is also important that an instructor stays current with operational best practice and 
changing trends so as to ensure that students are educated in-line with what is needed 
to do the job and not what the instructor perceives as relevant (Howe, 2009: 125-149). 
Siddle (1995: 12) summarises this idea by stating that “(use-of-force) instructors have a 
moral and legal obligation to constantly research, methods to enhance training and, 
ultimately, to assure the survival of their students”. Whilst it may not be necessary for 
the instructor to physically outperform students, the need for instructors to be able to 
provide demonstrations, as well as have a thorough knowledge of the subject matter, is 
critical. This concept is explained by correlating the fact that many professional athletes 
outperform their coaches but still require a good coach to succeed (Siddle, 1995: 14).  
 
 
7.9 THE MATERIALS AND TRAINING VENUES 
In terms of reviewing the existing literature, it was difficult to find a standardised 
structure that outlined student/instructor ratios. While some manuals (IFTA, 2010 and 
Dynamic Alternatives, 2010) provide guidelines for the approach, it seems that different 
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training organisations prefer different types of equipment. There are also inherent 
difficulties involved with practical and scenario-based training, as opposed to 
classroom-based training that will be discussed in these sections. Aveni sums this up 
with regard to police training as follows: 
 
It is far more time-efficient to utilize one instructor to lecture 30-50 trainees in 
a classroom than it is to have one instructor proctor 1-3 trainees in scenario-
based training. And, if your academy curriculum needs to be squeezed into 
sixteen weeks, quantitative demands tend to take precedence over those that 
are qualitative (Aveni, 2003: 1). 
 
This subject matter will be discussed below in four subdivisions: 
 Facilities; 
 Equipment; 
 Safety measures; and 
 Environmental considerations.  
 
7.9.1 Facilities 
A safe training environment is the first crucial component for any use-of-force training 
(Dynamic Alternatives, 2010a: 5). In reality use-of-force situations take place in unsafe 
environments and this has to be taken into consideration (Thompson, 1999: 127-128). 
When it comes to firearms training there is no choice but to utilise accredited firearm 
ranges (IFTA, 2010). In terms of use-of-force options, the training environment can 
indeed be diverse. Ideally, a matted area, free of obstructions would be required for 
Defensive Tactics training with other hard skills being integrated on the shooting range 
or in further training conducive outdoor environments (Dynamic Alternatives, 2010a: 5). 
Consterdine (1997: 251) highlights the importance of taking candidates “out of the 
matted training area and onto the street to train”. 
 
7.9.2 Equipment 
There have been huge advances in equipment that provide candidates with the 
opportunity to apply integrated, full power use-of-force techniques and this has, created 
a new era for use-of-force training (Mroz. 2003: 163-165). Equipment such as modified 
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paintball guns that are exact replicas of real weapons or ‘Simunition’ and other tools 
have enabled integration of use-of-force tools to be taken to a different level (Mesloh et 
al, 2008: 51). Simunition, better known as ‘Sim’, is a system whereby operators utilise 
their everyday service weapons but replace the barrels and use special paintball tipped 
cartridges in place of bullets. The weapon functions as normal which provides an 
excellent training tool for them. The development of ‘safety padding suits’ that enable 
students to apply full force, use-of-force techniques, to a moving opponent who fights 
back are also an excellent tool (Macho Products Inc, 2010). The benefit of such 
equipment is that it enables a trainee to undergo total immersion and really feel what a 
situation might be like in reality (Nowicki, 2001: 29-30). This forms the core basis for 
effective stress inoculation training. To support the benefits of modern equipment, a 
recent study stated that: “Simunition with reality-based training is the best way to apply 
what you were taught and see how good you think you are” (Seibel, 2010: 22).  
 
As the bare minimum, safety equipment should be a core part of all use-of-force training 
(Ben-Asher, 1983 and Hanover, 2008). This could include eye and ear protection for 
firearms training (IFTA, 2010) as well as groin protectors and mouth guards for unarmed 
combat training (Advanced Combat Training, 2008). Whilst it may be possible to 
introduce candidates to the basic operations of various use-of-force tools and 
equipment via videos and other multimedia resources, there is no substitute for actually 
handling and utilising relevant weapons and tools during training (Dynamic Alternatives, 
2010: 97-115). 
 
7.9.3 Safety measures 
The realities of use of force and violence, involve inflicting damage on an attacker. It is 
vital that students are exposed to this reality without getting injured. To highlight this 
concept, Dr Dennis Hanover (2008) is famous for stating that students should leave a 
training session ‘bruised but not broken’. The need to safely expose students to use of 
force – both from the receiving and issuing ends – is a complex issue. It requires for an 
instructor to have a wide range of experience, in such training and practice, and to 
ensure that first aid equipment is readily available (Siebel, 2010: 7). Risk management 
 173 
 
practices are also important for training companies who wish to truly provide realistic 
training. An example of this is applied by Dynamic Alternatives (2010a: 5) who employ a 
qualified paramedic when use-of-force scenarios are conducted during training courses. 
 
7.9.4 Specific environmental considerations 
The concept of factoring in specific training consideration refers to any aspects that may 
not have been taken into account when evaluating the facility, the equipment and the 
safety considerations. Aspects such as ventilation or the temperature that students are 
exposed too during training need to be taken into account (Franks, 2010: 25-34). When 
realistic work-orientated training is presented for officers in Categories Three and Four, 
there may be further considerations such as creating fatigue and pressure to simulate 
realistic operational conditions (Schneider, 2005: 108-110). When aspects such as this 
are applied, it is critical that the candidates are closely monitored. Monitoring is 
important in order to avoid any unnecessary injuries or psychological ill effects that 
stressful training may cause (Howe, 2005: 96-130). When conducting outdoor training, 
there may also be issues such as managing sunstroke or bee-stings, which should be 
factored into the training approach (Franks, 2010: 134-145). In essence, a 
comprehensive approach incorporating best practice training concepts, generic safety, 
occupational health and safety practices as well as specific requirements of the training 
intervention should be applied to use-of-force training. The core ideal is to ensure that it 
is delivered in such a manner that it “gets as close to reality – as safely as possible” 
(Dynamic Alternatives, 2010a: 5). 
 
7.10 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
The focus of this study is to ascertain how best to train private security officers in 
effectively managing use-of-force situations to which they may be exposed, as part of 
their work responsibilities. In order to deliver effective training, it is critical to understand 
what effective training actually is. This extends to identifying what core ingredients are 
needed to achieve set results. In order to assess this Schneider’s (2005), model of 
identifying the core aspects of effective training has been utilised. The model consists of 
seven key aspects, namely: 
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1. The content of the training; 
2. The focus of the training;  
3. The duration of the training;  
4. The trainee’s profile; 
5. The intensity of the training;  
6. The instructor’s skills; and  
7. The materials (protective equipment, gloves, impact shields, etc.) and training 
venues that are needed to deliver effective training.  
 
There were several important concepts that were identified and explained in this 
Chapter. The importance of stress inoculation training and attribute development of both 
physical and non-physical attributes is crucial for competency in use-of-force skills. 
Simulations, scenarios and role-plays are very useful tools for training officers in use of 
force. The use of ‘live’ scenarios and simulations to enhance trainee’s decision making 
capabilities should be included in use-of-force training programs. The reality is that the 
majority of the private security industry operates in Category One, which means that 
they require a very limited amount of use-of-force training. However, as the category 
levels increase comprehensive use-of-force training and re-training is required. There 
are many critical components required for a person to be a use-of-force instructor. 
Among these is the ability for the instructor to motivate his/her students and set an 
example of best practice for them. Instructors should be subject matter experts and 
constantly research methods to better educate and prepare their students.  
 
The application of modern use-of-force training tools can be very useful in developing 
students to effectively deal with work-related use-of-force incidents. It is important that a 
holistic risk management and safety approach be applied to use-of-force training. This is 
significant since the very nature of use of force involves inflicting damage onto another 
person. In order to ensure that the likelihood of injuries occurring is minimised advanced 
planning and a well experienced instructor are important components to the training 
initiative. First aid capacity should always be available in case of need. 
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Chapter 8 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: QUESTIONNAIRE 
______________________________________________________________________ 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to determine the realities of the private security industry, several research 
methodologies were utilised. This Chapter will focus specifically on the findings obtained 
from the survey component of this research project. The survey component could be 
classed as foundational research. This foundational structure was designed and 
developed in order to create a platform from which to ask probing questions during the 
next phases of research (face-to-face interviews and focus group research). A statistical 
analysis of the surveys will be provided. This analysis will highlight the data that was 
extracted once the information was coded and correlated. As with any research there is 
the possibility of inaccurate information being obtained from respondents. In order to 
diminish this issue, the survey research was only one component of the research 
conducted to compile this dissertation.  
 
8.2 THE QUESTIONNAIRE  
The Researcher has previously conducted research in the South African private security 
industry. In addition to the previous research, additional research, conducted through 
several focused interviews and a focus group enabled the Researcher to identify any 
changes in the South African industries as well as any changes in trends and practices. 
As such the survey which focused on Crowd Controllers was not utilised in South Africa 
as it was the researchers opinion that it would not yield any significant information about 
the South African specific environment that would not be obtained via the interview and 
the Focus Group. It was determined during the research design phase that more 
information regarding the industry in Queensland was required. In order to address this, 
a survey (see Annexure 2) was distributed to two hundred security officers in south 
eastern Queensland. The south eastern region of Queensland was selected as the 
target population since it accounts for more than two thirds of the state’s population 
(Queensland. Department of Treasury, 2010: 17). It was also suggested by the Director 
of the Queensland licensing authority during his interview (Woods, 2008) that it would 
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be more productive to focus on this geographic area as this is where there is a far 
higher density of private security officers and the likelihood of effective distribution and 
return would be dramatically increased. The survey consisted of fourteen questions 
making use of Likert scales, Yes/no choice, open and closed questions as well as 
cumulative rating scales. The aim was to focus the distribution amongst Crowd 
Controllers who are deemed to be the highest risk category in the Australian security 
industry. This goal was achieved with seventy-eight percent (78%) of respondents 
claiming to hold Crowd Controller licences and indicating that they worked as Crowd 
Controllers. Assistance from local security companies was a critical tool in getting the 
surveys distributed, completed and returned. Out of the two hundred distributed sixty 
four were returned. This is a response rate of thirty two percent (32%) which is 
considered a good return rate for volunteer survey and questionnaire distribution 
(Johnson and Owens, 2003: 127-133). It should be noted that there may be a certain 
level of bias and inaccuracy which could be attributed to the fact that the officers who 
responded were asked by their managers to complete the documents as opposed to 
being contacted directly by the Researcher. As such, they may not have wanted to 
answer negatively to some of the questions that could indicate a lack of delivery from 
their employer. Furthermore, the ‘ego’ and ‘pride’ associated with being a Crowd 
Controller (i.e. portraying an image of no fear and physical confidence) may have 
skewed responses. This could also have been as a result of peer pressure and 
respondents not wanting to take the chance of fellow officers knowing that they may be 
afraid or feel unconfident when they work. Despite these possible issues, the surveys 
provide some interesting outcomes which will be discussed below: 
 
8.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS 
Respondents were given the option of answering the survey anonymously. Many of the 
respondents (48.38%) chose to answer anonymously based on this option. As 
mentioned in the previous section, this could have been attributed to fear of 
repercussions in respondents giving their names and stating anything negative about 
their employer or the licensing authorities. Out of all the respondents, only three stated 
that they had attended a university and gained higher education. This relates to a figure 
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of just under five percent (4.7%) of respondents. This appears to be below the average 
of the United States findings which surveyed the whole industry there and found that 
twelve percent (12%) had completed a college or university degree (Strom et al, 2010: 
47). Respondent’s levels of experience ranged from a few months to sixteen years. The 
median level of experience for respondents, taking into account non-response, was 
three and a half years. This indicates that some, if not all of the candidates had 
hundreds of hours of operational experience working in the private security industry and 
as such, a wealth of knowledge regarding the industry and use of force.  
 
Eighty percent (80%) of the respondents indicated that they were licensed with the 
remaining twenty percent (20%) not answering the question. This could mean that 
despite all the attempts and efforts of the industry to ensure that only licensed officers 
can work, there still may be many unlicensed officers working (even in Queensland 
which has a very robust regulatory structure).  
 
8.4 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION ONE 
In this question respondents were asked to confirm what skills and subject matter they 
were taught during their initial training. The feedback26 is summarised in the table 
below: 
 
Figure 15: Questionnaire respondent feedback on skills taught in initial training  
 
 
Skill/Subject Percentage that 
were taught skill 
Percentage that 
were not taught skill 
1. Legal aspects of use of force 85.71% 14.29% 
2. Concepts of force escalation and de-
escalation  
79.37% 20.63% 
3. Fitness and conditioning 22.22% 77.78% 
4. Verbal command techniques 80.95% 19.05% 
5. Self defence against unarmed attack 71.43% 28.57% 
                                                 
26 Note: There was a non-response rate of 4.76% for Question 1. The non-response has not been 
factored into the percentage calculations.  
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6. Self defence against knife attack  31.75% 68.25% 
7. Restraint and control (using handcuffs, 
unarmed or improvised restraints)  
53.97% 46.03% 
8. Use of baton 20.64% 59.36% 
9. Use of Pepper spray of CS  4.76% 95.24% 
10. Firearm disarming, retention and tactical 
application  
12.70% 87.30% 
 
8.4.1 Discussion 
As a result of the fact that the Australian environment, where weaponry is not allowed to 
be carried by most Crowd Controllers, the lack of focus on weapons skills is understood. 
The respondents outlining that they had received training in legal aspects (85.71%), 
force escalation and de-escalation (79.37%) and verbal skills (80.95%) initially appears 
positive. However, these figures mean that between 15% and 20% of respondents 
either were not trained, or could not recall being trained in these aspects. This is a 
potentially worrying trend. These three subjects form the core structure for all security 
officer categories. Since the majority (78%) of officers claimed to be working as Crowd 
Controllers there seems to be a disparity in their skills training. An example of where the 
lack of training could be serious, is that it is not uncommon, for Crowd Controllers to be 
attacked with drinking glasses or beer bottles (Winlow et al, 2001: 537). The need to be 
able to defend against an edged weapon attack did not coincide with the feedback to 
this question. An overwhelming 68.25% of respondents claimed that they were not 
taught such skills. Whilst this is very concerning, an issue of greater concern was the 
fact that 28.57 % of respondents claimed they were not even taught to defend against 
unarmed attack. 
 
8.5 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION TWO 
Respondents were asked to rate how often they had received on-going or refresher 
training. The feedback was allocated into four time lines (a fifth option was ‘no 
response’). The timelines and the responses are illustrated below: 
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Figure 16:  Questionnaire respondent feedback on re-training  
 
Frequency of on-going or refresher training Percentage responses 
1. More than once a month 6.35% 
2. 1 or 2 times a year 44.44% 
3. Every 3 years 7.93% 
4. Never 38.10% 
5. No response 3.18% 
 100% 
  
       
 
 
8.5.1 Discussion  
Several months before this survey was distributed, the Queensland Licensing Authority, 
the OFT, implemented triennial revalidation training for Crowd Controllers and several 
other licensing categories (Department of Justice and Attorney-General Queensland, 
2008). The subjects requiring requalification are self-defence, conflict management and 
first aid. As a result of this, it was expected that the vast majority of respondents would 
have stated that they receive re-training every three years but this was not the case with 
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only 7.93% of respondents stating they received training every three years. It is 
exceptionally worrying that almost forty percent (38.10%) of officers claimed to have 
never been re-trained. A possible explanation for this is that a portion of these 
responses could be attributed to new entries into the industry. When assessing the 
median level of experience and relating this to this response, there is definitely a 
significant portion of active security officers who have not undergone training for years 
since they initially qualified. 
 
8.6 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION THREE 
Respondents were asked about how often their competency levels for the subjects in 
question one were assessed, either by their employer or regulatory authorities. The 
feedback was allocated into four timeline options. The responses are illustrated below: 
 
Figure 17:  Questionnaire respondent feedback on competency assessments  
 
Frequency of competency assessments Percentage responses 
1. More than once a month 12.70% 
2. 1 or 2 times a year 33.34% 
3. Every 3 years 7.93% 
4. Never 46.03% 
 100% 
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8.6.1 Discussion  
The core point worth noting under this question is that over forty six percent (46.03%) of 
respondents claim to have never been reassessed on their skills and competencies. 
The implementation of triennial revalidation in Queensland should greatly assist with an 
improvement in the measurement of competency levels. Regular competency 
assessment is an issue of concern because many of the hard skills that security officers 
learn are perishable and will degenerate without training. There are also on-going 
changes in legalisation and industry best practice, about which, officers would need to 
be educated. Over forty six percent (46.1%) of respondents stated that they were 
assessed at least once a year. This means that there are some companies or 
organisations that do conduct regular assessments and as such, it is both viable and 
possible that this should be an industry norm. 
 
8.7 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION FOUR 
Question four was a simple dual choice (yes or no) question. It was designed to assess 
whether students felt that they were well prepared by their initial training. It also was 
designed to assess whether or not they left their training with a heightened level of 
confidence. There was a non-response rate of 3.18 % for this question. The 
overwhelming majority (79.36%) of the respondents answered ‘yes’, indicating that they 
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felt adequately prepared for their work-related duties. A minority (17.46 %) of 
respondents answered ‘no’. This response rate may be linked to the ratio of officers who 
have actually experienced violent attacks. This correlation will be discussed further in 
section 8.13 of this Chapter.  
 
8.8 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION FIVE 
Question Five was intended to clarify information obtained in Question Four. The 
clarification was intended to relate the general levels of confidence obtained after 
completing initial training and specifically in relation to self-defence. The response 
options were ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘maybe’. The aim of this question was to ascertain the ratio 
of security officer’s specific confidence levels in terms of defending against attack as 
compared with the previous question which measured confidence levels after initial 
training. The response feedback was as follows: 
 
Figure 18:  Questionnaire respondent feedback on confidence to defend against 
an attack  
 
Confidence to defend against an attack Percentage responses 
1. Yes 46.03% 
2. No 4.76% 
3. Maybe 49.21% 
 100% 
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8.8.1 Discussion  
Ideally, training should prepare an officer for all of his/her duty-related responsibilities. 
The rate that officers felt prepared should have been similar to the rate of confidence 
they felt after completing initial training (79.36%). Feedback to this question identified 
that the categories of ‘not being prepared’ and ‘being uncertain’ account for 53.97% of 
the responses. This is exceptionally worrying. This feedback outlines that more than half 
of the officers certified did not have a confirmed level of confidence in their capability to 
defend themselves. Another factor that needs to be considered is that as a result of not 
wanting to seem unfit for their job, candidates may not have selected to answer ‘no’ but 
opted for the more neutral ‘maybe’. This means that low levels of confidence in terms of 
self-defence could be even worse. 
 
8.9 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION SIX 
In order to better understand the findings of Question Five, the respondent were asked 
whether or not they had concerns for their own or their fellow officer’s safety whilst 
conducting their work-related duties. Respondents were given three options of response 
linked to the frequency that they felt unsafe whilst working. The findings are outlined 
below: 
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Figure 19:  Questionnaire respondent feedback on safety concerns 
 
Frequency of concerns for own and fellow 
officers safety 
Percentage responses 
1. Always 28.57% 
2. Sometimes 52.38% 
3. Never 17.46% 
4. No response 1.59% 
 100% 
 
 
 
8.9.1 Discussion  
Almost thirty percent (28.57%) of respondents indicated that they were always 
concerned for their own or fellow officers’ safety. This feedback clearly shows that the 
risks that certain categories of security officers constantly face are very real. Since this 
survey focused on Category Two officers, it would stand to reason that officers in higher 
categories may have even greater concerns regarding operational safety. The 
comparatively small number of respondents (17.46%) who stated that they have no 
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safety concerns can probably be associated with the number of very experienced 
officers who may, over the years, have faced attacks and developed the skills to 
manage such attacks. The reality that over eighty percent (80%) of the respondents 
were either concerned about safety ‘sometimes’ or ‘all of the time’ whilst working, 
indicates a definite need to better train and prepare officers. 
 
8.10 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION SEVEN 
Question Seven was designed to ascertain whether officers felt that they had the 
necessary equipment to safely perform all of their work-related duties. Responses were 
divided into three categories as shown below: 
 
Figure 20:  Questionnaire respondent feedback on equipment  
 
Have the correct equipment Percentage responses 
1. Yes 55.55% 
2. No 23.81% 
3. Never thought about it 19.05% 
4. No response 1.59% 
 100% 
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8.10.1 Discussion  
Over half (55%) of the respondents believed they were adequately equipped to perform 
their duties. The feedback to this question infers that the balance of respondents who 
did not answer ‘yes’ either ‘never thought about it’ (i.e. they did not know that they could 
get better equipment) or believed that the equipment they were given was inadequate. 
The issue of equipment was also supported by some survey respondents in their open-
ended responses which will be discussed in greater detail in section 8.18 of this 
Chapter. The issue of equipment will be discussed in more detail in section 9.8 of 
Chapter 9. 
 
8.11 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION EIGHT  
Question Eight was specifically designed to ascertain whether respondents felt they had 
the necessary equipment and skills to restrain a violent suspect without unnecessarily 
hurting him or her. In addition, this question aimed to determine whether respondents 
understood the concepts associated with minimum force practices. The feedback was 
as follows: 
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Figure 21:  Questionnaire respondent feedback on restraint capabilities  
 
Capability to restrain assailant with 
minimum force 
Percentage responses 
1. Yes 65.08% 
2. No 22.22% 
3. Unsure 12.70% 
 100% 
  
 
 
 
8.11.1 Discussion  
The capability to restrain an offender until police arrive is a core skill for most jobs that 
security officers perform. This skill set becomes critically important for officers in 
Category Two and above as they are most likely going to be the first responders that 
need to manage or contain a situation until police officers arrive. The feedback 
illustrates that almost thirty-five percent (34.92%) of respondents felt they either could 
not, or were unsure as to whether they could safely restrain an offender. This means 
that approximately a third of officers may not be able to effectively and safely apply a 
citizen’s arrest and restrain offenders without causing the suspect unnecessary harm. 
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This indicates a dire need for further training. The low levels of capabilities indicated by 
this response may also be linked to the lack of restraining equipment and the legal 
limitations that officers face in carrying and using such equipment. 
  
8.12 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION NINE  
Respondents were asked to indicate the frequency with which they have had to utilise 
physical force whilst performing their duties. This question was designed to ascertain 
the real levels of exposure that respondents had to violent attack as well as the need for 
them to utilise force to manage incidents of violence. The respondents were given four 
response options as outlined below: 
 
Figure 22:  Questionnaire respondent feedback on the frequency of use of force  
 
Frequency of use of force on the job Percentage responses 
1. Never 6.35% 
2. Occasionally 68.25% 
3. Regularly 20.64% 
4. All the time 4.76% 
 100% 
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8.12.1 Discussion  
The comparatively small number (6.35%) of respondents who have never had to utilise 
physical force were most likely new entrants to the industry. The overwhelming majority 
of candidates (88.89%) answered that they have to either apply force regularly or 
occasionally. This frequency further illustrates the importance of use-of-force training for 
security officers (specifically in the Category Two and above). The respondents who 
answered that they utilise physical force all the time (4.76%) are indicative of a small 
minority who may not have the verbal and conflict management skills to de-escalate 
incidents. There is also a possibility that this small minority may be abusers of steroids 
or similar substances which negatively affect them and their ability to determine when 
and when not to apply force. 
 
8.13 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION TEN 
Respondents were asked to rate the importance that they attributed to on-going skills 
training and how important the on-going training was to their operational safety. The 
primary aim of this question was to ascertain if officers placed a priority on the need to 
train and re-train in order to enhance their safety. Respondents were asked to rate the 
priority of the subject according the options illustrated below: 
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Figure 23:  Questionnaire respondent feedback on the importance of on-going 
  training  
 
Importance of on-going training Percentage responses 
1. Very important 44.44% 
2. Important 49.20% 
3. Not important 3.18% 
4. No response 3.18% 
 100% 
 
       
 
 
8.13.1 Discussion  
The results to this question were interesting, with almost ninety four percent (93.64%) of 
respondents indicating that they believed on-going training was either important or very 
important, in order to enhance personal safety. This feedback clearly identifies that 
respondents believe that effective training does contribute to their safety. The concept 
of on-going training and refresher training is of critical import to this study. The response 
to this question clearly indicates (at least in theory) that officers place a priority on 
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training and re-training. This does not seem to correlate with the amount of training 
respondents claimed to attend as outlined in section 8.4 of this Chapter. The feedback 
from section 8.4 of this Chapter showed that approximately forty percent (40%) of 
respondents stated that they never re-train. When correlating the feedback from this 
question and previous feedback it indicates a severe discrepancy which raises the 
following question: ‘If security officers understand the need for re-training and feel it is 
important, why do they not re-train regularly?’ This question will be discussed in more 
detail in the feedback from interview respondents in Chapter Nine. 
  
8.14 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION ELEVEN 
In Question two respondents were asked to rate the importance of on-going skills 
training to enhance safety. Question Ten assessed respondent’s rating of the 
importance of training for their own safety. The difference in the focus of question 
eleven is that it relates directly to the safety of the antagonist and not to the safety of the 
security officer. The basis for this question was to assess whether officers placed equal 
importance on training and on-going training with regard to the safety of themselves and 
the antagonist. The feedback is outlined below: 
 
Figure 24: Questionnaire respondent feedback on the importance of training to
 improve the safety of assailants  
 
Importance of training to antagonists safety Percentage responses 
1. Very important 39.68% 
2. Important 55.55% 
3. Not important 1.59% 
4. No response 3.18% 
 100% 
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8.14.1 Discussion  
Over ninety five percent (95.23%) of the respondents rated the need for on-going skills 
training as either ‘very important’ or ‘important’ to the safety of a potentially violent or 
violent suspect when an incident occurs. This feedback correlates to the findings from 
Question Ten. It could thus be stated that respondents appeared to understand the 
importance of training not only to enhance their own safety but also the safety of 
persons to whom they may be applying force. 
 
8.15 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION TWELVE 
Question Twelve was designed to ascertain the respondent’s perception of their own 
skills. It was also designed to measure the perceptions of officers regarding use of force 
and training. Respondents were asked to circle as many of the statements (outlined 
below) that they believed were relevant to themselves. There was a non-response rate 
of 6.35% to this question: 
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Figure 25:  Questionnaire respondent feedback on the perception of their own 
skills  
 
Security officer statements Percentage responses 
I am well equipped and trained   76.19% 
I am not motivated to improve my skills 9.52% 
I do not believe I need to have better skills 
to be safer 
1.59% 
I am not interested in physical activity 3.18% 
I have no incentives to attend training 11.11% 
Management does not provide me with the 
opportunity to improve my skills 
20.64% 
Management does not understand what 
training I need to perform my duties more 
safely 
4.76% 
 
8.15.1 Discussion  
Most candidates (76.16%) indicated that they were adequately equipped and well 
trained. This feedback raises some points of dispute with earlier findings in the survey 
where many officers mentioned that they felt unsafe and ill equipped to perform their job 
related tasks. It is also interesting to note that over twenty percent (20.64%) of 
respondents felt that their companies and management structures did not provide them 
with the opportunities to train and re-train. This feedback implies that there is a portion 
of the industry who feel that it is an employer’s responsibility to provide on-going training 
to their staff. This shift of responsibility from self to employer is not necessarily positive 
or negative, simply a trend that is worth noting. It is also a point of consideration that 
whilst over eight percent of respondents stated that they felt unsafe in their work 
environments, they did not repeat this assertion in this question. This prompted the 
Researcher to investigate further by contacting several of the respondents who provided 
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contact information. Several respondents stated that they did not read the question 
properly and only circled one of the headings. This unfortunately invalidates many of the 
findings of this question. 
 
8.16 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION THIRTEEN 
Question Thirteen was put in as a control to assess whether respondents were 
accurately interpreting the concepts and the aims of this questionnaire. The question 
asked if respondents understood why the concept of minimum force was relevant even 
when dealing with violent or potentially violent suspects. The feedback for this question 
is outlined below: 
 
Figure 26:  Questionnaire respondent understanding of reasonable force  
 
Understanding of reasonable force Percentage responses 
1. 100% sure 87.30% 
2. Not 100% sure 6.35% 
3. If he/she tries to hurt me, I will hurt them 6.35% 
 100% 
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8.16.1 Discussion 
The response rate of over eight seven percent (87.3%) clearly shows that the vast 
majority of officers believe that they understand the importance of the subject. However, 
whilst it may seem low, almost thirteen percent (12.7%) of the respondents either were 
not totally sure of the concept or indicted that they do not understand it at all by circling 
option three (hurting the attacker without understanding minimum force). This indicates 
that there is, without doubt, a portion of respondents who may hurt others due to a lack 
of understanding of the overarching concept or reasonable use of force. 
 
8.17 FEEDBACK FROM QUESTION FOURTEEN 
Question Fourteen was an open-ended question giving respondents an opportunity to 
clarify their previous answers or add anything that they perceived to be of relevance. All 
answers were grouped and coded into similar themes and then the relevant 
percentages of response were calculated. The sample size was adjusted to be 
calculated only according to those respondents who answered this question. The issues 
of relevance and the percentage of respondents who raised these issues are outlined 
below: 
 
Figure 27:  Questionnaire respondent feedback on open ended questions  
 
Additional subjects raised by respondents Percentage responses 
Supply zip ties/cuffs (restraints)  23.33% 
Training General 33.33% 
Training Physical 3.33% 
Training: Defensive 16.66% 
Training: restraining 10.00% 
Training: violent offender 10.00% 
Training: verbal 6.66% 
Training: Legal rights and obligations 3.33% 
Education: Public Awareness 6.66% 
Education: QPOL (Queensland Police Service 10.00% 
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awareness of security guard issues) 
More protective equipment 10.00% 
More Surveys 3.33% 
More Powers to perform duties 3.33% 
Enforcement of punishments of offenders 3.33% 
Radios linked to Police 3.33% 
 
8.17.1 Discussion  
The difficulty in getting respondents to complete surveys is well known (Johnson and 
Owen, 2003: 127-133) so the fact that respondents took the time to highlight issues of 
relevance to them is, in itself, important. The majority of comments (33%) and points of 
feedback were based on more training opportunities being made available to officers. 
There were also comments on operational issues such as the need to work more 
effectively with the police and enhance contact with them via radio links. There were 
also several comments regarding better equipment. There were very few comments 
related to other issues. In order to assess the importance of the issues based on 
respondent feedback, the four areas mentioned in this section (training, education of the 
public and QPol, additional equipment and other issues) are broken down as follows: 
 
Figure 28:  Questionnaire respondent open-ended comment categories  
 
Grouping of subjects discussed by 
respondents 
Percentage responses 
Training related concerns 83.33% 
Education of Police and the public  16.66% 
Need for better or additional equipment 33.33% 
Other 13.33% 
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Based on the above feedback, we can see that training and related issues appear to be 
one of the primary areas of concern. This is followed by education of other role-players 
such as QPol and needing better equipment.  
 
8.18 SUMMARY OF CORE FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEYS 
Whilst each of the questions was discussed in the previous sections of this Chapter, it is 
relevant to compare the findings of the questions and consolidate the themes. The 
points of bearing will be discussed in generalities. Should the reader require more 
details, they should refer to the previous sections of the Chapter directly. There seems 
to be a basic level of understanding within the sample of respondents regarding use of 
force and the relevant applications in their jobs. There does, however, appear to be a 
definite lack of consistency regarding on-going training, competency assessments and 
refresher training. Whilst most respondents seem to acknowledge the importance of the 
need for these to occur, it appears that they are very rarely actually conducted. 
Individual respondents who were experienced, and provided additional information, 
seemed to accept that the responsibility for maintenance and development of use-of-
force skills, once they were trained, rested with them. These respondents mentioned 
that they have sought out their own training and maintain, if not look to increase their 
own skill levels.  
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It was also interesting to note that whilst the vast majority of respondents appear to 
understand the nature of use-of-force according to their job descriptions, they 
consistently feel unsafe and at risk while working. The vast majority of respondents 
stated that they regularly had to utilise force as part of their on-going work 
responsibilities. This, in itself, is an indicator of an unsafe working environment where a 
unique set of skills is required to operate securely. Whilst the majority of respondents 
indicated that they felt equipped and able to do their jobs, there was a constant theme 
of being underequipped that radiated throughout the survey responses. This concept 
will be discussed in more detail in the next Chapter (section 9.8) which will provide more 
information on the face-to-face interview responses.  
 
8.19 CONCLUSION  
A survey was conducted which focused primarily on the crowd control sector in 
Queensland. This sector, with reference to cases of excessive use of force, had been 
identified as the highest risk sector in Australia. The focus on this sector extends to the 
reality that Crowd Controllers more than any other group in Australia utilise force on a 
regular basis as part of their day to day responsibilities. The survey provided useful 
information regarding the frequency with which officers utilise force as well as the way 
that officers working in these sectors feel about training and safety. It also raised 
questions regarding equipment that should be issued to Crowd Controllers as well as 
identifying several other issues of relevance. These issues of relevance included 
perceptions of the police and the public as well as the involvement of management in 
on-going skills development and maintenance for security officers. This survey created 
a platform for probing questions to be asked during the next phase of the research 
which included the face-to-face interviews and focus group.  
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Chapter 9 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP 
______________________________________________________________________ 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The literature review clearly identified that there was no standard use-of-force training 
model being applied in any private security industry across the world. An assessment of 
the Australian and South African environments was also conducted. These 
assessments identified that whilst there were set regulatory and training structures, 
there was no clear generic framework that could be transportable across borders for 
use-of-force training. The questionnaire outlined in the previous Chapter indicated 
inconsistency with the results achieved from training. The findings also identified several 
of the issues that officers on the ground were experiencing (such as lack of equipment 
or support from authorities). In order to gain a more in-depth understanding of what was 
actually happening in the industry, as well as what the experts consider best practice, a 
wide range of in-depth interviews were conducted. There were thirty one interviews 
conducted. Interviewees included persons representing the following groups: 
 
 Security training agencies; 
 Operational companies; 
 Regulatory authorities;  
 Defensive Tactics experts; 
 Police officials; and  
 Academics and experts on the security industry. 
 
9.2 ABOUT THE INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP  
In order to expand on the information obtained in the literature review as well as from 
the questionnaire and the in-depth interviews, a focus group of leading Defensive 
Tactics and firearms instructors was also conducted. The primary aim of the focus 
group was to evaluate and gain information regarding the recommended design of a 
best practice use-of-force training model. Many of the findings of the interviews and 
focus group were consistent with data obtained from the literature review. Aspects that 
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enhance these concepts and provide new data will be discussed in this Chapter. These 
findings are important as they were of vital import in creating the basis for the design of 
the best practice use-of-force training model that will be identified and explained in the 
next Chapter. These additional findings have been grouped according to themes which 
were consistent through much of the literature review. The themes that will be 
discussed in this Chapter, as extrapolated from the interviews and focus group, are as 
follows: 
 
 Perceptions of the security and training sector; 
 Interaction with the police and other official organisations; 
 Use-of-force training; 
 Use-of-force training content and focus; 
 Use-of-force continuums;  
 Legal considerations; 
 Techniques and equipment;  
 Limitations of training in the private security industry; 
 Trainee considerations; and 
 Issues regarding regulation.  
 
Unless otherwise stipulated and specifically referenced, the findings and categories 
outlined in this Chapter were identified as consistent themes throughout the interviews 
and the focus group session.  
 
9.3 PERCEPTIONS OF THE SECURITY AND TRAINING SECTORS 
The industry itself was the focus of much of the feedback that was obtained from 
interview respondents. The industry is viewed very differently by the relevant parties 
involved and associated with it. When assessing the industries of different countries, it 
became quite clear that the focus of security and related services can differ 
dramatically. To demonstrate this point, most interviewees in Australia believed that the 
largest issue in the industry was that of ‘Crowd Controller Violence’ (Bastable, 2009; 
Brooks, 2009; Franks 2010; Martin, 2009; Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; Prenzler, 2009; 
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van Der Stel, 2009; and Woods, 2008) whereas the South African interviewees believed 
that officers having to face armed assault was the largest area of concern (Badenhorst, 
2010; Baker, 2010; McGuire, 2010; Ras, 2010; and Sharp, 2010). In terms of the 
Australian environment, Prenzler (2009) stated that “within Australia, Crowd Controllers 
are the sub-sector of the security industry that are most often exposed to violent 
altercations”. The exposure of Crowd Controllers to violence may be true for South 
Africa too. During his interview, Badenhorst (2010) stated that:  
 
Violent crime and armed attacks are so prevalent (that) this means that 
officers conducting activities such as Cash-in-Transit [C-I-T] or working as 
Armed Response Officers, face potentially lethal attacks, on an almost daily 
basis.  
 
Therefore, from a South African perspective these job descriptions in the security 
industry face the highest likelihood of having to apply force as part of their jobs. 
 
The Researcher found that there seems to be much professional jealousy between the 
various role-players within the industry. This male-dominated industry is full of ‘alpha 
male’ types with very high self-opinions that may not always be consistent with their 
capabilities or the offerings of their organisations. In fact, one respondent stated that he 
did not care what anyone else was doing because he knew that whatever his RTO was 
applying was infinitely superior (Anonymous, 2009). Perceptions and opinions are vastly 
different from country to country. These vastly differing perceptions were a further 
reason why the research was focused primarily on South Africa and south east 
Queensland in Australia. From the view point of the individuals who were interviewed, 
there is little doubt that their perceptions form the basis for their reality. It is primarily for 
this reason that it is worthwhile to have a look at the security training industry from the 
perspectives of the following role-players: 
 
 Training providers; 
 Regulators;  
 Operational companies; and  
 Law enforcement officers.  
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Despite many of the differences that interviewees had, there are some general 
perceptions regarding inefficient regulatory practices. An example of this is that in 
Australia there is a reality that the industry may in fact be ‘over regulated’, and as such 
there are now too many barriers to entry, which have forced high quality transient labour 
(such as university students) to seek work in other sectors (Bastable, 2009; Baxter, 
2009; Bourke, 2009; Brooks, 2009, Franks, 2009; Lewkowitz, 2009; Martin, 2009; 
Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2009; Turner, 2009; and Van der Stel, 2009). 
There is also a general consensus across borders that the huge disparity of pay scales 
for security officers in comparison to other sectors is driving away quality personnel 
(Baker, 2010; Bastable, 2009; Baxter, 2009; Bourke, 2009; Brooks, 2009, Franks, 2009; 
Lewkowitz, 2009; Magee, 2009; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 
2009; Schurer, 2009; Turner, 2009; and Van der Stel, 2009). This most definitely does 
seem to be the case where lower level labour seems to be choosing to work in retail or 
construction instead of having to deal with the training, regulations and expenses 
associated with entry into the security industry (Bastable, 2009; Baxter, 2009; Bourke, 
2009; Brooks, 2009; De Caires, 2009; Franks, 2009; Lewkowitz, 2009; Martin, 2009; 
Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2009; Turner, 2009; and Van der Stel, 2009). 
 
A further consideration that often seems to be overlooked is that training providers in 
the private security industry are running businesses. The need for business owners to 
run a profitable business is a well acknowledged point (Bastable, 2009; Baker, 2010; 
Baxter, 2009; Franks, 2009; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; 
Ras, 2010; Schurer, 2009; and Van der Stel, 2009). This issue is further complicated 
when there are massive barriers to entry, and further compliance requirements for 
companies, that wish to trade in accord with all legislative and best practice 
requirements. The reality of understanding business as an entry point for private 
security training providers is vitally important. A person may be the best use-of-force 
trainer but if they cannot run an effective business, then there is no platform for them to 
deliver their skills. The issue of profitability is further exacerbated in the private security 
industry where a dubious provider may attain accreditation, turn a quick profit and then 
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close their doors before regulators are able to impose any penalties (Bastable, 2009; 
Baxter, 2009; Bourke, 2009; Brooks, 2009, Franks, 2009; Lewkowitz, 2009; Martin, 
2009; Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2009; Turner, 2009; and Van der Stel, 
2009).  
 
It seems that many questionable training providers are able to slip through the net and 
deliver substandard training to unsuspecting students (Baker, 2010; Franks, 2010; 
Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009 and Schurer, 2009). These training providers 
are able to offer cheaper, shorter courses that may not meet the necessary 
requirements of best practice training, but fulfil the fundamental evidence requirements 
of the AQTF or SASSETA (Baker, 2010; Franks, 2010; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; 
Pole, 2009 and Schurer, 2009). This is a very worrying consideration as training 
organisations are usually the starting platform for all entrants into the private security 
industry and as such, an inadequate foundation will have a negative ripple effect on the 
performance of a poorly trained officer in every job that he/she gets. Aside from the 
obvious cascade effect that poor training has on the industry as a whole, the fact that 
new entrants to the industry are exposed to corrupt and substandard business practices 
demonstrates a very poor example of the industry as a whole. It would seem that there 
are extensive efforts to eliminate such practices, but the resources required to do so do, 
not appear to be readily allocated to the necessary departments (Badenhorst, 2010; 
Baker, 2010; Baxter, 2008 and Woods, 2008).  
 
9.3.1 Perceptions of training providers 
In both South Africa and Australia, training providers are regulated and need to be 
licensed to trade (see sections 3.7 and 3.8 of Chapter 3). Unfortunately, there seems to 
be some disparity as to who is experienced and knowledgeable enough to present 
training in the subjects related to use of force and Defensive Tactics. The issue is 
slightly simpler in Australia where there are fewer specialised security vocations 
available than in South Africa. However, almost all the training providers interviewed, 
mentioned at some point in their interviews, that the industry was flooded with dubious 
providers who are trying to make a quick profit and do not care about standards or 
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quality (Bastable, 2009; Baker, 2010; Baxter, 2009; Franks, 2009; Martin, 2009; 
McGuire, 2010; Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; Ras, 2010; Schurer, 2009; and Van der 
Stel, 2009). The general apathy and lack of interest among most training providers, in 
terms of quality and standards improvement, was felt first-hand by the Researcher when 
requests for interviews were sent out to providers and very few responded (only about 
10% responded and made themselves available for interviews).  
 
A clear finding from the interviews was that, many security training providers really do 
not seem to care about educating their students, but rather on how profitable their 
business can be. Several providers highlighted that this was not a new problem, 
however the need for more efficient legislative enforcement, remains an area of concern 
(Bastable, 2009; Baker, 2010; Franks, 2009; Pole, 2009; Lewkowitz, 2009; Martin, 
2009; McGuire, 2010; Ras, 2010; Schurer, 2009; and Van der stel, 2009). It is also an 
opinion of the Researcher that several of the STA’s interviewed were more focused on 
ensuring compliance with training regulators than on delivering quality training. This was 
identified based on the fact that much of the training provided is paperwork-heavy and 
practical training, by comparison, is somewhat limited. This seems to be directly related 
to the training regulatory organisation’s requirement for providers to gather and store 
evidence that training has occurred. There is also a further issue of liability surrounding 
what is taught and how it is taught. There is no doubt that many training providers try to 
limit their liability, and reduce risk of student injury, by only teaching a very limited 
curriculum and shying away from practical training. This trend seems to be more 
prevalent in Australia than in South Africa where the need for a higher skill level in use 
of force and Defensive Tactics is often a necessity. 
 
9.3.2 Perceptions of regulators  
In interviews with regulators both in South Africa and Queensland, Australia, it was 
interesting to see that there were many similarities. Respondents from both countries 
believed that they are dramatically under resourced in the ability to effectively regulate 
their industries (Badenhorst, 2009; Millmore, 2008; Rashford, 2008 and Woods, 2008). 
Many of these parties do acknowledge that comparatively low pay scales and intense 
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competition within the industry make it very hard for providers who strive for 
compliance, to be profitable. This is exacerbated by dubious providers who are not 
compliant and take chances to increase profitability based on the limited enforcement 
capacity of regulators. There is a general perception that incidents will always occur but 
that significant progress has been made by regulators to weed out unsavoury operators 
and persons (Badenhorst, 2009; Millmore, 2008; Rashford, 2008 and Woods, 2008). It 
is worth noting that this perception does not seem to be congruent with the thoughts of 
training providers or security companies with regard to the success of regulators in 
policing the industry. Another consideration is that the need for training, compliance 
requirements and stricter legislative practices have led to more issues that need to be 
enforced by regulators, without the allocation of additional resources to regulate these 
issues (Badenhorst, 2009; Millmore, 2008; Rashford, 2008; and Woods, 2008).  
 
An interesting point was raised by the interview respondent from PSIRA who believes 
that the vocational education model is inherently flawed. This is due to the fact that 
training providers provide training as well as oversee competency and knowledge-
based assessments, i.e. assessments/exams are controlled and conducted by the 
trainers, usually on the same site as the training. In essence, the providers are acting as 
both coach and referee. It was suggested that perhaps a different model, in which the 
regulators conducted examinations and competency based assessments, may be a 
more efficient structure (Badenhorst, 2010).  
 
9.3.3 Perceptions of operational companies 
The general perceptions of the respondents from operational companies who were 
interviewed was that most of the training conducted was focused on training compliance 
and not on preparing persons for the work place (Bourke, 2010; Brooks, 2009; 
Lewkowitz, 2009; McGuire; 2010; Pole, 2009 and Rivera, 2010). It is for this reason that 
many providers are able to qualify people who meet regulatory requirements even 
though they may need to be thoroughly re-trained when they actually start working. As 
one interview respondent stated “we know that if we get graduates from certain training 
providers, that we cannot use them and they will probably have to be thoroughly re-
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trained” (McGuire; 2010). It is also a very common perception (and perhaps a reality) 
that the there is no substitute for actual work experience and a person may only truly be 
competent after the gaining of on-the-job experience. This experience is particularly 
relevant when it comes to managing and reducing violence. Many of the interview 
respondents who had experience as Crowd Controllers supported this concept of 
enhanced training and verbal skills so as to reduce the likelihood of violence occurring 
(Bastable, 2009; Ben-Keren, 2010; McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; Steinberg, 2010; and 
Van der Stel, 2009). Unfortunately they also alluded to the reality that sometimes, no 
matter what an officer does to calm a situation down, some situations will manifest in 
violence regardless of how effectively the officer attempt’s to manage an altercation 
(Bastable, 2009; Ben-Keren, 2010; McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; Steinberg, 2010; and 
Van der Stel, 2009).  
 
Operational companies also indicated their own frustrations with dubious and non-
compliant companies which undercut them in the market place. These dubious 
providers make it very difficult for compliant companies who only employ licensed and 
qualified officers to stay in business (Bourke, 2010; Brooks; 2009; Lewkowitz; 2009; 
McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; and Rivera, 2010). This focus on profit is often considered 
the primary concern of most companies over and above what is in the best interests of 
the communities in which they operate. One interviewee (Brooks, 2009) stated that he 
was “aware of certain companies that would vandalize their own clients’ properties to 
ensure that security contracts would be renewed”.  
 
There is also the huge issue of debate as to ‘who pays for what’ that needs to be 
considered. Whilst many companies stated that they would love their staff to go through 
more training and undergo on-going training and assessments, the issue of who pays 
(the officer, the company or the client) was the key deciding factor (Bourke, 2010; 
Brooks, 2009; Lewkowitz, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; and Rivera, 2010). The 
comparatively low levels of pay for Security officers and the tight margins that prevail in 
most companies make on-going training provision very difficult. Even funded training 
options offered through government subsidies in Australia seem to create difficulties 
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whereby unmotivated staff do not complete the training, or could not be bothered to 
attend training sessions (Franks, 2009; and Schurer, 2009). The issue of training 
expense is a huge problem and probably one of the primary stumbling blocks 
preventing on-going training and skills development within the private security industry. 
 
There is little doubt that the majority of people view the security industry as a lower level 
employer which generally does not provide skilled and trained professionals when 
compared to other industries. The media in different countries also seems to play a 
large part in public perception of the security industry. As an example, the media 
portrays bashings by Crowd Controllers in Australia as a major problem but in reality it 
is a comparatively rare occurrence. In fact, the findings of this research indicate that 
Crowd Controllers probably get assaulted more often then so called cases of excessive 
use of force but since this is never featured in the media, it is not perceived as a reality 
(Bastable, 2009; Baxter, 2009; Brooks, 2009; Franks, 2009; Gregory, 2009; Hoskings, 
2009; Magee, 2009; Martin, 2009; Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; Ras, 2010; Schurer, 
2009; Stanborough, 2009; Van der Stel, 2009; and Woods, 2008).  
 
9.3.4 Perceptions of law enforcement agencies 
In South Africa there seem to be more cases than in Queensland, Australia, where 
security companies work together with police officers, with a higher level of mutual 
respect (Badenhorst, 2010; Baker, 2010; Focus Group, 2010; McGuire, 2010; Ras, 
2010; and Sharp, 2010). In Queensland, Australia there are definite barriers between 
the groups. The security officers in Queensland, Australia would like to be treated as 
equals but there are certain obstacles that make this quite difficult. An example is that 
basic police recruit training may last six months or more whereas private security 
officers training may only be for ten days or even less in the case of dubious providers 
(Gregory, 2009; Hoskings, 2009; Jones, 2009; Stanborough, 2009; and Turner, 2009). 
As such, there is a real barrier in skills and competencies between the majority of 
officers, in each of the groups. Despite this there do seem to be practical measures that 
policing agencies and Crowd Controller companies are implementing, in order to reduce 
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crime and violence, in popular night time areas in Queensland (Gregory, 2009; 
Hoskings, 2009; Jones, 2009; and Stanborough; 2009).  
 
At the upper end of the security industry there is also a perception that you need to be 
an ex-police or military officer in order to have the necessary qualifications and 
experience to be ‘competent’ (McGuire, 2010; and Sharp, 2010). This appears to be an 
older perception among interviewees, who had been in the industry for many decades. 
It does seem that skills and academic qualifications – such as security science/security 
management tertiary qualifications programs offered by the University of South Africa or 
Edith Cowan University in Australia as well as industry qualifications such as the ASIS 
Certified Protection Professional – are possibly changing this perception. Several 
interviewees stated that a police or military background is not enough to get ahead in 
the industry anymore and that further qualifications are now becoming a mandatory 
requirement for employers when looking for top staff (Baker, 2010; Lewkowitz, 2009; 
McGuire, 2010; Ras, 2010; and Sharp, 2010). As such, it now appears that experience 
and industry-recognised qualifications are becoming the benchmark and may even be 
overriding the importance of having a policing or military background. 
 
9.4 INTERACTION WITH THE POLICE AND OTHER OFFICIAL ORGANISATIONS 
In section 3.7 of Chapter 3, the topic of private/public partnerships between police and 
the private security industry was discussed in much detail. The issue of the roles and 
responsibilities of regulatory authorities has also been discussed in Chapter Three. 
However, the interaction between these parties was identified as an area of much 
frustration for interviewees in both South Africa and Australia, albeit for differing reasons 
(Bastable, 2009; Baker, 2010; Baxter, 2009; Bourke, 2009; Brooks, 2009; Franks, 2009; 
Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; Ras, 2010; Schurer, 2009; 
and Van der Stel, 2009).  
 
In South Africa the majority of issues centred on firearms licensing and the issue of 
firearms for training purposes (Badenhorst, 2010; Baker, 2010; Focus Group, 2010; 
McGuire, 2010; Ras, 2010; and Sharp, 2010). In Queensland, Australia the issues 
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seemed to be more on an operational level where security officers felt that they were 
not respected and treated as professionals by police officers. They also felt that in 
certain cases, there was not sufficient support and ‘back-up’ for officers when incidents 
occurred (Bastable, 2009; Brooks, 2009; Martin, 2009; Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; and 
Van der Stel, 2009). A case in point was provided by one interview respondent 
(Anonymous, 2009) who has a black belt in Judo and trains in several other Martial Arts, 
five times a week, and is also the manager of a large security company. He stated that 
he knew his skill levels in terms of Defensive Tactics and use of force were superior to 
that of the vast majority of police officers, yet he was being dictated to by them, as to 
what he could and could not do. Several interview respondents felt that the professional 
levels between the two groups (Private Security officers and Police officers) were too 
different and as such there was very little common ground (Bastable, 2009; Hoskings, 
2009: Pole, 2009 and Turner, 2009). Despite these issues, approaches that integrate 
the joint strengths of policing and the private sector are a reality. Effective PPP 
initiatives, without a doubt, add to increased growth and stature of the private security 
industry as well as safety of the said community where they operate.  
 
There has also been a significant increase in the number of tasks that were previously 
the sole domain of the police and are now provided by private sector security 
companies (Bourke, 2010; Hoskings, 2009; McGuire, 2010 and Sharp, 2010). The 
statement below from one of the interview respondents (Sharp, 2010) in South Africa 
further illustrates the reality of the privatisation of activities that may previously have 
been the domain of the Law Enforcement community: 
 
As the police are not able to cope with the frequency of crime and the 
subsequent investigations required for apprehension and prosecution of 
offenders, it becomes an opportunity for us (the private security industry) to 
fill these gaps.  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, both in South Africa and Australia, it was accepted 
practice for off-duty Police officers to work in the private security industry. Many such 
officers even ran their own private security businesses in addition to their full-time jobs 
(Brooks, 2009; Franks, 2009; McGuire, 2010; and Sharp, 2010). This changed in both 
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countries in the late 1990s and early 2000’s and as such there was a need for additional 
private security officers to fulfil the demand requirements of the private sector. In many 
countries where moonlighting is legal, there are often smaller private security industries 
that experience a closer working relationship with the police (McGuire, 2010; and Sharp, 
2010). In certain countries it is even possible to ‘rent’ police officers for private security 
activities. Two examples of this are Papua New Guinea and Nigeria where private 
companies employ police officers (officially and unofficially) to act as armed security 
officers. In many third world countries such as Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, 
etc. police agencies are forced to employ outside consultants and utilise external 
companies to provide specific expertise or technological solutions (McGuire, 2010; 
Sharp, 2010; and Steinberg, 2010). There are many positive outcomes from such 
relationships when handled correctly (Badenhorst, 2010; Bourke, 2010; Brooks, 2009; 
Hoskings, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Sharp, 2010; and Turner, 2009). Many solutions-
orientated police agencies in South Africa also work together with the private security 
industry in order to alleviate manpower shortages and deliver an integrated solution. 
Two examples of this is are the Johannesburg Metro Police Department (JMPD) who 
have partnered with a private company to install and monitor the entire CCTV system 
for downtown Johannesburg and also Ekhuruleni Metro Police Department (EMPD) 
which outsourced the training of its specialist Close Protection unit to a private sector 
company (McGuire, 2010; and Focus Group, 2010). As of November 2011, these joint 
initiatives have been very effective and there have been substantial reductions in crime.  
 
9.5 USE-OF-FORCE TRAINING 
Whilst from an academic perspective, the motivation, perpetration and consequences of 
violence are relatively easy to understand, violence almost always involves action (with 
acts of interpersonal violence, this always occurs). The fact that it involves action means 
that violence is inherently a physical deed. Therefore, in order for persons to effectively 
manage violence, they would need to be acclimatised to the physical nature in which it 
usually manifests, i.e. unarmed attack, knife attack, firearms attack, explosives, etc. 
(Ben-Keren, 2010; Hanover, 2010; McGuire, 2010; Sharp, 2010; and Steinberg, 2010). 
One interview respondent stated this as follows: “Without commitment and aggression, 
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it is almost impossible to survive [the realities of attack] where the attackers are usually 
armed and take you [the security officer] by surprise” (Hanover, 2010). For officers at 
the higher end of the security industry, the ability to ‘aggressively assault back’ when 
under attack, is considered the best form of defence and has been proven many times 
to lead to a speedier resolution of an incident and enhance the safety of the officers and 
the public (Ben-Keren, 2010; Hanover, 2010; McGuire, 2010; Sharp, 2010; and 
Steinberg, 2010). Martial Arts are also not necessarily directly transferable to the 
training requirements of security officers. This is true for a variety of reasons mentioned 
by the interview respondents. These include the following: 
 
 Many Martial Arts are sport orientated; 
 The do not focus on the minimum force concept and in fact may teach 
techniques that are too deadly; 
 They often take too long to learn; 
 The rigid nature of many systems does not enable them to be easily applied in 
the erratic and diverse environments that officers may work in; 
 Many Martial Arts do not teach weaponry which makes it very difficult to translate 
into a street system; 
 Many Martial Arts do not effectively teach multiple attacker management or 
multiple officer skills; and 
 Martial Arts often focus on one area of combat (such as grappling or kicking) and 
do not provide an officer with a rounded knowledge (Bastable, 2009; Ben-Keren, 
2010; Hanover, 2010; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2010; 
Sharp, 2010; Steinberg, 2010 and Turner, 2009). 
 
Unfortunately, it is exceptionally difficult to simulate realistic violent attacks, safely within 
a training environment (Ben-Keren, 2010; Hanover, 2010; McGuire, 2010; and 
Steinberg, 2010). However, the realities can be very closely matched when a well-
qualified instructor is given sufficient time to prepare, willing and able students, and 
safety equipment is utilised (Bastable, 2009; Hanover, 2010; McGuire, 2010; and Sharp 
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2010). As mentioned in section 6.10 of Chapter 6, a student who truly wants to become 
competent, must come with a basic set of attributes, such as good physical fitness and 
a positive attitude. This is important for training in life or death skills .As one of the 
interview respondents stated: 
 
Training should aim to be as realistic as possible. The most important is for a 
fighter [security officer] to have heart. If someone is soft [exhibits a lack of 
physical and mental toughness] and has no spirit [commitment and 
willingness] than no matter what you teach them, they will not be able to fight 
(Hanover, 2010). 
 
As mentioned in section 4.5 of Chapter 4, a security officer‘s ability to assess and 
determine the nature of aggressive behaviour is also an important skill (Bastable, 2009; 
Baker, 2010; Baxter, 2009; Franks, 2009; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Ottaway, 2009; 
Pole, 2009; Ras, 2010; Schurer, 2009 and Van der Stel, 2009). Unfortunately, the ability 
to assess and determine whether an aggressive person is simply venting or may 
actually become violent is a skill seldom taught to security officers (Martin, 2009; Pole, 
2009; Schurer, 2009; Steinberg, 2010 and Turner, 2009). Simply being taught a skill 
does not mean that you can actually apply it in practice. Certain interview respondents 
(Bastable, 2009; Pole, 2009; Ottaway, 2009; and Van der Stel, 2009) believed that on-
the-job experience is the only real way that persons will learn to discern whether an act 
of aggression is a prelude to violent attack or not. The use of a ‘buddy system’, whereby 
an experienced operator takes a new arrival under their wing and ‘shows them the 
ropes’, is the best way for ‘newbies’ (officers new to the job) to learn what they need to 
know about violence and the job, i.e. Crowd Control (Van der Stel, 2009). The need to 
include ‘stress inoculation’ has been identified as the critical ingredient for successful 
training to take place (Bastable, 2008; Martin, 2010; McGuire, 2010; Schurer; 2009; 
Sharp. 2010; and Turner, 2009). Stress identification and coping should be taught to all 
officers. It may not be as important for the lowest level of security manpower offerings 
that focus on observation and reporting, however it is essential for officers conducting 
activities such as Crowd Control, C-I-T, Armed Response or Close Protection (Ben-
Keren, 2010; McGuire, 2010; Schurer, 2009 and Sharp, 2010). It seems that many 
operators in the private security industry recognise this, and acknowledge that even 
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informal after action discussions with their colleagues, help officers to de-stress after an 
incident (McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; and Sharp, 2010). The need for trainers to 
educate students on these realities is very important. Students need to understand that 
de-stressing is critical and that activities such as physical exercise can have a very 
positive effect on helping to dissipate any excess stress that may be stored in their 
systems (Sharp, 2010).  
 
One of the core points raised by interview respondents (Bastable, 2009; Baker, 2010; 
Franks, 2009; Pole, 2009; Lewkowitz, 2009; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Ras, 2010; 
Schurer, 2009; and Van der Stel, 2009) and the Focus Group (2010) was that there is a 
constant conflict in play for private security training providers. This battle is hinged on 
being competitive in the market (reducing costs and prices) and offering quality training 
(longer, more thorough training, with the best equipment and training aids). The 
difficultly is centred on the fact that most persons seeking security training are looking 
simply to get a qualification for licensing or employment purposes and do not assess 
training providers on the length, scope and quality of training. Ironically, longer training 
periods that are more comprehensive may actually be considered a negative factor 
when a potential trainee is selecting a provider. This is primarily because the issued 
qualification is the same but training takes longer and may be arduous. For training 
providers the more detailed the training, the higher the level of skill a trainer must have. 
This would directly translate into a higher cost for such a trainer. This extends to the 
length of training too, as there are cost implications for every extra day of training that is 
delivered. This becomes even more complicated as the tools for conducting 
comprehensive skills training in use of force are very costly (Red man suits, Simunition, 
etc.). As such, many providers have found that they are able to meet the competency 
delivery requirements of training regulators without having to provide training in such a 
manner (Bastable, 2009; Baker, 2010; Franks, 2009; Pole, 2009; Lewkowitz, 2009; 
Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Ras, 2010; Schurer, 2009; and Van der Stel, 2009). 
 
The issue of liability and greater risk associated with a higher level of training in use of 
force, is a major negative factor, for most training providers. The need for highly 
 214 
 
qualified, experienced instructors who are able to conduct live scenarios safely further 
contributes to this problem since there are not many instructors with this competence in 
the industry. As a result of these issues, it seems that many providers deliver the 
absolute bare minimum of use of force and Defensive Tactics skills training (Baker, 
2010; Bastable, 2009; Ben-Keren, 2010; Franks, 2009; Hanover, 2010; Martin, 2009; 
McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2009; Sharp, 2010; Steinberg, 2010; and Turner, 
2009).  
 
The primary motivation for this minimalistic approach is probably most directly related to 
the dramatic increase in potential for injury during training with higher levels of contact, 
reality and the dynamism of the training itself. There is also the concern of increased 
vicarious liability (see section 6.2 of Chapter 6). Should a training provider teach a wide 
arsenal of techniques and skills (some of which may be lethal) they may be held 
responsible for an officer actually using them. This issue is often side-stepped by only 
teaching very safe (from the trainer’s point of view) techniques and not teaching 
potentially dangerous techniques such as LVNRs. There may also be a gap whereby 
the issue of physical use of force is dramatically underplayed by training providers. This 
may be done for many reasons including the reality that the occupational health and 
safety aspects of the job are supposed to ensure a safe working environment as well as 
the fact that trainers may not want to ‘scare’ students out of the industry before they 
even get started (Baker, 2010; Bastable, 2009; Ben-Keren, 2010; Franks, 2009; 
Hanover, 2010; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2009; Sharp, 2010; 
Steinberg, 2010; and Turner, 2009). The underplaying of use of force in the private 
security industry is true in several literary resources as well. As an example, the 
International Foundation for Protection Officers (1992: 205) training manual includes 
only one paragraph to explain the use of force and does not cover any practical skills or 
recommendations for the application of use of force in the work place. It is interesting to 
note that very few of the respondents from security training agencies who were 
interviewed applied ‘focus’ to the mental aspects of use-of-force training (Pole, 2009; 
Franks, 2009; Ottaway, 2009; Ras, 2010; Schurer, 2009; and Van der Stel, 2009). It 
was identified that many felt they did not have sufficient time to concentrate on these 
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issues. Instead, candidates are normally taken through some basic form of force 
continuum and then taught a few techniques and that is all (Baker, 2010; Bastable, 
2009; Ben-Keren, 2010; Franks, 2009; Hanover, 2010; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; 
Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2009; Sharp, 2010; Steinberg, 2010; and Turner, 2009). In 
summary, the following issues are hindering factors and reasons why training 
companies may not provide effective use-of-force training to their students: 
 
 Limited time frames; 
 The low levels of education and physical capabilities of most trainees; 
 Cost implications for equipment; 
 Limited knowledge, experience and skills of instructors in use of force and 
Defensive Tactics;  
 Cost implications of needing better qualified instructors;  
 Increased risk of injury; and 
 Increased liability and vicarious liability. 
 
9.5.1 Training content 
The content of the training is important. The content needs to be based on the actual 
jobs that security officers perform (Franks, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Schurer, 2009; and 
Sharp, 2010). The feedback received from the interview respondents as well as the 
focus group was consistent with the points identified in the literary review (section 7.6 of 
Chapter 7). Many points of similarity were raised, these included aspects such as; 
stress inoculation, the need for repetition as well as application of the “one mind – any 
weapon” approach (This concept is based on the idea that it is critically important to 
train the officer’s mind-set first and not focus specifically on what weapons (tools) the 
officer uses). The importance of implementing an integrated training approach whereby 
skills should all be transferable was also mentioned, i.e. the fundamental techniques 
and concepts applied for unarmed combat should be similar to those used for armed 
combat and vice versa (Ben-Keren, 2010, Hanover, 2010; McGuire, 2010; Sharp, 2010; 
Steinberg, 2010; and Turner, 2009). One of the interview respondents summarised the 
need for realistic training by stating that:  
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Training needs to include intense fighting, to prepare for the real world. 
Without this preparation it may be very hard for a person to survive an attack. 
Especially since they [attackers] strike when you are least prepared for the 
attack (Hanover, 2010).  
 
 
9.5.2 The duration of training 
The duration of training is an on-going source of dispute in the private security industry. 
This is primarily because training is usually paid for by the individual and not state 
funded as it is in the police (McGuire, 2010; Sharp, 2010; and Turner, 2009). Duration 
refers specifically to the actual training time that occurs and not necessarily the amount 
of days it takes since training may actually only occur for a few hours a day and not the 
whole period. As previously discussed, the policing environment provides the closest 
basis for comparison for the private security industry. It is not uncommon for police 
basic training to run for at least six months. During this training period, Defensive 
Tactics and physical fitness are usually trained on a repetitive basis (Hoskings, 2009; 
Jones, 2009; McGuire, 2010; and Turner, 2009). The aim is to provide the officers with 
the best possible skill-sets and capabilities to manage use-of-force incidents effectively. 
In the security industry, training can vary from just a few days to several weeks (Franks, 
2009; McGuire, 2010; and Schurer, 2009). Entrants to the private security industry 
normally start with a basic course and then undergo further training courses as they 
seek to upgrade their qualifications and skills. It is a common finding in the private 
security industry that students train to get qualifications, not necessarily knowledge and 
skills (Franks, 2009; Martin, 2009; Ottaway, 2009; and Schurer, 2009). This means that 
dubious training providers who limit the training time may actually get more business 
than providers who focus on delivering quality training.  
 
The need for on-going skills maintenance was also identified as a crucial area of 
concern. There is no doubt that many of the hard skills learned in Defensive Tactics 
training are considered perishable, i.e. they wear-away when not practised. On-going 
physical fitness should be part and parcel of the requirements for any officer operating 
in Category Two and above (Ben-Keren, 2010; Hanover, 2010; McGuire, 2010; 
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Steinberg, 2010; and Turner, 2009). This is consistent with literary sources (Grossman 
and Christensen, 2008 and Schneider, 2005), which show that for a person who was 
initially well trained, an assessment and re-training session run once every six months 
will keep their competency levels in place. When referring to the life or death situations 
that officers operating in Categories Three and Four may face, they require on-going 
(daily, weekly or monthly) training (Hanover, 2010; McGuire, 2010; Sharp, 2010; and 
Steinberg, 2010).  
 
9.6 USE-OF-FORCE CONTINUUMS 
During the interviews as well as the focus group components, it was indicated that it is 
less important which model is selected, but it is more important to focus on the way 
such a model is taught. In other words, the need for an instructor to be able to 
practically relate theoretical concepts to students based on actual experience was 
viewed as more important than whichever model was used (Baker, 2010; Bastable, 
2009; Ben-Keren, 2010; Brooks, 2009; Franks 2010; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; 
Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; Ras, 2010; Sharp, 2010; and Van der Stel, 2009). The 
majority of the interview respondents felt that with effective training and field experience, 
it is possible to proactively identify potentially violent characteristics in persons, before 
they actually commit a crime (Bastable, 2009; Baker, 2010; Ben-Keren, 2010 ; Brooks, 
2009; Hanover, 2010; Hoskings, 2009; Lewkowitz, 2009; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; 
Pole, 2009; Ras, 2010; Rivera, 2010; Schurer, 2009; Sharp, 2010; Steinberg, 2010; 
Turner, 2009; and Van der Stel, 2009).Whilst a general overview on use-of-force 
models was given in section 5.9 of Chapter 5, there were a few points of specific 
relevance identified in the interviews and focus group that need to be discussed. 
Throughout the interviews, different respondents outlined why they believed that the 
use-of-force model which their organisation utilises is superior to all others. Whilst this 
was not a surprise in itself, it created a unique problem as almost all of the respondents, 
including those who attended the focus group sessions, utilised and recommended 
different models. In the focus group session, the issue of which force continuum model 
was superior was hotly debated and the consensus was that no one model is superior 
to another. Rather, it comes down to the instructors ability to teach the relevant legal 
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guidelines, use-of-force tools, awareness techniques and necessary decision-making 
and consequent actions that would be the most appropriate in different circumstances. It 
is important to note that some of the training providers interviewed or who participated 
in the focus group still taught use-of-force theory separately from Defensive Tactics. 
Some focused on either teaching techniques or theory but did not actually integrate the 
practical and theoretical concepts.  
 
One of the outcomes of the focus group was to highlight the importance of linking 
theoretical and practical training when teaching use of force and Defensive Tactics. The 
focus group identified that the core competency outcomes of use-of-force training 
should place emphasis on the students ability to actually choose the right course of 
action and implement it correctly in various circumstances, as opposed to simply 
explaining a specific continuum or decision-making model. In order to meet this 
outcome the concept proposed by the focus group was to use a model with ‘two boxes’ 
– one for all of the use-of-force options and the other for the scenarios in which they 
should be applied. The situations then need to be role-played, simulated and if possible 
experienced by students. The performance and decision-making process of the student 
should then be discussed with the student. If necessary the actions should be modified 
and repeated in order to evaluate the ability of the trainee to respond correctly under the 
pressure of a real use-of-force situation.  
 
The concept of training students and then linking and measuring their performance 
under pressure led to the development of the Practical Use of Force Training Model 
(PUoFTM) which will be explained in detail in the next Chapter. One of the core findings 
regarding use-of-force continuums is that, whilst all the models may have utility, alone 
they do not equip an officer to make the correct decisions and act correctly. Whichever 
model and/or techniques taught actually need to be integrated into a practical 
framework that verifies whether or not a student is able to implement the correct 
concepts and action under the simulated duress of an attack situation. Without actually 
having the ability to assess this, it is actually impossible to determine whether a trainee 
exhibits work-related use-of-force competencies or not (Baker, 2010; Bastable, 2009; 
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Ben-Keren, 2010; Brooks, 2009; Franks 2010; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Ottaway, 
2009; Pole, 2009; Ras, 2010; Sharp, 2010; and Van der Stel, 2009). 
 
9.7 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS  
The vast majority of interview respondents agreed that it was more important for 
students to understand the foundational concepts of applicable legislation than to simply 
be able to recite the relevant act or statute by rote but have no understanding of its 
application (Badenhorst, 2010; Baker, 2010; Bastable, 2009; Ben-Keren, 2010; Brooks, 
2009; Franks, 2009; Hoskings, 2009; Lewkowitz, 2009; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; 
Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2009; Sharp, 2010; Steinberg, 2010; Van der Stel, 
2009; and Turner, 2009). Whilst it was agreed that the relevant source information 
(legislative acts and regulatory authority guidelines) and even case-law should be 
taught and explained to students, the focus of training should be on the practical 
implementation of legal concepts. There should be a particular emphasis placed on the 
consequences of action and the manner in which the law determines guilt or innocence.  
 
The application of tried and tested security and crime prevention models can be useful 
but also has its limitations (McGuire, 2010, Schurer, 2009; and Sharp, 2010). An 
example of this relates to the difficulties of applying a ‘Rational Choice’ model to 
security operations in high risk and hostile environments, specifically where suicide 
bombers may be active. This example was given in several interviews and was outlined 
by respondents who stated that if a person is willing to sacrifice their lives during an 
attack, it makes the application of a ‘rational choice’ type model very difficult (Ben-
Keren, 2010; Hanover, 2010; McGuire, 2010; and Sharp, 2010). When explaining legal 
use of force, it was not uncommon for respondents to cite a well-used saying in the 
industry: “It is better to be tried by twelve than carried by six” (Ben-Keren, 2009; Focus 
Group, 2010; Franks, 2009; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Schurer, 2009; and Sharp, 
2010). The saying refers to the jury-based legal system applied in the United States 
which usually consists of twelve jurors. The premise is that in a life or death encounter, 
if you were to make the wrong decision, it could cost your life and as such you would be 
carried to the grave by six pallbearers but even if you make the wrong decision (apply 
 220 
 
excessive force) you would at least be alive to defend your decision in front of a jury. 
The consistent citing of this saying illustrates that most trainers do understand the 
potential lethal consequences of use-of-force decision-making. Despite this 
understanding, the Researcher identified that there still seems to be significant gaps in 
the way trainers teach use-of-force skills and measure the competency levels of the 
students that they have trained.  
 
It is commonly accepted that trainers teach the fundamentals of legal action and provide 
students with an understanding of the application of law and legislation. The approach 
of ensuring that students understand the application of law in a practical context is 
critical. This approach needs to be implemented over and above the requirement for 
students to cite specific acts and memorise specifics of various laws. In other words, it 
is more important that a student should understand and apply legal concepts than 
whether he/she can recite them from memory. This is particularly important in light of 
limited training times and budgetary constraints that most private security training 
providers face as well as the comparatively low levels of education of many of the entry 
level students (Baker, 2010; Bastable, 2009; Ben-Keren, 2010; Brooks, 2009; Franks, 
2010; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; Ras, 2010; Sharp, 
2010; and Van der Stel, 2009). In addition, the perception that private security officers 
and companies do not necessarily take use-of-force training in South Africa seriously 
enough was mentioned by several interview respondents (Badenhorst, 2010; Baker, 
2010; McGuire, 2010; Ras; 2010; and Sharp, 2010). This sentiment was echoed by the 
focus group which strongly believed that effective training would dramatically reduce the 
risks and dangers that security officers face on a day-to-day basis.  
 
9.8 TECHNIQUES AND EQUIPMENT 
Throughout the interviews and the focus group, respondents were asked to give their 
thoughts on which techniques should be taught, and which should not. Several highly 
experienced trainers who were interviewed stated that whilst it is preferable to have the 
best equipment and nicest training centre, it is possible to train and equip motivated 
candidates in limited environments (Ben-Keren, 2010; Hanover, 2010; McGuire, 2010; 
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Sharp, 2010; and Steinberg, 2010). As one interview respondent stated: “Some of the 
best results I have achieved have been from presenting training outside with no training 
aids but the students themselves” (McGuire, 2010). The concept of needing the correct 
training aids and the need to provide learning in favourable training environments was 
discussed in section 7.10 of Chapter 7. An important consideration raised by several 
respondents was the student/instructor ratio when delivering training (Ben-Keren, 2009; 
Franks, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Sharp, 2010; and Turner, 2009). Factors influencing 
student/instructor ratio that were mentioned by the respondents included the following: 
 
 The experience of the trainer/s; 
 The number of students; 
 The experience of the students; 
 The complexity of the equipment being utilised; and 
 The nature of the training (practical or theoretical). 
 
In terms of tools and equipment, the South African context where use of alternative 
weaponry and firearms is commonplace, there were far wider specifications and 
descriptions given by respondents (Badenhorst, 2010; Baker, 2010; McGuire, 2010; 
Ras; 2010 and Sharp, 2010). Conversely in terms of the Australian context, where use 
of any weaponry is generally restricted, the recommendations were far narrower 
(Bastable, 2009; Brooks, 2009; Franks, 2009; Lewkowitz, 2009; Martin, 2009, Ottoway, 
2009; Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2009; and Van der Stel, 2009). Feedback from the interview 
respondents identified that one technique in particular, the lateral vascular neck restraint 
(LVNR), was an issue of contention in the industry (this technique is described in 
section 6.4.8 of Chapter 6). Some of the interview respondents stated that they would 
not teach it for liability reasons and others maintained that it was a critical technique 
necessary should an Officer actually be fighting for his/her life (Franks, 2009; Martin, 
2009; Schurer, 2009; and Turner, 2009).  
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Feedback from the focus group indicated that edged weapon skills have been identified 
as a gap in the training of South African security officers. In the focus group session it 
was stated that: 
 
Most serious security officers and almost all tactical officers will carry a knife. 
It’s strange that they are not trained to use these weapons correctly and 
safely. This is an area of serious concern if we look at use of force as a 
comprehensive set of skills (Focus Group, 2010). 
 
Key findings related to equipment and techniques from the interviews and the focus 
group are summarised below: 
 
 The use of the LVNR is a very controversial skill, but if used properly, can very 
effectively subdue a violent attacker without any serious injury to any of the role-
players. Despite this knowledge, many trainers said that they would not teach it due 
to the risk of injury and the negative perceptions associated with the technique. It 
was stated several times during interviews that respondents know that past incidents 
have been mainly due to positional asphyxiation after the application of the 
technique, and not by the technique itself. 
 
 The need to better equip private security officers was raised as a point of concern. 
Whereas it seems that regulators and industry associations are striving to disarm the 
private security industry, trainers and operational companies seem to believe that 
officers are ill-equipped to do their jobs. Giving officers the option to utilise tools such 
as pepper sprays could dramatically reduce the need to use other impact-based 
types of force. 
 
 The third point was that security officers, in particular Crowd Controllers, were often 
required to restrain and apply a citizen’s arrest until police arrive. Crowd Controllers 
in several states of Australia are, however, legally not allowed to carry handcuffs or 
restraining devices which makes this task very difficult. 
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 The fourth consideration mainly relevant to South Africa was that officers should be 
better trained in all aspects of edged weapon usage and defence. 
 
9.9 LIMITATIONS OF TRAINING AND WORKING IN THE PRIVATE SECURITY
 INDUSTRY  
There are many limitations that are relevant to use-of-force training in the private 
security industry. Many of these limitations have been mentioned at several points 
throughout this dissertation. Whilst the list below is not exhaustive, it does provide an 
overview of what issues of importance were identified by interview respondents 
(Badenhorst, 2010; Baker, 2010; Bastable, 2009; Ben-Keren, 2010; Brooks, 2009; 
Franks, 2010; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; Ras, 2010; 
Sharp, 2010; Steinberg, 2010 and Van der Stel, 2009) and the focus group: 
 
 Limitations based on legislation; 
 Limitations based on the external business environment; 
 Limitations based on the internal business environment; 
 Limitations based on student capabilities and levels of interest; 
 Limitations based on price and marketing; 
 Limitations based on instructor capabilities; and 
 Limitations based on training time and equipment. 
 
There are also limitations in the manner in which an officer works that need to be 
factored into the way that they are trained. The private security officer does not have 
specific powers of arrest enjoyed by law enforcement officers. Nor do they have 
applicable rights of search and seizure which would enable them to stop and search 
suspicious persons in their areas of operations (Ras, 2010; Schurer, 2009; Turner, 2009 
and Van der Stel, 2009). The reality of having these limits implies that there are many 
additional considerations to use of force for a private security officer than for a police 
officer (Hoskings, 2009). As discussed in section 6.2 of Chapter 6, in almost all cases, 
the private security officers have the same rights of arrest as any normal citizen. One 
interview respondent outlined his thoughts on this subject as follows: 
 224 
 
 
There is a lot to consider when using force, regardless of when or how a 
private security officer applies force, it inevitably comes back to a ‘citizen’s 
arrest’. As such, it is critical that private security officers are well versed in the 
requirements of lawful arrest and detainment (Ras, 2010). 
 
The issue of what can be taught, and how it can be taught, differs dramatically from 
country to country and even from region to region within a country. In Australia, it even 
differs from state to state. As discussed the very nature of training in the private industry 
is driven by an on-going balancing act between what must be taught (legislative and 
training authority mandates) and what the market requires (business considerations). 
Whilst budgetary concerns are also applicable in the law enforcement and military 
sectors, these sectors are not influenced by the business issues relevant to running a 
private training organisation. These business considerations are probably one of the 
primary influencing factors in terms of what trainers in the private security industry teach 
and the way that they teach. In several of the interviews, it was highlighted that without 
taking into account the nature of ‘business’ i.e. trading for a profit, it would be impossible 
to make recommendations to the industry that would actually apply (Baker, 2010; 
Bastable, 2009; Ben-Keren, 2010; Franks, 2009; Hanover, 2010; Martin, 2009; 
McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2009; Sharp, 2010; Steinberg, 2010; and Turner, 
2009).  
 .  
The concept of training limitations associated with business is further complicated by 
issues such as sales and marketing, geographic locations, infrastructure costs and 
many other variables. The reality is that in most countries where training is provided to 
the private security industry, there are probably high levels of competition (Bastable, 
2009; Baker, 2010; Baxter, 2009; Franks, 2009; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Ottaway, 
2009; Pole, 2009; Ras, 2010; Schurer, 2009 and Van der Stel, 2009). The numerous 
providers are all trying to win new business. More often than not, training companies are 
bidding for the same business. A large proportion of the market consists of new entrants 
to the security industry. The sentiment that new entrants do often not know enough to 
differentiate between what may be quality training and what is not was mentioned by 
several respondents (Franks, 2009; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Ottaway, 2009; 
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Schurer, 2009; and Sharp, 2010). This, combined with the reality that most entrants into 
the industry are seeking the cheapest, quickest way of becoming qualified so that they 
can gain employment, makes dictating best practice training norms quite complicated 
(Franks, 2009; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Ottaway, 2009; Schurer, 2009; and Sharp, 
2010). An example of this may be that in order for private security training companies to 
adequately train personnel in use of force, a minimum training time of sixteen (16) hours 
could be mandated. In theory this sounds simple, however, this issue (legislative 
compliance) is superimposed with other concerns such as who covers the cost for this 
training and the implications of how this affects the market.  
 
For the training providers these are all of equal importance, whereas for the regulators, 
they are primarily concerned simply with compliance. If a provider is not able to meet 
the requirements in such a manner that they can generate a profit, they will soon go out 
of business (Bastable, 2009; Baker, 2010; Baxter, 2009; Franks, 2009; Martin, 2009; 
McGuire, 2010; Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; Ras, 2010; Schurer, 2009; and Van der 
Stel, 2009). This, in many cases, leads providers to look for ‘short-cuts’ in compliance 
that enable them to meet requirements with the minimum possible cost implications. 
Many interview respondents felt that this concept, i.e. the understanding of the business 
implications of legislation and conditions placed by regulators, was in itself a large issue 
of concern (Baker, 2010; Bastable, 2009; Baxter, 2009; Ben-Keren, 2010; Franks, 2009; 
Hanover, 2010; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2009; and Sharp, 
2010). This point will be discussed in greater detail under the next heading. 
 
Interview respondents also often gave their thoughts on the minimum entry 
requirements for candidates seeking to be trained. The Researcher mapped this data by 
allocating it into the four categories of security officers and then structured this into the 
table illustrated below: 
  
(The table below is based on guidelines for basic entry into training according to the 
interview respondent’s feedback and not just for licensing purposes) 
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Figure 29:  Table illustrating numeracy, literacy and physical fitness 
requirements for defensive tactics in the private security industry  
 
CATEGORY MINIMUM 
LITERACY AND 
NUMERACY 
MINIMUM 
PHYSICAL 
FITNESS 
ADDITIONAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
1.  
One 
 
Basic competency  
(Ability to read, write 
reports and verbally 
communicate) 
Very basic: ability 
to walk a patrol or 
stand for long 
periods 
Many officers in this category work 
in low risk environments and as 
such need the bare minimum of 
capabilities  
2.  
Two 
Basic competency  
(ability to read, write 
reports and verbally 
communicate) 
Need to be 
physically fit and 
able. Capable of 
push ups, sit ups 
and short 
distance runs 
The fact that there is a medium 
risk level or that the officer has 
alternative weaponry means there 
is a possibility of use of force and 
as such, the officer needs to be fit 
enough to respond  
3.  
Three 
Basic competency  
(Ability to read, write 
reports and verbally 
communicate)  
Need to be 
physically fit and 
able. Capable of 
push ups, sit ups 
and short 
distance runs 
The officer should also be able to 
demonstrate the ability to select 
the correct force options and apply 
them under pressure 
4.  
 
Four 
 
 
Higher level 
competency than 
previous levels. The 
officer should be 
able to compile 
plans and 
documents 
commensurate with 
their job 
descriptions  
High level of 
physical fitness 
and capability. 
This in many 
cases may 
include the ability 
to function without 
sleep or under 
intense pressure. 
Since an officer in 
this category may 
have to carry or 
move a wounded 
comrade: physical 
strength becomes 
more important  
The Officer should also be able to 
demonstrate the ability to select 
the correct force options and apply 
them under pressure with a very 
small error rate. This is critical as 
the officer may face life or death 
use-of-force situations as part of 
their job 
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9.10 TRAINEE CONSIDERATIONS  
9.10.1 Mental stability  
Especially at the lower levels of the security industry, mental stability is often something 
that trainers do not take into account (Baker, 2010; Bastable, 2009; Baxter, 2009; Ben-
Keren, 2010; Franks, 2009; Hanover, 2010; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; 
Schurer, 2009; and Sharp, 2010). This is often because the skills taught at entry level 
are of a basic nature. Most trainers consider the verification of mental stability an issue 
for regulators and possible employers. This may not always be the case especially with 
regards to weapons and high level Defensive Tactics training. The issue of mental 
capacity is very complicated as the costs of hiring a suitably trained professional (such 
as a psychologist) can make this unpalatable for almost all private security training 
companies (Bourke, 20010; Lewkowitz, 2009; and McGuire, 2010). In order to manage 
this issue, most professional companies and training academies will have a right to 
remove a person from a course after counselling them and concluding that they may 
pose a danger to themselves, other students or training staff (Franks, 2009; and 
McGuire, 2010). 
 
9.10.2 Integrity of candidates  
Whilst it is possible to verify a person’s truthfulness and past history using tools such as 
polygraphs, voice stress analysis and background checks these methods do have 
limitations. There is also the issue of expense which directly refers to who would bear 
the costs. The issue of who pays, once again is something that is normally left up to 
regulators or employers, and is mostly sidestepped by training providers. There are 
certain training providers who claim to run mandatory drug and alcohol testing when 
presenting high risk courses (Franks, 2009) along with other providers who conduct 
mandatory pre-training interviews and request references before candidates are allowed 
to attend any specialist-type training (McGuire, 2010). It is also common practice for 
professional training providers to have a ‘code of conduct’ which states that behaviour 
such as cheating or rudeness may result in dismissal from a course (Baker, 2010; 
Franks, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2009; and Sharp, 2010). 
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Since most training providers are private companies and as such need an income to 
continue trading the thought of losing income by dismissing a person from a course is 
often unpalatable. However, even at the low levels of the security industry (Category 
One) security officers may be responsible for the safety of expensive goods, the 
wellbeing of persons and the good name of their client and company (Schurer, 2009; 
and Turner, 2010). As a result of these responsibilities, a person with no integrity could 
be very dangerous and cause much damage (Sharp, 2010). It is thus the responsibility 
of a training provider to try and identify these negative traits early on and not train those 
candidates who may pose a danger or exhibit risky characteristics (McGuire, 2010). 
 
9.11 ISSUES REGARDING REGULATION  
Interviews with the regulators (Badenhorst, 2009; Millmore, 2008; Rashford, 2008 and 
Woods, 2008) showed that they believed that they were under-resourced. Whilst they 
were aware that there were non-compliant operators in the industry, they believed that 
they were doing their best to implement and oversee the legislative guidelines that they 
were mandated to enforce. It is easy to understand their points of view but the results 
on the ground may indicate that they are not achieving this to the satisfaction of the 
industry (Baker, 2010; Bastable, 2009; Baxter, 2009; Brooks, 2009; Franks, 2009; 
Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2009; and Sharp, 2010). Several 
interview respondents who ran security and training companies indicated high levels of 
frustration because they could not make headway in their businesses as non-compliant 
providers kept undercutting them (Bourke, 2010; Lewkowitz, 2009; and McGuire, 2010). 
In South Africa PSIRA provides a legislated Code of Conduct that whilst very 
prescriptive unfortunately falls short due to lack of implementation, enforcement and 
compliance on ground level (Minnaar, 2007(b); McGuire, 2010; and Ras, 2010). It is 
believed that the mandatory inclusion of knowledge of the PSIRA Act into training 
programs will help to rectify this (Badenhorst, 2010). Despite measures taken by the 
South African and Australian regulators there still seem to be many inconsistencies in 
terms of the criteria actually utilised to accredited trainers and training companies as 
well as the manner in which these trainers deliver training (McGuire, 2010; and Ras, 
2010). This may not be as relevant when we assess the required training for Category 
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One officers. However, it is absolutely relevant to higher level categories where 
inexperienced instructors, could be very dangerous to the students and to the public, 
should they qualify students who may not possess the minimum levels of competency. 
A possible solution was suggested during an interview with Stephan Badenhorst (2010) 
who is the head of law enforcement at PSIRA: 
 
A system whereby testing is done through the licensing authority (i.e. testing 
is removed from the Training Organisation) would mean that skills were the 
key issue and eliminate training provider bias or dubious practices by suspect 
training providers.  
 
There are obviously numerous complications and costs associated with a system such 
as this but it is nonetheless interesting to note the perceptions of an enforcement officer 
and his insight into the industry and its problems. Based on the feedback received from 
the interview respondents, the question of what level of industry regulation actually 
works begs to be asked (Badenhorst, 2010; Baker, 2010; Bastable, 2009; Ben-Keren, 
2010; Brooks, 2009; Franks, 2009; Hoskings, 2009; Lewkowitz, 2009; Martin, 2009; 
McGuire, 2010; Ottaway, 2009; Pole, 2009; Schurer, 2009; Sharp, 2010; Steinberg, 
2010; Van der Stel, 2009; and Turner, 2009). South Africa has a far larger industry than 
Australia but the regulatory structures employ more staff and have greater powers than 
their South African counterparts. Despite this, there still appear to be dubious 
companies who operate ‘below the radar’. There is also the question of licensing fees 
that in themselves, form barriers to entry to the industry, for certain people wishing to 
work in it. Whilst few would debate as to the importance of basic levels of regulation in 
terms of ensuring that criminals and persons who are of bad moral character are not 
allowed to protect assets and lives, it is an issue of debate as to whether high levels of 
regulation enforce high standards within the industry (Baker, 2010; Bastable, 2009; 
Baxter, 2009; Bourke, 2010; Franks, 2009; Martin, 2009; McGuire, 2010; Pole, 2009; 
Schurer, 2009; Sharp, 2010; and Turner, 2009).  
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9.12 THE SPECIFICS OF THE FOCUS GROUP FEEDBACK 
The focus group was conducted to provide additional information regarding the industry 
in South Africa. A goal of the focus group was also to gain insight into the perceptions, 
opinions and thoughts of seasoned Defensive Tactics instructors, who have to train 
security operators at all levels in the private security industry, on an on-going basis. The 
focus group ran for half a day and much useful data was obtained. Whilst some of the 
feedback from the focus group was included in other sections of this Chapter, there are 
some additional issues that need to be mentioned. The key points of the data which was 
obtained centred on the application of practical skills training and assessments to 
measure levels of competency in use-of-force application. The processes of attack 
recognition, correct use-of-force decision-making followed implementation of the correct 
action and finally acting correctly after the deed, was discussed in great detail.  
 
Focus group attendees were also asked to debate the various use-of-force continuums 
and rate which they believed to be the most effective model. An outcome of this 
discussion was the identification of some frustration in regard to well-established use-of-
force continuums. Several of the focus group respondents stated that whilst most of the 
traditional use-of-force models are useful tools to teach students the concepts of use of 
force and decision-making, they have many shortcomings. These shortcomings are 
inherently linked to the fast-paced dynamic situations that require use of force. This 
feedback is in-line with model six discussed in section 5.9.6 of Chapter 5 which outlines 
the use of an informal model over a structured model. 
 
Aspects that were outlined in greater depth earlier in this dissertation – such as the 
need for simplicity (section 6.11 of Chapter 6 & 7.5.2 of Chapter 7) and repetition 
(section 7.5.3 of Chapter 7) in training – were also identified as being of great import. 
There was also much debate on what makes a person a competent and qualified use-
of-force instructor. The outcomes of this debate are in-line with the discussion points in 
section 7.9 of Chapter 7. This was followed with a discussion regarding training duration 
and the frequency of on-going training required to ensure that the applicable skills levels 
are maintained. The consensus reached at the end of the discussions forms the primary 
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basis for the development of the Practical Use of Force Training Model (PUoFTM) 
which will be explained in-depth in the next Chapter.  
 
9.13 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
There were several areas of import and concern that were identified during the interview 
and focus group research phases. The information obtained from these phases was 
collated and grouped. The data was then divided into the following subjects, which were 
discussed in this Chapter: 
 
 Perceptions of the security and training sector; 
 Interaction with the police and other official organisations; 
 Use-of-force training; 
 Use-of-force continuums; 
 Legal considerations; 
 Techniques and equipment; 
 Limitations of training in the private security industry; 
 Trainee considerations; and 
 Issues regarding regulation.  
 
Some of the core findings of these research phases included the importance of 
understanding that private security training operators run businesses, and that their 
processes and decision-making, therefore had to be influenced by the need to make a 
profit. Further to this point, concerns about the effectiveness of regulation and the 
results it actually achieves, were raised, as issues of concern by several of the interview 
respondents. Many of the other points (such as Trainee considerations) provided further 
depth to the information obtained from the literary review. The ultimate aim of all this 
research is to identify points of relevance to improve use-of-force training in the private 
security industry. In the next Chapter the points covered in this Chapter will be 
combined with the findings of preceding Chapters to explain how the Practical Use of 
Force Training Model was conceived and why it is the core outcome of this research 
project.   
 232 
 
Chapter 10 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE PRACTICAL USE OF 
FORCE TRAINING MODEL 
______________________________________________________________________ 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental objective of this research project was to answer the primary research 
question, namely: How can defensive tactics trainer’s best prepare private security 
officers to manage and diffuse use-of-force incidents? At the outset of this research 
project, the Researcher forecast that one of the probable outcomes would be to develop 
a new use-of-force continuum or modify an existing one. As discussed in section 5.9 of 
Chapter 5, the important idea behind the development of use-of-force continuums was 
to provide the user with a guideline to justify use of force. Force continuums were also 
designed to assist the user in selecting a use-of-force option that was proportionate to 
the threats being faced. As these use-of-force models developed they also integrated 
the application of awareness tools, as well as some of the concepts needed to justify 
why an officer would select a specific use-of-force option. The findings of this research 
have indicated that it is not really these models that pose a problem to the effective 
delivery of use-of-force training. Rather, it is the manner in which officers are trained to 
apply these models and the tools that they prescribe in practical situations. The core 
concept of use-of-force continuums as they relate to use-of-force training is that the way 
these models are taught is more important than which specific model is actually used.  
 
Identifying the recommended use-of-force options, combined with the vast array of 
techniques available to apply these options, was another core factor that was forecast 
as a key output of this research. The research findings definitely indicate ‘must have’ 
inclusions from a use-of-force skills point of view. These ‘must have’ options are vital 
inclusions for effective application of proportionate force under the duress of a realistic 
attack situation. Unfortunately, it is not enough for officers to simply be taught 
techniques that align to best practice and a use-of-force continuum. Rather, it is critically 
important that an officer is actually able to apply the correct use-of-force option under 
the duress of a realistic attack situation. The ‘correct option’ is one that is proportionate 
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to the attack and enhances the safety of all parties. In order to maximise the likelihood 
of this occurring, a whole set of required training variables needs to be taken into 
account. These will be summarised in this Chapter. 
 
As a result of the need to provide for a structured system that outlined what the best 
practice for use-of-force training in the private security industry is, the Researcher 
developed the Practical Use of Force Training Model (PUoFTM). The model has two 
core components. These two components will be illustrated in diagrammatical format 
and explained in this Chapter. The complex nature of use of force requires that a holistic 
description be provided. This description will include guidelines for both the use and the 
various applications of the Practical Use of Force Training Model. It will also highlight 
how the model could be applied in different regions and environments. Once the 
fundamentals of the model and the supporting explanatory notes were developed, the 
Researcher sought to test them and gain feedback from the industry as to the 
acceptance and credibility of the model.  
 
10.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRACTICAL USE OF FORCE TRAINING MODEL 
The development of the Practical Use of Force Training Model was not initially identified 
as a forecast outcome of this research. As the data from the research was collected, it 
became apparent that the gap in the industry was due to the way officers were being 
trained and measured for competency. The way officers are trained from a practical 
perspective to identify, process and react was identified as being of greater importance 
than the relevant theoretical background. The theoretical background that is being 
referred to is the way officers are taught how to explain the selection of use-of-force 
options from a set of guidelines (a use-of-force continuum). It was interesting to note 
that certain world renowned use-of-force trainers (such as Dr Dennis Hanover) focus 
very little on the theoretical components required for use-of-force decision-making but 
rather on the technical skills and attribute development of trainees. The focus is on 
toughening-up trainees and developing reflexive skills. Whilst there is no doubt that a 
theoretical understanding of use of force is still important, the focus on practical skills 
development and the ability to apply the correct use-of-force option under the real 
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pressures of an attack, should be the overarching goal of trainers. This goal should 
supersede the need for students to be able to recite legislation or merely explain the 
theoretical context for decision-making in written or oral form. The training motto of 
Dynamic Alternatives (Pty) Ltd summarises this concept well, it states “Show Me – Do 
not Tell Me” (Dynamic Alternatives, 2010). The explanation thereof being that if a 
trainee is not able to demonstrate their capability to select and actually apply the correct 
use-of-force model under the simulated duress of a live scenario, how can they be 
measured as competent (McGuire, 2010)? 
 
The concept of competence is not necessarily tied to a wide range of technical skills but 
rather the ability of the trainee to apply a reasonable response to the situation that they 
are facing. i.e. if the only skill that an officer possessed was the ability to apply one 
technique (for example, a tackle with a restraint on the ground) but the officer could 
apply this technique with various levels of force in a wide range of circumstances, 
he/she could be found competent. The measure of competency also increases or 
decreases based on the number of use-of-force options that the officer has available 
and within the context of the situation itself. It is also critical to acknowledge that 
unfortunately, competency is perishable and that re-training and reassessment is an 
integral component towards ensuring that effective use-of-force skills capabilities are 
maintained. In order to define a holistic and practical solution, the components as 
discussed in various Chapters of this dissertation, need to be integrated into one model. 
The aspects that need to be integrated were discussed as separate topics in the various 
Chapters of this dissertation. These topics are all important to ensure that an officer has 
been well trained in the context of his/her job description, the environment within which 
they will work in as well as the skills that they will require. The integration of these 
concepts is summarised in the diagram below: 
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Figure 30:  Diagram illustrating the components identified necessary to develop 
the Practical Use of Force Training Model  
 
 
 
The design and 
development of a 
best practices use-
of-force training 
model for the 
private security 
industry 
1. Understanding of 
the Private Security 
Industry – including 
legislative 
considerations 
(Explained in Chapter 
3, 8 & 9)  
2. Understanding of 
violence reduction 
and aggression 
management  
(Explained in Chapter 
4, 8 & 9) 
 
 
3. Need to integrate 
best practice models 
of crime prevention 
and security skills 
(Explained in Chapter 
4 & 9)  
4. Application of a  
use-of-force 
continuum or 
explanatory model 
(Explained in Chapter 
5, 8 & 9) 
 
 
5. Which use-of-force 
tools are applicable 
and how should they 
be used? 
(Explained in Chapter 
6, 8 & 9) 
6. What constitutes 
effective training in 
use-of-force skills? 
(Explained in Chapter 
7, 8 & 9) 
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The diagram above illustrates how the topics covered in the various Chapters of this 
dissertation all need to be integrated to answer the research objective. The integration 
of the core concepts of these various Chapters is the foundational basis of the Practical 
Use of Force Training Model. In the above diagram, all of the topics interlink. This 
interlinked structure illustrates that no aspect is of more importance than any other. The 
need for a trainer to ensure that each of the concepts is understood and can be applied 
in reality, is vital for students to achieve any practical level of competency. Each of 
these concepts will be summarised as an introduction to the content of what must be 
taught, tested and applied when utilising the Practical Use of Force Training Model.  
 
10.3 GENERAL CONTENT AND STRUCTURE APPLICABLE TO THE PRACTICAL
 USE OF FORCE TRAINING MODEL  
In this section an overview of the core inclusions and relevant components that are 
required for the Practical Use of Force Training Model will be discussed:  
 
10.3.1 Understanding of the private security industry: including legislative
 considerations 
Without understanding the roles, duties and job descriptions that are relevant in the 
private security industry, it would be almost impossible for a trainer to adequately 
prepare students. The application of laws and regulations form the core structure of 
what can and cannot be taught to students based on what their legal limitations actually 
are. Since the legalities are different from region to region the specific aspects of 
relevance for each area of operations must be identified. It is within this phase of 
training preparation that trainers need to clarify the job specifications and requirements 
of the students who they are intending to train. The topic of understanding the private 
security industry was covered in detail in Chapter Three and a realistic snapshot of what 
is occurring was covered in Chapters eight and nine. An application of the four 
categories that have been used to subdivide the industry is an invaluable tool for 
trainers to confirm exactly what level of competency the students would require. It is 
also relevant to ensure that a use-of-force risk (how likely is the officer in each Category 
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to be exposed to use-of-force situations) rating is in place for each Category. These will 
be discussed in section 10.5.3 of this Chapter. 
 
Summary of the fundamental points of relevance: 
 
 Whilst the field of security science is expanding the critical function of the industry is 
the protection of ‘something’ (assets, people, information, etc). As such there may 
be a very real need for a security officer to defend him/herself whilst carrying out 
such protective duties.  
  
 Globally, most governments regulate their private security industries in one form or 
another. Before a security officer could be trained as to the best practice of applying 
force whilst carrying out his or her duties, he/she would need to have an 
understanding of the legislative compliance required to legally operate in their 
countries private security industry. 
 
 The ability for a private security officer to work hand-in-hand with the relevant law 
enforcement personnel in his/her region is an important consideration to the 
management of potential (or actual) use-of-force incidents. 
 
 A security officer should be educated with regards to the various job descriptions, 
activities and roles in the security industry and how use-of-force principles and 
techniques differ in the various jobs he/she may perform. 
 
10.3.2 Understanding of violence reduction and aggression management 
In order to deliver effective use-of-force training it is necessary that officers are taught 
the early warning signs that help predict violent behaviour before it occurs. A basic 
understanding of the models and concepts that assist in reducing violence and 
aggressive behaviour are fundamentally important to a security officer. The topic of 
understanding violence reduction and aggression management was covered in depth in 
Chapter Four (sections 4.2-4.6). The scope and depth of an officer’s understanding is 
directly relevant to the classification of the job the officer will perform, i.e. it is critical for 
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officers operating in Category Four to be well versed in violence reduction and 
aggression management but this is not as important for officers in Category One. The 
core deliverables included under this heading fall mainly in-line with the pre-incident 
recognition and prevention or de-escalation of incidents. It is also critical that students 
are taught to identify their own stress and adrenal response levels. This topic should 
also include how to manage these adrenal and stress levels to ensure effective 
performance (as outlined in section 4.8 and 4.9 of Chapter 4). The core deliverables 
under this heading include the ability for an officer to apply the following skills: 
 
 Situational awareness (the ability to know what is occurring in the surrounding
 environment and proactively identify threats or hazards); 
 
 Conflict management (the ability to resolve an aggressive interaction in a
 professional manner without having to resort to the use of physical force);  
 
 Adrenal response management (the ability to identify the signs and symptoms of
 the flight-or-fight response, in order to manage any negative consequences and
 perform effectively under the duress of a violent or potentially violent situation);  
 
 Stress management (the ability to identify and cope with the signs of stress
 related to the performance of demanding and often violent duties);  
 
 Verbal and non-verbal communication (the ability to utilise all the tools of
 communication to achieve a desired outcome. In the case of use-of-force
 situations, it is the ability to de-escalate a situation without having to resort to
 physical use-of force); and 
 
 Use of physical presence (the ability and confidence to portray an image of
 competence and professionalism that may in itself deter potential offenders from
 instigating an incident).  
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10.3.3 Need to integrate best practice models of crime prevention and security 
skills 
The concept of applying crime prevention and security skills systems and models is an 
aspect of direct relevance for the security officer. This application is a further 
development of the need to understand violence reduction and aggression management 
models. Since the core concept of security is to enhance safety, it is directly tied to 
violence reduction. This is why an understanding of security and crime prevention 
models is absolutely critical. The topic of crime prevention and best practice security 
models was discussed in depth in Chapter 4 (section 4.10-4.13). An example of 
relevance would be the application of the Defence-in-depth model which in itself may 
dissuade violent behaviour.  
 
The core deliverables under this heading fall mainly in-line with incident prevention and 
management as well as environmental and physical security considerations for reducing 
and managing violent incidents. Models such as the application of CPTED or the 
Broken Windows Theory are very useful for the prevention of violent behaviour. Many 
crime prevention and security models also include post-event practices such as the 4 
D’s model which includes delaying the escape of a suspect after an incident to increase 
the potential for apprehension (please see Annexure 8 for examples of how these 
models could be applied to Crowd Controllers and C-I-T officers). An understanding of 
the Routine activity Theory would enable an officer to identify the trends and behaviours 
that may be the prelude to a violent attack and act proactively to prevent such a 
situation from occurring. 
 
In an ideal world, if it was possible to ensure that the law was one hundred percent 
enforced and policies were adhered to by all parties, it would be highly unlikely that 
incidents of violent crime would even occur but this is not reality and as such many 
experts (Hanover, 2010; McGuire, 2010 and Sharp, 2010) believe that the shifting of the 
type of crime to a lesser category is a success in itself, i.e. violent crime shifting to petty 
crime. One of the primary benefits of ensuring that students are trained in security and 
crime prevention models is that such training creates an understating of the need for 
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proactive prevention of violent incidents. This proactive prevention can only be achieved 
with prior planning in-line with proven systems and models. 
 
The following criminological and security theories and models were outlined in 
Chapter Four: 
• The Routine Activity Theory; 
• Situational Crime Prevention Theory; 
• Responsive Regulation Theory; 
• The Defensible Space Theory; 
• The Four D’s of Crime Prevention;  
• The Defence-in-depth Principle; and 
• The Broken Window’s and Zero Tolerance Theories. 
 
10.3.4 Application of a use-of-force continuum or explanatory model 
Before a model or system can be taught it is critical that an understanding of reasonable 
force is achieved. This is not necessarily easy for trainers to accomplish, as by definition 
any use-of-force action or decision is made or applied under intense pressure (time 
pressure, risk of injury, concern of consequences of action or inaction, etc.). Only once 
a basic understanding of the application of reasonable force is achieved can a model for 
assisting the student in selecting and ascertaining the correct force option and response 
be taught. In terms of applying best practice, this research indicated that it is not really 
important which model is used. This is accurate on the proviso that there is a structure 
for communicating the core concept of what is reasonable force decision-making and in 
which circumstances it is relevant to apply the appropriate use-of-force tool. These 
concepts could be taught using any of the continuum structures. Recent trends indicate 
that it may even be preferable to teach this without using a formalised model – as per 
Model 6 outlined in Chapter 5 (section 5.9.6), which explains that it is possible, and 
even advantageous, to teach the core concepts of use-of-force response without 
applying a formalised chart, graph or word flow structure. The underlying concepts and 
explanations of the various use-of-force models was discussed in depth in Chapter 5 
(section 5.9). The essential consideration is that no matter which model is used, 
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students need to be educated in such a way that they are able to make, under pressure, 
the correct use-of-force decision and act on it. This decision and consequent action 
needs to be based on legal considerations, organisational procedures or rules of 
engagement as well as cultural and region specific issues. It is also worth noting under 
this heading that should an instructor, who does not have the necessary experience and 
field expertise, be utilised it is highly unlikely that they will be able to effectively convey 
the complexities related to the application of use of force (see section 7.9 of Chapter 7). 
 
The following groupings of use-of-force continuums were identified: 
1. The line graph model; 
2. The ladder model; 
3. The matrix model; 
4. The wheel or nonlinear model; 
5. A perceptual or timeline model; and 
6. An informal model.  
 
10.3.5 Which use-of-force tools are applicable and how these should be used 
The concept of which use-of-force tools should be taught should commence with the 
determination of the category and risk level in which the trainee officer will need to 
operate. Once the category has been determined, it should be superimposed with the 
legalities and specific requirements applicable to working in a given jurisdiction. The 
various issues related to the selection of use-of-force tools taught hinge on the selection 
of the relevant practical skills and techniques that may apply. It is also important to 
determine what the criteria for selection of these skills and techniques should be. A 
process of attribute (skill and capability) development, needs to also be taken into 
consideration as an essential component of any use-of-force tools training program. All 
of these issues and the applicable recommendations were outlined in detail in Chapter 
6. The content inclusions per category will be described in section 10.5.3 of this 
Chapter. 
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10.3.6 What constitutes effective training in use-of-force skills 
The question of what constitutes effective use-of-force training was described in detail in 
Chapter 7 (see section 7.2). As previously discussed, the fundamental considerations 
that need to be taken into account included a wide range of variables such as the 
instructors, the venue, the equipment, etc. The concept of what is, and what is not, 
effective when training officers in use of force is a core inclusion for the application of 
the Practical Use of Force Training Model (see section 10.5.3 of this Chapter). It is 
critical that all parties (regulators, training organisations, trainers and even the students) 
have an understanding of what is required to deliver use-of-force training. The outcome 
of such training should ensure that the safety of all the parties who may be involved is 
enhanced should an incident occur. In order to provide a guideline of effective use-of-
force training, the following topics were discussed in Chapter 7 (sections 7.3-7.10), 
namely: 
 
 The content of the training; 
 The focus of the training;  
 The duration of the training;  
 The Trainee’s profile; 
 The intensity of the training;  
 The instructor’s skills; and  
 The materials (protective equipment, gloves, impact shields, etc.) and training 
venue that are needed to deliver effective training.  
 
As outlined in section 7.5.5 of Chapter 7, the need to develop candidates’ confidence 
levels is also very important. The Researcher has personally witnessed the importance 
of confidence on many occasions. One occasion was when an Armed Reaction Officer 
attended a few hours of Defensive Tactics training and learned the basics of firearm 
disarming. The officer could not get the techniques one hundred percent correct in 
training but was constantly encouraged and therefore left the session feeling very 
positive. On the very next day, he responded to an armed robbery at a fast-food store 
and performed a perfect firearm-disarm, stopping the robbery and apprehending the 
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suspect. His actions ensured his and the customers safety. He was credited as a local 
hero. 
 
Critical points for the effective delivery of use-of-force training include: 
 Techniques should be based on Defensive Tactics aligned to a security officer’s 
job description and operational requirements and not based on Martial Arts 
doctrine. 
 
 Training should not only teach theoretical concepts and technical capabilities but 
develop combat applicable attributes. 
 
 The training approach should be based on developing the ability to conduct an on-
going situational threat assessment in order to enable proactive prevention or 
response. 
 
 Training should be based on the realities of violent attack and not on a trainer’s 
perception of violence. It is primarily for this reason that trainers should be 
experienced use-of-force professionals and not simply teach use-of-force as an 
‘add-on’ or ‘text-book’ subject. 
 
 Techniques, training and response should be kept as simple as possible. The more 
complex the technique and response the less likely it is to be applied in reality. 
 
 Techniques and reactions should be practiced repetitively during training in order 
to ensure that the various neural response pathways are developed. This is vitally 
important so that an officer’s responses to attack are instinctive. 
 
 Throughout the use-of-force training process, the trainer should focus on 
developing a trainee’s confidence, along with physical skills and attributes. 
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 The trainer should ensure that work-related role-plays, simulations and scenarios 
form part of the summative assessment and trainee development process. 
 
 Throughout the training process proactive avoidance, communication and conflict 
management skills should be emphasised. 
 
 The trainer must develop the trainee’s decision-making capabilities along with their 
physical and technical skills. 
 
 The ability to operate as part of a team should be integrated into training wherever 
possible. It is important that team work does not substitute the individual’s 
capabilities to defend him/herself if attacked alone. 
 
 Safety considerations should be built into any training intervention, however, it 
should be noted that in order for trainees to acclimatise to the realities of violent 
attack there needs to be impact and contact during training. It requires an 
experienced instructor to provide ‘hard’ Defensive Tactics training that is reality 
based and is run safely without trainees incurring injury. 
 
 For Category Three and Four students training should be taken out of the 
‘classroom and gym’ environments and into the surroundings where an attack is 
likely to occur. For example trainees should practice on tar and concrete and not 
just on mats. 
 
10.4 TRAINING OUTCOMES AND THE NEED FOR AN ON-GOING OFFICER
 DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM 
The goal of designing a model that provides a guideline for best practice in use-of-force 
training required that the subject not be assessed in isolation. The reality of use of force 
is that excessive or incorrect use of force may cost lives and as such, should be treated 
with the utmost seriousness. The need to assess the external environment in which 
officers will operate is the first requirement for the design of a use-of-force training 
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program. This extends to an assessment of the local culture and acceptance of use-of-
force in each region that the training is to be presented in. Unfortunately, the external 
environment may change at any time in a variety of ways. These changes could include 
legislative changes, changes in the nature of threats or even changes in the way law 
enforcement permits Security officers to operate. It is thus very important that a view of 
on-going training and skills development is developed.  
 
The assessment of competency is truly the crux of developing a best practice use-of-
force training model. The measure of competency, as the benchmark, as opposed to 
the number of training hours or amount of paperwork that needs to be completed should 
be the overarching reference point. The difficulty of competency assessment lies in 
ascertaining an acceptable minimum standard of performance. This minimum standard 
needs to be based primarily on the measurement and determination of what is actually 
required operationally, as well as the nature of the threats that officers may face. The 
reality of defence against violent attack needs to be linked to a set standard. It is the 
Researcher’s opinion that inconsistencies in the understanding of use-of-force training 
and the skills applicable to defence against real attacks has led to the majority of 
training provided in the security industry not meeting the stated objective of enhancing 
safety for all parties. A critical component required to maintain the enhanced safety that 
effective training may create is to ensure that officers must be assessed on a regular 
basis to ensure that they have the necessary physical and mental capabilities to carry 
out their duties. The only measure of this is to apply an assessment measurement 
system in a practical structure that measures the student in realistic situations and 
scenarios.  
 
Whilst a practical approach to measuring competency is difficult, it should be the goal of 
all training providers. Competency in both decision-making and practical application of 
skills in work-related scenarios and simulations should form the backbone of use-of-
force skills assessments. The perishable nature of use-of-force skills, in conjunction with 
changing trends, requires that re-training should take place at least every six months 
(see section 8.5, 8.14.1 of Chapter 8 & 9.4.2 of Chapter 9). If possible this training 
 246 
 
should be integrated with scenario assessments to confirm the student’s capabilities to 
apply skills and knowledge in practical situations (see section 7.5.6 of Chapter 7). The 
need for officers to maintain a level of fitness in order for them to apply Defensive 
Tactics is also an important consideration. This maintenance of attributes (both physical 
and mental) should be part of an officer’s daily routine. In reality this maintenance 
cannot be done through a training provider since ensuring that an officer gets enough 
exercise and maintains a healthy diet is really the personal responsibility of the 
individual officer. 
 
10.5 PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRACTICAL USE 
OF FORCE TRAINING MODEL 
In essence the Practical Use of Force Training Model is a holistic model that should be 
applied in an integrated structure. This integrated structure requires that all the relevant 
components necessary for competency are taught before the candidate is assessed in a 
practical context. Should candidates believe that they possess all the skills and 
requirements to demonstrate competency, then should they be able to directly (i.e. 
without the need to undergo training) undertake the final assessment phase of the 
model. Both training and assessment should focus on ensuring that candidates have 
capabilities that can be applied before an incident (prevention and avoidance), during 
and incident (management) and after an incident (recovery/reporting) – see sections 1.4 
of Chapter 1, 5.6 of Chapter 5 and 7.2 of Chapter 7. The subject matter should be 
delivered in-line with the best practice training concepts outlined in this dissertation (see 
sections 7.2, 7.5 of Chapter 7 and 9.5 of Chapter 9). The subject matter flow and 
inclusions, which form the first component of the model, will be explained in the next 
section. 
 
10.5.1 Subject matter inclusions for the Practical Use of Force Training Model 
There are a broad range of issues covered throughout this dissertation that are relevant 
to use-of-force training, however, a few critical inclusions are: 
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1. A candidate needs to understand and demonstrate knowledge of the private security 
industry and his/her job description as well as the skills requirements of the job. 
 
2. A candidate should understand and be able to apply the tools of aggression 
management and proactive prevention of violence within their working environment. 
Tools such as the OODA loop or Colour Codes of awareness should be included in 
this subject.  
 
3. A candidate should be able to apply security and crime prevention models to reduce 
the likelihood of violence occurring and effectively manage a situation should it 
occur. 
 
4. A candidate should be able to apply a use-of-force explanatory model (continuum) in 
the context of his/her job description. This should include the capability to explain the 
decision-making process and apply it under pressure. 
 
5. A candidate should be able to demonstrate the effective application of use of force 
tools and use-of-force options within work-related contexts. Whilst these physical 
skills could be taught throughout a training course they need to be integrated and 
taught effectively. This can only really be achieved once the underpinning concepts 
(outlined above in points 1 through 4) have been covered. Required content 
inclusions will be described in greater detail in section 10.5.3 of this Chapter. 
 
In diagrammatical form the aspects that need to be covered in use-of-force training for 
the private security industry can be illustrated as follows: 
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Figure 31:  Diagram of the subject matter and interaction thereof relevant to the 
  private security Practical Use of Force Training Model (Part 1 of the 
  Model) 
 
 
 
 
 
10.5.2 Recommended training time frames 
Feedback from the interview respondents, the focus group and literary sources have 
been correlated to provide basic time frame training requirements needed to ensure that 
a new student has the basic levels of Defensive Tactics capabilities. 
The following points should be noted: 
 
 It is assumed that an individual is fit and able both mentally and physically for 
these time frames to be applicable;  
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 It is assumed that the individual has the relevant literacy and numeracy 
capabilities; and 
 The time frames refer only to the necessary time frames for Defensive Tactics and 
not to the suggested duration of a comprehensive security skills training course.  
 Training for the categories should be progressive and the time allocations should 
be cumulative, i.e. an officer should first be trained for Category One and then 
Two, Three and Four progressively. 
 
Figure 32:  Table illustrating suggested minimum and maximum training times 
for defensive tactics in the private security industry  
 
CATEGORY OF 
OFFICER 
MINIMUM TIME MAXIMUM TIME ADDITIONAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
1. One 12 hours 50 hours - 
2. Two 16 hours 50 hours 16 hours per additional 
weapons system added 
3. Three 36 hours 50 hours Based on specific job 
description  
4. Four 36 hours 150 hours Based on specific job 
requirements and the 
nature of the high risk 
environment  
 
Examples of suggested training content for each of the categories will be discussed 
below. Content suggestions have been compiled by consolidating feedback from the 
interview correspondents, the focus group, literary sources, survey respondents as well 
as the Researcher’s personal experience. 
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10.5.3 Recommended training content  
Content for Category One  
Category One officers are defined by the fact that they work in low risk environments 
(i.e. the likelihood of being exposed to violent incidents is very low) and that they are 
unarmed. Based on these two factors use-of-force training may not be as important as it 
is for the other categories. However, the basic fundamentals according to the building 
blocks approach are still necessary as they provide a level of confidence to the officer 
and will hopefully equip the officer with enough knowledge and skill to manage a 
situation should it actually occur. The content of training for officers in this category 
could be as follows: 
 
 Situational awareness; 
 Observation skills; 
 Basic legal fundamentals and decision making concepts; 
 Verbal dis-engagement and de-escalation skills; 
 Conflict management and communication skills; 
 Fundamentals of stress and adrenal management (theory); 
 Fundamentals of fitness and physical conditioning; 
 Basic Unarmed Combat Foundational skills (Stance, On-guard positions); 
 Practical disengagement techniques; and  
 Basic first aid.  
 
The concept of teaching officers at this level that they need to avoid violent interactions 
and simply observe and report is critical. However, since this category is the major one 
for the employment of persons in the security industry, it would be important to ensure 
that the necessary foundational skills are in place. This foundational skills development 
approach is important so that officers wishing to operate in higher category levels (move 
up the ranks) have the basis to build their skills. 
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Content for Category Two 
This category is defined by the addition of either a higher risk level than in Category 
One or the addition of alternative weaponry. The content of this training thus should be 
expanded to include more detailed unarmed combat and weapon-specific training. The 
unarmed combat skills that should be taught include: 
 
 Non-Physical force options; 
 Additional Foundational skills (turning, covering distance, break-falls, tactical get-
ups); 
 Striking; 
 Defence against grabs and strikes; 
 Joint locks and pressure points; 
 Neck restraints (if local legislation allows for this); 
 Restraint and control techniques;  
 Stand-up grappling and ground fighting; and 
 Team tactics and multiple attacker considerations. 
 
Training in the various weapons systems, officers are issued with, should now be 
included. Regardless of the weapons systems being taught, the training should, at the 
very least, cover the following four components per weapons system: 
 
 Safety considerations for using relevant weapons systems; 
 Maintenance and upkeep of the weapons system; 
 Practical use of weapons; and 
 After care when weapons and tools are used. 
 
The basis of the content taught needs to be job related and specific to the private 
security industry and the jurisdiction within which the officer will be licensed and work in, 
i.e. it would be pointless to train a security officer to utilise ECD tools if they were not 
legally allowed to be used in his/her operational jurisdiction.  
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Content for Category Three 
The content for Category Three will expand to include the use of handguns or shotguns 
which are the most common firearms issued to security officers. The building blocks 
approach means that before an officer commences training in these weapons, he/she is 
competent in all the requirements and skills of Category One and Two. The training 
content should follow the basic components as outlined below: 
 
 Safety considerations for using handguns/shotguns; 
 Maintenance and upkeep of the handguns/shotguns; 
 Use of Body Armour; 
 Advanced and Defensive Driving skills; 
 Practical use of handguns and shotguns: operating skill sets and technical 
capabilities (as outlined in the use-of-force tools section 6.8 of Chapter 6);  
 After-care when weapons and tools are used; and 
 A greater level of first aid training including managing gunshot wounds 
 
The training should include relevant work-based applications, i.e. if the officer was a C-I-
T operator, it should involve shooting from cover, shooting from vehicles, C-I-T team 
tactics, etc. Should the officer also carry alternative weaponry then weapons integration 
training is required. Regardless of whether or not additional alternative weaponry is 
carried, basic integration training which combines unarmed and armed skills should be 
undertaken. The training should cover all of the firearm-related categories as outlined in 
the use-of-force tools outlined in section 6.8 of Chapter 6. 
 
Content for Category Four 
This category assumes high risk operational environments and/or the use of assault-
type weaponry (rifles or carbines). Should an effective building block approach be 
utilised, then it is presumed that a security officer would be competent with all the 
aspects of the previous three categories. The training content should now expand to 
include the applicable weapons systems (Rifles, Carbines, etc.). It should be stated that 
due to the high risk nature of this category, an officer’s tactical and skills proficiency 
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should be at a much higher level, i.e. a Category Three officer may be deemed 
competent with 60% of his/her bullets striking the correct area of a target but a Category 
Four officer may have to score 80% or higher. In order to maintain the applicable levels 
of competency for this category a systematic on-going training structure should be 
mandatory. It would be considered best practice for Security officers working at this 
level to have a higher level of competency in all the areas of unarmed combat described 
in Chapter 6 (sections 6.4-6.6). Furthermore, they would need to be trained and 
competent in any weapons system that was applicable (see section 6.7 of Chapter 6) 
and driving skills may extend to include offensive driving.  
 
Only once all these competencies were in place would it be possible to effectively run 
and conduct comprehensive work and skills-based scenarios and assessments. By 
ensuring that these scenarios and assessments are realistic, they could be considered 
the most effective preparatory tool. This is extremely important in order to ensure that 
the correct Defensive Tactic is applied under the pressure of a life or death attack. This 
approach also develops the ability to make effective decisions under pressure.  
 
10.6 COMPETENCY AND ASSESSMENT ASPECTS OF THE PRACTICAL USE OF 
FORCE TRAINING MODEL 
Once all necessary training has been delivered or should the candidate believe that 
he/she already possesses the knowledge and skills needed to demonstrate 
competency, then the Practical Use of Force Training Model system of assessment 
(part two of the model) can be applied. Part two of the model is based on the 
foundational principles of ABET and competency-based assessment (see section 7.2 of 
Chapter 7). The model is designed to serve as a structure for verifying that a candidate 
can make the correct decision and apply the right actions, under pressure, in various 
work-related role-plays, scenarios and simulations (see sections 7.2, 7.7.2, 7.5.6 of 
Chapter 7 and 9.5 of Chapter 9). Unfortunately, there are no substitutes for real world 
experience but it is critical to ensure that a trainee’s knowledge base is created and 
aligned to reality, reinforced and practiced until it is reflexive along with stress 
inoculation being implemented, i.e. becomes intuitive/habitual under the demands of 
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split-second decision-making (see sections 4.7 of Chapter 4, 7.2 of Chapter 7 and 9.4.3 
of Chapter 9). This process provides a way to actually measure and evaluate the 
likelihood of a candidate making the correct decision and applying the associated action 
under pressure. A diagrammatical representation of the model is outlined below and 
each point will be discussed in the following section. 
 
Figure 33:  Diagrammatical representation of the Practical Use of Force Training 
  Model for competency assessment (Part 2 of the Model) 
 
  
 
     Role-playing 
 Simulations 
 Scenarios  
 = Experience  
 
 
 
 
10.6.1 Block 1 
 
 
 
The first block on the left of the model is the starting point for all decision-making. This 
is because a candidate who does not have the ability to utilise certain use-of-force tools 
(whether via lack of access, lack of capability, legality or any other factor) cannot even 
consider them as a response option. If we assess a traditional use-of-force model such 
as the ladder model used by the US department of Customs (see Chapter 5, section 
5.9.2), we can see that the use-of-force options are listed and classified on various 
levels (it should be noted that different models include a greater or lesser number of 
All possible reactions and  
use-of-force tools 
All possible reactions and  
use-of-force tools 
Consequences of action 
or inaction 
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options). It is vital for safety, and in order to measure performance, that before any role-
play, scenario or simulation training is undertaken, that the ground rules for what use-of-
force tools are applicable are well established. 
 
10.6.2 Block 2 
 
 
 
The second block on the right of the model refers to the final outcome of the scenario. 
There are only two possible outcomes which are explained below: 
 
Outcome 1 
The situation is not effectively resolved. Ineffective resolution may be the result of any of 
the following issues not being effectively addressed: 
 
 The correct level of safety of the officer and his/her colleagues was not assured; 
 The maximum safety of the victim or assailant was not being taken into account;  
 The adherence to policy, procedure or rules of engagement was not effectively 
followed; and 
 Situational best practice was not demonstrated. 
 
The discretionary nature of this manner of assessment requires that an experienced 
Assessor is utilised to ascertain the level of performance and provide effective, 
constructive criticism to resolve ineffective practices. It is also important that this 
Assessor possesses the necessary experience in use-of-force training and Defensive 
Tactics in order to adequately assess technical applications. If any of the above points 
occur, or specific issues are deemed to be a problem, then the trainee must be referred 
back to Block 1 and commence the exercise again until competency is achieved. 
 
 
 
Consequences of 
action or inaction 
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Outcome 2 
The scenario is resolved in an effective manner, i.e. the candidate demonstrates 
competency. Once found competent, a situational debrief should be conducted. 
Situational debriefs allow for a critical analysis of performance to identify any possible 
opportunity for improvement in actions taken or in the decision-making process. 
 
Assessment of outcomes  
When Trainers or Assessors are evaluating candidate performance the points below 
provide a guideline for measurement of effective performance: 
 
 Adherence to the law; 
 Moral and ethical considerations; 
 The job description/roles and responsibilities of the officer (policies 
procedures and rules of engagement) were met; 
 The safest outcome in terms of physical or psychological injury for all parties 
involved was achieved (i.e. safest use-of-force tool and approach was 
selected enhancing safety for the officers, offender’s and bystanders); and 
 A best-practice option was selected based on the designated operational 
environment of the simulation or scenario. 
 
10.6.3 Model Middle Section 
The balance of the model shows that: 
 
Role-plays, Simulations and Scenarios = Experience  
 
This concept identifies the need for reality-based assessments and activities that 
provide a platform for the candidate to experience the pressures of decision-making and 
action. It is critical that this decision-making is directly related to practical conflict 
resolution and use of force. The aim of this phase should be to expose candidates to 
realistic situations as safely as possible (see section 7.10.2 of Chapter 7). There are 
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many examples of effective role-plays and scenarios ranging from desk-based 
discussion to reality-based simulations and the application of technological training tools 
such as the Firearms Training Simulator (FATS) system (Meggitt Training Systems, 
2010) used by a number of United States police departments and other similar 
agencies. Role-plays serve as the most basic and simple tool for acclimatising 
candidates to assessments and decision-making. It is important that the assessments 
progress from role-plays to live simulations (controlled active role-plays) to unplanned 
and unrehearsed scenarios where the outcome is dynamic and the goal is to mimic 
reality as closely as possible. It is important that the situations and scenarios that are 
utilised be based on actual incidents that the trainee officer may encounter. An effective 
way to deliver this is to group scenarios into the four classifications of security officers. 
Examples according to these categories will be explained below: 
 
Security officers who operate unarmed with no alternative weapons (Low Risk) 
This would be applicable to the vast majority of the man-guarding industry. 
 
Scenario guideline – the candidate only has options limited to the unarmed use of force. 
Situations may involve incidents such as drunken harassment, attempted assault and 
even possible attack with a knife or blunt object.  
 
Security officers who operate with alternative weapons but not with firearms 
(Low-Medium Risk) 
This would be applicable to higher risk man-guarding deployments and other 
specialisations such as Crowd Control, Unarmed C-I-T or Close Protection. 
 
Scenario guideline: the candidate’s use-of-force options are extended to whatever 
equipment he/she may carry as part of the relevant job requirements (i.e. Torches, 
Pepper Sprays, Batons and Handcuffs). Situations may now involve multiple assailants 
or multiple officers and more complex scenarios such as armed assaults where there 
are innocent bystanders in close proximity. 
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Security officers who operate with firearms and possibly alternative weaponry 
(Medium-High Risk) 
This would be applicable to high risk man-guarding deployments and other 
specialisations such as Armed C-I-T, Armed Response or Close Protection. 
 
Scenario guideline: The candidate’s use-of-force options may now include the use of 
the firearm/s with which they may be issued in terms of their job requirements. 
Situations should now relate to attacks by multiple armed assailants. This does not 
mean, that the lowest level of force that achieves the said objectives, should still not be 
the primary option. 
 
Security officers who operate in high risk environments with assault type 
weaponry (High Risk) 
Scenario Guideline: The candidate’s use-of-force options may now extend to the use of 
assault rifles. The diversity of scenarios should be broad enough to cover issues such 
as attack in transit, or attack whilst embussing and debussing from vehicles. Scenarios 
may also become multi-tiered and include issues such as Improvised Explosive device 
(IED) attacks followed by armed assaults. Once again, this does not mean, that the 
lowest level of force that achieves the said objectives, should still not be the primary 
option. 
 
10.6.4 The two circular arrows 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The two circular arrows in the model represent the following: 
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Role-plays, Simulations and Scenarios = Experience but also that experience should 
be fed back into the system and form part of the simulation, scenarios and role-plays. In 
other words Experience = Role-plays, Simulations and Scenarios. This means that 
candidates should be encouraged to share their experiences with each other and the 
Trainer or Assessor, in order to create an active feedback system. It also means that to 
run these drills and scenarios effectively an Instructor, Trainer or Assessor should have 
extensive experience and high levels of competency. 
 
It is important that the system should function as a continuum, i.e. if mistakes are made 
the candidate should redo the scenarios until the correct choices are made. Correct 
decisions and actions should occur in a continuous sequence, i.e. if a wrong decision is 
made, the sequence of responses must be restarted from the beginning. Once the 
candidate is able to make the correct decisions and implement the correct physical 
responses, he/she should be introduced to further simulations, scenarios and role-plays. 
This is particularly relevant towards ensuring that on-going and refresher training is 
stimulating and interesting for candidates. It is important that scenarios, simulations and 
role-plays are constantly updated as the candidate’s working environment changes. 
These changes may include legal issues, best practice considerations and/or new 
threats that the officers may face. 
 
10.7 VALIDATION AND TESTING OF THE MODEL (EVALUATION RESEARCH 
PHASE) 
After the design and development phases of the Practical Use of Force Training Model 
were completed, the two components of the Practical Use of Force Training Model 
(training guideline and assessment guideline) were subjected to two layers of validation 
and testing. Two approaches were implemented in order to provide independent 
evaluation of the model in differing contexts. Firstly under the auspices of Dynamic 
Alternatives (Pty) Ltd, a group of candidate volunteers were put through this model 
whilst attending a twenty eight day Close Protection Officer training course in South 
Africa (for details of the candidates please see the References section of this 
dissertation). On completion of the training and assessments, the group participated in a 
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discussion and review session with the Researcher. Secondly a public comment 
document and feedback from was distributed to the industry for comment and feedback. 
The outcomes of the field test group phase were as follows: 
 
 One hundred percent (100%) of the candidates felt that their ability to defend 
themselves and make the correct decision under pressure had dramatically 
improved. This was validated by the candidate’s performance during numerous 
assessments that took place as part of the training program. 
 
 Candidates unanimously agreed that the need for on-going skills maintenance and 
refresher training was critical.  
 
 Ninety percent (90%) of candidates believed that the model was simple and made 
sense and the only point of improvement cited was the need to do more training to 
ensure that muscle memory and retention of technical skills was achieved. 
 
 The decision-making model and training approach that was utilised was deemed 
effective by one hundred percent (100%) of the candidates who expressed the belief 
that they were now better able to select the correct use-of-force option and justify 
that selection after an incident.  
 
 Thirty percent (30%) of the candidates stated that despite the numerous scenarios 
conducted, they would have liked more scenario training and additional time for 
repetition. This feedback indicated that even though the outcomes and assessments 
were scenario-based, the need for contextualization of the application of skills 
cannot be overstated. 
 
 One hundred percent (100%) of the candidates agreed that whilst the contact and 
impact phases of the training may have been difficult, the need to ‘feel’ the effects of 
attack was crucial. It was further explained that the need to train to respond when 
there is consequence to ineffective action is vitally important. This process was 
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stated as being very useful to candidates during both the training and assessment 
aspects. 
 
The findings of the field testing group, without doubt, demonstrated the effectiveness of 
this model. It is necessary to state that the candidates were interviewed after all 
assessments were conducted and performance results correlated. It was made clear to 
candidates that their feedback in the review would in no way effect the outcomes of their 
training and their course results. This was done to ensure that candidates would provide 
open and honest feedback and not simply tell the Researcher what they believed he 
wanted to hear.  
 
After the field testing of the model, the findings of all of the research the research 
(literature review, questionnaires, interviews, focus group and field test group) were 
summarised into a public comment document (see Annexure 6 for a breakdown of the 
topics covered in this document) and a feedback form (see Annexure 7). This evaluation 
research approach was used a validation check of the feedback obtained from the field 
test group. The public comment document and feedback form were distributed through 
industry channels that were willing to assist (more details of these channels is provided 
below). Since the documents were distributed openly and several associations and 
organisations were asked to assist, it is impossible to ascertain the exact number of 
persons to whom it was distributed. A realistic assumption would be that it was sent to 
five hundred security professionals. Assistance with the distribution was requested from 
the following: 
 The South African Institute of Security (SAIS); 
 The Close Protection Association of South Africa (CPASA); 
 ASIS Chapter 155 in Johannesburg; 
 ASIS Chapter 268 in Queensland; 
 ASIS Chapter 227 in New South Wales; 
 The international Institute for of Safety and Security Management (IISSM) based 
in Delhi; and 
 The British Institute of Security. 
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Due to lack of feedback from some of these organisations, it is difficult to establish who 
actually distributed the comment document, and who did not. The representative from 
the IISSM was unwilling to distribute the document as he stated that he did not believe 
that one model could be developed, and that in his opinion, each region and country 
had to design their own tools and systems. It is confirmed that SAIS, CPASA, and the 
various ASIS Chapters assisted in distributing the documents to their member bases. 
There were twenty completed feedback forms returned, which based on the assumption 
that five hundred persons received the documents, is a response rate of four percent 
(4%). The low response rate could be attributed to the time required for recipients to 
read the nineteen page comment document and complete the three page feedback 
form. The feedback forms (See Annexure 7) were designed to ascertain if any 
improvements were required to the model and also to determine examples for the 
scenario-based contextualisation of the model into the four categories of security 
officers. The feedback from the public comment research component is summarised 
below: 
 
 One hundred percent (100%) of the respondents agreed that they could see how 
existing models could be integrated and work in conjunction with the Practical Use of 
Force Training Model. 
 
 One hundred percent (100%) of the respondents agreed that the model provided an 
effective guideline for scenario training and assessment of use of force for security 
officers. 
 
 One hundred percent (100%) of the respondents agreed with the core concepts that 
were outlined in the public comment document that was distributed. Ninety percent 
(90%) of the respondents endorsed the concepts and explained in greater detail 
what they believed was most relevant to the subject. These comments were 
consistent with the research and findings covered in the various Chapters of this 
dissertation. 
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 The vast majority (80%) of respondents who provided feedback on the scenario 
questions in the feedback document gave very similar examples. These examples 
were in alignment with the scenario guidelines given in the explanation section of the 
Practical Use of Force Training Model outlined earlier in this Chapter (section 10.6).  
 
Based on the feedback received the research indicated both acceptance and the 
recognised utility of the model. This was taken as an indication by the Researcher that 
the final dissertation could be drafted and that the topic had been adequately examined. 
Furthermore, it was an indication that the model is an effective contribution to the field of 
Security Science and offers a valid contribution to the body of knowledge. It is sincerely 
hoped that the Practical Use of Force Training Model will be utilised as a tool by security 
trainers to enhance their delivery of use-of-force training and contribute to an improved 
level of operational safety for security officers.  
 
10.8 AREAS IDENTIFIED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
At several points throughout the research process there were areas that have been 
identified as aspects requiring further research. These specific aspects are summarised 
below: 
 
 More research into the size and performance of police forces and how this relates to 
the size and performance of the private security industry and vice versa. This topic 
could be expanded to include the effects that this relationship has on safety. Issues 
of relevance for further research could also focus on the manner in which concepts 
such as police training, deployment practices as well as societal-based 
socioeconomic factors combined with the private security industry, affect crime. 
 
 Research into the benefits and applications of canines in the private security 
industry, with specific reference to use of force. 
 
 The design and development of a practical model of pre-selection and psychological 
evaluation that could actually be utilised in the private security industry. 
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 Does extensive regulation in the private security industry actually work, i.e. is an 
industry regulated by supply and demand more effective than an industry that is 
highly regulated by legislative bodies? 
 
 How does the interaction between profit driven objectives of training providers affect 
the quality of training? 
 
10.9 CONCLUSION  
This research dissertation set out to identify and explain the process, findings and 
outcomes that were achieved in order to design and develop a best practice model for 
use-of-force training in the private security industry. The task of formulating a theoretical 
model to address a practical subject was a complex undertaking. It was a difficult to 
design a practical model that could be applied across borders and could be 
contextualised to different regional legislation, regulations, customs and practices. The 
integrative nature of the model, which incorporates both the requirements for holistic 
training as well as the requirements for practical assessment, is aimed to address the 
gaping hole that exists in use-of-force training in the private security industry. This gap 
is particularly relevant to the way that officers are prepared and equipped to deal with 
violent attacks that may often be life threatening.  
 
The aim of the Practical Use of Force Training Model is to serve as a tool to assist those 
who need to prepare themselves and others, to survive the realities of managing conflict 
and violence, while working in the private security industry. Whilst the vast majority of 
security officers do not operate in environments that may have a high likelihood of 
attack, there are others such as Crowd Controllers or Tactical officers who deal with 
violence on a daily basis. It is primarily for these officers who fall into Categories Two, 
Three and Four, that the Practical Use of Force Training Model will hold the most value. 
As stated numerous times in this dissertation, the responsibility for effective use-of-force 
training cannot rest solely with one party (such as use-of-force trainers), rather it is 
important that all parties (new trainees, seasoned officers, regulators, trainers, owner of 
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security companies and owners of training academies) realise that effective training and 
best practice requires a hands-on approach from all involved. This applied approach 
needs to be on-going and structured in such a way as to ensure that officers are 
exposed to refresher training and regular competency assessments. This is critical if 
operational safety for all parties is to be enhanced.  
 
Whilst the nature and scope of attack (including the method of delivery) is constantly 
changing, the realities of managing violence and potentially lethal attack have many 
fixed elements. Thus the application of the Practical Use of Force Training Model is not 
designed to be static but to change and adapt to the environmental threats and 
requirements within which officers may operate. It is the duty of all parties to constantly 
strive to make safety a priority. This is specifically applicable for officers whose 
workplace puts them in harm’s way whilst engaged in protecting the physical safety and 
assets of companies, organisations, individuals or the general public. It is the sincerest 
wish of the Researcher that those who require skills and training are given what they 
need in order to be able to perform to the highest possible standards. It is hoped that 
the findings of this research should provide a foundation for further study and evolution 
of the subject matter. 
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FOCUS GROUP 
A focus group was run with various defensive tactics, firearms and specialised security 
trainers in Krugersdorp, South Africa. The Focus Group was hosted by the International 
Firearms Training Academy (IFTA). The focus group discussions ran on the 4 May 2010 
for five hours and the group consisted of the following persons: 
 
 Andre Pretorius, Director IFTA, Chief Councillor IFTA 
 Clinton McGuire, Director Dynamic Alternatives and Councillor IFTA 
 Du Toit Lampbrechts, Director Defensive Training Concepts and Councillor IFTA  
 Michael Mansel, Director Laser shot South Africa, Firearms Instructor  
 Nico van Husysteen: Advanced firearms instructor  
 Bossie Hatingh: Former Police and Military instructor, Councillor and Training 
Manager Goldfields Mining   
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FIELD TESTING OF MODEL 
The following group, who were attending a specialised security training course hosted 
by Dynamic Alternatives in Centurion, South Africa, were used as a test group to assess 
the model and delivery specifications of this research. This group’s training ran for 28 
days throughout May 2010. A detailed feedback and review session was conducted on 
completion of the training. The group members all had diverse backgrounds and skill 
levels. With the exception of Mr Lee Moore who was a citizen of the United Kingdom all 
the other participants were South Africans. The group consisted of the following 
persons: 
 
1. Ms Debra Smart, (Manager 
Specialised Security Group) 
2. Mr Geoff Schapiro (MD Specialised 
Security Group) 
3. Mr Tilly Mbalani (Private individual 
with military experience) 
4. Mr Andre Kampman (Private 
individual – no prior experience) 
5. Mr Mandla Zwane (Private individual 
– no prior experience) 
6. Mr Innocent Mtembu (Private 
individual – no prior experience) 
7. Mr Tyrone Mathner (Prior experience 
as an events security officer) 
8. Mr Cassius Malatji (Private individual 
– no prior experience) 
9. Mr Ronnie Khumalo (Private 
individual – no prior experience) 
10. Mr Lee Moore (Private individual – 
no prior experience)
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ANNEXURE 1: QUESTIONNAIRE COVERSHEET 
 
STUDY DETAILS: AN EXAMINATION OF REGULATED TRAINING AND DEFENSIVE 
TACTICS SKILLS IN THE QUEENSLAND SECURITY INDUSTRY 
QUESTIONNAIRE COVERSHEET 
 
Researchers details  Name: Gavriel Schneider 
Contact Phone: 0415 758 827 
Contact Email: gavriels@dynamicalternatives.co.za  
  
1. Why is the research being conducted? 
 
To determine if the current level of Defensive Tactics training applied in Queensland 
effectively equip Security Practitioner’s to carry out their work-related duties as safely as 
possible for all parties involved? 
 
2. What you will be asked to do: 
 
Please complete the attached questionnaire (please feel free to keep this coversheet) 
 
3. Are you the right person to complete this questionnaire  
 
You should go ahead if you are a licensed security person working in Queensland  
 
4. With your assistance the following parties should benefit from this study: 
 Individual security officers 
 Security Training Agencies  
 The various Security Associations 
 Security clients 
 ‘Third parties’ affected by security operations  
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5. Your confidentiality 
 
Please only insert name and contact details should you feel comfortable to do so, if you 
do not wish to place your details it will not be a problem as the Researcher would like 
you to answer honestly and therefore would like to keep your identity anonymous. 
 
6. Please note that your participation is voluntary  
 
7. Mechanism for distribution and return 
 
Once you have completed this questionnaire to your manager or the designated person 
that gave it to you  
 
8. The ethical conduct of this research 
 
Griffith University conducts research in accordance with the National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Research Involving Humans. If potential participants have any concerns or 
complaints about the ethical conduct of the research project they should contact the 
Manager, Research Ethics on 3875 5585 or research-ethics@griffith.edu.au. 
 
9. Consent 
 
By completing this questionnaire you acknowledge that you have done so of your own 
free and consent to answer these questions to the best of your knowledge  
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ANNEXURE 2: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SECURITY OFFICERS 
 
Name (optional): 
 
Contact details (optional): 
 
Qualifications: 
 
Type of license: 
 
Years of experience: 
 
Please circle the answer (s) that is/are the most correct or relevant to you. 
 
1. Please circle the skills that you were taught during your basic training: 
Legal aspects of use of force 
Concepts of force escalation and de-escalation  
Fitness and conditioning 
Verbal command techniques 
Self defence against unarmed attack 
Self defence against knife attack  
Restraint and control (using handcuffs, unarmed and improvised),  
Use of baton 
Use of Pepper spray of CS  
Firearm disarming, retention and tactical application  
 
2. How often have you received additional or refresher training in the subjects 
that you circled in the last question: 
More than once a month/1 or 2 times a year/Every 3 years never  
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3. How often do you get assessed on your competency levels regarding all of 
the subjects that you circled in question 1 (by employer or for licensing 
requirements): 
More than once a month/1 or 2 times a year/Every 3 years never  
 
4. Do you feel that your training (including initial and re-training) has provided 
you with all the skills that you need to perform your duties effectively: 
Yes/No 
 
5. Do you feel that you are sufficiently trained to defend yourself if attacked 
by either armed or unarmed suspects: 
Yes/No/Maybe 
 
6. When you are performing your duties do you have concerns about you own 
and your fellow Officers safety: 
Always/Sometimes/Never 
 
7. Do you believe that you have all the necessary equipment needed to 
perform your duties safely:  
Yes/No/Never thought about it 
 
8. Do you feel that you have the necessary equipment and skills to restrain a 
violent suspect without hurting him/her unnecessarily: 
Yes/No/Unsure 
 
9. Rate how often you have used physical force whilst performing your 
duties: 
Never/Occasionally/Regularly all the time  
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10. How important do you believe on-going skills training is to your operational 
skills safety: 
Very important/Important/Not important 
 
11. How important do you believe on-going skills training is in terms of your 
ability to apprehend a violent suspect whilst applying the concepts of 
minimum force: 
Very important/Important/Not important 
 
12. Please circle as many of the below you feel are relevant to you:  
 I am well equipped and trained 
 I am not motivated to improve my skills 
 I do not believe I need to have better skills to be safer  
 I am not interested in physical activity 
 I have no incentives to attend training 
 Management does not provide me with the opportunity to improve my 
skills 
 Management does not understand what training I need to perform my 
duties more safely  
13. Do you understand why the concept of minimum force is relevant even 
when you are dealing with a violent or potentially violent suspect: 
I am 100% sure/not 100% sure/If he/she tries to hurt me then I will hurt them 
 
14. Can you make any suggestions in order to enhance your ability to safely 
carry out your duties and enhance relations with the general public and/or 
police: 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you for taking the time to honestly answer and complete this questionnaire  
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ANNEXURE 3: INTERVIEW GUIDELINE 
 
The below points were utilised as discussion headings during the interviews: 
 
1. Any knowledge or thoughts that the interviewee may have regarding the private 
security industry in general (focus on the Queensland or South Africa if applicable 
to candidate background) 
2. Discussions on use of force and candidates perceptions on the subject 
3. Discussion on use of force training 
4. Discussion on training standards and competency levels (focus on the Queensland 
or South African industries if applicable to candidate background)  
5. Discussion on Registered Training Organisations and other training providers 
6. Discussion on regulation and regulators levels (focus on the Queensland or South 
African industries if applicable to candidate background) 
7. Does the candidate think that a standardised a standardised model for use of force 
training be implemented in the private security industry  
Yes  No  
 
8. If no, please give your reasons for not implementing a standardised model. 
9. If yes, what training standards, techniques and tactics should be included in such a 
model include?  
10. Is there any further information that has not discussed under one of the previous 
headings that is relevant to this study 
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ANNEXURE 4: FOCUS GROUP AGENDA 
 
Focus Group: Development of a best practice Use of force and Defensive Tactics 
model for the private security industry (Phd study by Gavriel Schneider) 
 
Agenda: 
 Welcome and administration  
 Background to the study  
 Discussion of the research questions: 
 
1. How can Defensive Tactics trainer’s best prepare Private Security officers to 
manage and diffuse use of force incidents?  
2. How is Defensive Tactics training for Private Security officers currently being 
delivered (is there a best practice model)?  
3. If a best practice model exists, how can its utility be assessed? 
4. What, if any, additional factors would contribute to the enhancement of violence 
reduction (the minimisation of the need to use force) within the Private Security 
officers working environment? 
 Outcomes of the focus group to be clarified  
 Conclusion and thanks  
 
Gavriel Schneider contact details: 
Phone: +27828291943  
Email: gav@daprotect.com  
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ANNEXURE 5: TEST GROUP INTERVIEW AGENDA 
 
Test Group:  Development of a best practice Use of force and Defensive Tactics 
model for the private security industry (Phd study by Gavriel 
Schneider) 
 
Agenda: 
 Welcome and administration  
 Background to the study  
 Discussion: 
 
1. Did the training and assessments improve your ability to make the correct use of 
force decisions and take the necessary actions under pressure 
2. Do you understand the importance of on-going skills maintenance and refresher 
training  
3. Did the training model and system make sense and is there any way that the 
model could be improved  
4. Did the training model and system better equip you to make the correct use of 
force decisions and explain your selection of use of force options after an 
incident  
5. Do you have any further inputs or suggestions regarding the training and use of 
force model  
 
 Feedback from the test group to be clarified  
 Conclusion and thanks  
 
Gavriel Schneider contact details: 
Phone: +27828291943  
Email: gav@daprotect.com  
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ANNEXURE 6: SUMMARY CONCEPT DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 
 
The purpose of this document was to provide the reader with an overview of the 
research that had been conducted, the proposed training model as well as the structure 
of the final research report. The goal was to gain valuable input and comment from the 
external industry role-players, the 19 page document contained a synopsis of the 
dissertation. In order to avoid repetition only the headings of the comment document are 
provided below: 
 
 Cover page; 
 Purpose of the public comment document and introduction;  
 Research conducted to develop this model; 
 Terminology overview; 
 Summary of the concept; 
 The design of a Practical Use-of-force Training Model; 
 Explanation of the Practical Use of Force Training Model; 
 Security officers categorisation according to risk and weapons carried; 
 Conclusion and summary; and 
 Summarised references.  
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ANNEXURE 7: PUBLIC COMMENT DOCUMENT FEEDBACK FORM  
 
Feedback Form for comment on the Practical Model for Use-of-force Training 
(PMUoFT) 
Please complete the feedback form below and email back to gav@daprotect.com  
Or print and fax back to +27126440909 
Please note that forms need to be returned before the 15th October 2010 
 
Name: ____________________________ (optional) 
Contact details: 
_____________________________________________________ (optional) 
Current Job Description and past experience in the security industry (or allied work 
experience): 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Were you clearly able to understand how the model should be applied in
 conjunction with existing models? (Please indicate with an ‘X’ your choice in the
 appropriate blank block) 
YES  1 
NO  2 
 
2. If No to the previous question, please elaborate: 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
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3. Do you believe the model is useful to provide a guideline for scenario training
 and assessment of Security officers in the use-of-force? 
YES  1 
NO  2 
 
4. If Yes, please say why you think it would be useful for the training of Security
 officers in the use-of-force? 
______________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. If No what do you think needs to be done to improve the model? 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Do you agree with the core concepts as outlined in the attached paper?  
YES  1 
NO  2 
 
7. Please motivate your answer choice in Q6: 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
  
 305 
 
8. If you do not agree with the core concepts are there any other alternate core
 concepts you would propose for inclusion? 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
9.  Please insert training scenario examples that you believe should be
 recommended to be utilised in conjunction with this model for each of the
 below: 
 Security officers that operate unarmed with no alternative weapons 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 Security officers that operate with alternative weapons but not with firearms  
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 Security officers that operate with firearms and possibly alternative weaponry  
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 Security officer that operate in high risk environments with assault type weaponry  
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
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ANNEXURE 8: ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF THE APPLICATION OF VARIOUS 
   CRIMINOLOGICAL AND SECURITY THEORIES 
 
1. Situational Crime Prevention Theory  
Several interviewees discussed this concept and highlighted that, in terms of use-of-
force, all we need to do is look at the military tactics that are used by attackers used in 
many Cash-in-Transit and related crimes (Badenhorst, 2009, McGuire, 2009, Ras, 2010 
and Sharp 2010). An example based on the South African context and correlated from 
these various interviews is as follows: The suitable target is without doubt the large 
quantities of cash or other valuables that C-I-T officers transport. There appears to be 
no shortage of motivation based on the fact that C-I-T operators move around in the 
public arena. Criminals have access to cash or valuables and the comparatively low 
likelihood of being hurt, apprehended and/or prosecuted. In this context without capable 
guardians (C-I-T officers) robberies would be even more common than they have been 
in the past. 
 
2. Responsive Regulation Theory  
In terms of Crowd Controllers, there are several direct inferences that would apply. 
These include the ability for Crowd Controllers to develop good relationships with the 
local police. This concept was endorsed by interviewees from a policing background 
who stated that such approaches do provide a structure for more effective policing and 
a reduced level of risk for Crowd Controllers (Gregory, 2009 and Stanborough, 2009).  
 
Interviewees stated that there have been several successful cases whereby C-I-T 
Officers and police officers collaborated to apprehend attempted robbers (Badenhorst, 
2010; McGuire, 2010 and Sharp, 2010). These cases have had a direct effect in the 
reduction of specific crimes for periods following such incidents. As a logical extension 
of the Responsive Regulation Theory, it is also critical that authorities and regulators be 
made aware of the specific risks and the manner in which officers are attacked. An 
example given in one of the interviews (McGuire, 2010) explains that:  
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If regulators and authorities were not aware of the threats and potentially C-I-T 
officers not be allowed to carry assault time weapons in South Africa. They 
would simply be a very easy target for criminals and this could cost lives life 
and limb (even more than it does so already)”. 
 
3. Defensible Space Theory  
3.1 Territoriality 
Whilst the need for Crowd Controllers is to protect their ‘property’, the venue they work 
in is a consideration of territoriality. This concept probably applies more in terms of the 
ego or image aspects related to Crowd Controllers. It is well documented that a Crowd 
Controllers credibility is often based on his/her reputation (Winlow et al, 2001:539). This 
correlates to the fact that patrons may be less likely to make trouble at a venue where 
the Crowd Controllers have a ‘reputation’ for high levels of enforcement and low 
tolerance levels for ‘bad’ behaviour (raucousness, rudeness or inappropriate actions). 
As one interviewee described, this may also have a converse effect as ego and 
reputation may be the very reason that Crowd Controllers are often quick to resort to 
use of force, i.e. they are protecting their territory (Van der Stel, 2009). 
 
The concept of territoriality is different for a C-I-T officer. This concept generally applies 
primarily to the few locations whereby an officer feels he may be safe. These could 
include some of the following; inside the loading areas, inside safe rooms and even 
sometimes inside vehicles. An example of this was given by an interviewee who stated 
that “It is not uncommon for C-I-T officers to let down their guards as soon as they are 
back in their vehicles and driving as the feeling of being inside the vehicle provides a 
level of safety” (McGuire, 2010). This concept was also mentioned by Sharp (2010) in 
his interview when he outlined that the importance of territoriality for C-I-T officers is 
“that the more secure (armoured) a C-I-T officers vehicle is the more secure they often 
feel. They may even feel secure despite the vulnerability that is in place whilst getting 
into our out of their vehicles”.  
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3.2 Natural surveillance 
The ability to pro-actively scan and identify threats within a set operational environment 
is a key component for any security officer. Increased situational awareness as 
discussed in Chapter Four is rated by experts as one of the most important attributes for 
law enforcement officials to apply (see section 4.5). This translates directly to the private 
security officer. As stated in their interviews; Ben-Keren (2010), McGuire (2010) and 
Sharp (2010) were of the opinion that by taking into account the concepts of natural 
surveillance at all times during the preparation and the actual delivery of security 
activities, the ability to pre-empt and avoid situations is dramatically increased. Whilst 
Newman (1972) may have been referring specifically to implementing natural 
surveillance at the design phase of an infrastructure activity, it does translates into other 
areas (Saville and Cleveland, 2011: 1-3). In terms of a practical on the ground 
application for security officers, this concept will be discussed in more detail in the next 
theory, The Four D’s. 
 
3.3 Image 
As mentioned by Graham and Homel (2008: 143) the perception of the security and the 
professional staffing of a venue or location may greatly contribute to the reduction of 
incidents. There are also several studies that reference the importance of a venue being 
neat and clean as being a deterrent to violent and aggressive behaviour (Graham and 
Homel, 2008:106) In terms of Crowd Controllers, the image of a “bouncer’ may be 
enough to deter many would be troublemakers. In other words the image of a large, 
muscular, aggressive man with a reputation for fighting may be enough to prevent 
patrons from stepping out of line (Hobbs, Hadfield, Lister, & Winlow, 2002 and Roberts, 
2009: 59-68). Large male bouncers may be targeted by patrons, ‘who want to prove 
themselves’ (Hobs et al, 2002 and Tomsen, 1997). One interviewee had the following to 
say on this issue:  
There are loads of times I will just take a shot [get hit] by some drunk kid that 
knows I cannot hurt him and wants to show off to his mates, cos [because] if I 
do [hit back], I may be in trouble with the company or even lose my licence so 
tries to show how tough he is to his mates (Pole, 2009).    
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In terms of C-I-T officers the concept of image is just as serious. In his interview 
McGuire (2010) explained that officers that appear to be poorly equipped, driving a 
vehicle in poor condition, that are wearing dirty uniforms and do not seem to be paying 
attention would often be considered an easier target for criminals. Whereas a 
professional, well equipped, alert and aware officer may pose a significant deterrent to 
would be attackers. Unfortunately for C-I-T officers as with Crowd Controllers there is a 
converse to presenting a highly professional image. McGuire (2010) and Sharp (2010) 
explained this as follows: “the professional alert operator may create the perception that 
they are protecting something of greater value and therefore may in fact become a more 
of an attractive target to potential attackers”.  
 
3.4 Milieu  
The environment in general may have vast effects on violence aggression levels (Hobs 
et al, 1997 and Roberts, 2009). In terms of both Crowd Controllers and C-I-T officers 
aspects such as police presence and access to back up and assistance are critical 
issues that may have great impact on whether crimes occur. For Crowd Controller’s 
aspects such as the number of night clubs and bars that are clustered together, 
alcoholic service policies as well as crowding and ratio of male to female patrons may 
also have an effect on the level of violent or potentially violent behaviour (Graham & 
Homel, 2008: 27-36 and Scot, 2002: 4). For C-I-T officers, the amount of people around 
may add many more complications. In their interviews McGuire (2010) and Sharp 
(2010) explained that, attackers may not hesitate to open fire in a crowd, whereas C-I-T 
officers (like all well trained officers, armed security officers) should not open fire if there 
is a risk of injuring innocent civilians. They further described that aspects such as a 
large police presence is a great deterrent for armed robbers and may force them to 
abort the crime they intended to commit.  
 
5. The 4 d’s model 
Examples of how the four D’s could be applied in terms of the Crowd Controllers and C-
I-T officers will be discussed below. The below concepts in term so the application for 
Crowd Controllers were drawn from the following interviews: Bastable, 2009; Lewkowitz, 
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2009; Martin, 2009; Pole, 2009 and Van der Stel, 2009. Concepts for the application to 
C-I-T officers were drawn from the interviews with McGuire, 2010 and Sharp, 2010. 
Where necessary the Researcher has contributed certain points based on consulting, 
training and provision of services in both Crowd Control and the C-I-T industry. 
 
4.1 The four D’s and Crowd Controllers 
 
Detect 
 Position of Crowd Controllers to ensure maximum field of vision; 
 Design of patrol routes that cover ‘blind spots’ or problem areas; 
 Physical layout of venue to enable best possible observational capacity; and 
 Creation of acceptable behaviour practices among patrons so that patrons that 
do not adhere would stand out. 
Delay  
 Whilst “delay’ is usually utilised to describe how physical security measures 
would delay a criminal long enough for them to be caught, this can be applied by 
Crowd Controllers by delaying possible incidents until enough ‘back-up’ or police 
are on scene to assist. 
Deter  
 Protection by physical presence and ‘stature of Crowd Controllers’; 
 Fear of consequences by patrons; and 
 Proactive approach to incident prevention by Crowd Controllers. 
 Deny  
 A zero tolerance attitude to misconduct may deny potential trouble makers the 
opportunity of creating incidents; 
 Denying access to drunk persons or persons that appear to be trouble makers 
(rowdy and non-compliant); 
 Utilising verbal and postural de-escalation techniques to diffuse situations 
prevent fights form occurring; and 
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 Utilising defensive tactics techniques to prevent potential assailants form 
throwing strikes at patrons or staff. 
4.2 The four D’s and C-I-T officers 
  
Detect 
 Well trained in situational awareness and threat identification;  
 Selection of effective embus and debus points; and 
 Route selection to enable counter surveillance.  
Delay  
 Should have extensive anti-ambush training to delay attackers; 
 Should have well-rehearsed pre-planned reactions to attacks often referred to as 
immediate action drills (IADs); 
 Use of armoured vehicles to delay access to goods during robbery; and 
 Carrying of lock cases and safe transport systems are further delay systems.  
Deter  
 Protection by physical presence and professional conduct; 
 Carrying assault weapons and operating from armoured vehicles; and 
 Visible levels of alertness and awareness. 
Deny  
 By effective application of security principles; 
 Via the willingness to engage attackers; 
 Safe storage and transport of valuables in armoured vehicles; and 
 Controlling the distance persons are able to get to in terms of accessing crew 
and/or vehicle.  
 
5. The Broken Windows theory  
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There are so many complexities involved in both the environments of Crowd Controllers 
and C-I-T officers27 that it is not quite so simple to apply the Broken Windows or Zero 
Tolerance theories. The difficulties involved in applying this concept (such as legislative 
support) to either the crowd control or C-I-T officers’ environments make it very difficult 
to apply this concept on a macro level. However, the fact that this approach has shown 
great success within the policing environment with several case studies available to 
verify this make the concepts very attractive to security officers. Proving its 
effectiveness means that even on a micro level the concept could be useful in the 
security industry. An example of the implementation of a ‘Zero Tolerance Policy’ 
provided by several of the interviewees that had extensive Crowd Controller experience 
is applied to patron’s raucous behaviour in a nightclub. This would be applied by 
ensuring that patrons who become unruly may not even be allowed to enter a venue 
and would then simply go to another venue which allows them to behave at will (Pole, 
2009, McGuire, 2010 and van der Stel, 2009).  
  
                                                 
27 Complexities such as: licensing rules, licensee policies, Crowd Controller/C-I-T officers’ perceptions 
and training, patron/general public behaviour and changes in criminal modus operandi. 
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ANNEXURE 9: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CATEGORISATION OF  
   SECURITY OFFICERS BASED ON RISK AND USE-OF-FORCE  
 
Category 1:  Security officers  
(Unarmed/low risk level or likelihood of attack) 
This category refers to security officers that operate unarmed with no alternative 
weapons. This means that the officer is totally unarmed and does not carry any ancillary 
equipment such as a torch or handcuffs. This category accounts for the vast majority of 
security officers in most countries. It would be fair to state that the primary role of this 
category is to focus on observation and reporting (Ben-Keren, 2010; Baker, 2010; 
McGuire, 2010; Ras, 2010, Sharp, 2010 and Steinberg, 2010). Officers in this category 
do not necessarily operate in environments where there is a high likelihood of violent 
crime occurring, as such the use-of-force is not a core area of concern for these 
officers. In many cases they are not physically fit or may be unable for medical reasons 
to utilise physical restraint techniques (Steinberg, 2010). Officers in this category would 
be given the bare minimum of use-of-force training with the core emphasis on dis-
engagement and calling for assistance. In fact, several interview respondents stated 
that they believed that “a high level of use-of-force training at this level of security was in 
fact dangerous” (Ben-Keren, 2010 and Steinberg, 2010) since this area is usually filled 
with the lower spectrum of competent guard. The dangers of delivering high risk tactical 
training to guards at this level include increased possibility of injuries in training. There 
is also the potential that the guard believes that he/she can actually engage in combat if 
necessary which could lead to confusion over the guard’s responsibilities and functions. 
 
In certain countries such as the United Kingdom all levels of security officer 
deployments must be done unarmed this would mean that officers operating at the top 
end of the security provision spectrum (such as Close Protection Officers) would need a 
comparatively high level of unarmed combat skills, i.e. it is possible to operate unarmed 
when facing confirmed threat and a high likelihood of attack but definitely not preferred 
or recommended (McGuire, 2010 and Sharp, 2010).  
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Category 2: Security officers  
(Alternative weapons/low-medium risk level or likelihood of attack) 
This category refers to security officers that operate with alternative weapons but not 
with firearms. The specifics of what the classification of alternative weaponry includes 
was covered in more detail in Chapter Six. On a basic level the majority of officers fitting 
into this category may be equipped with Batons, Tasers or Stingers, Handcuffs and/or 
Pepper sprays (Mesloh et al, 2008). Officers may carry all or some of the equipment. 
These tools are usually classified as non-lethal weaponry, i.e. they are designed to 
incapacitate and not kill an assailant. Officers working in this category need to have a 
basic level of training in unarmed combat. This is critical as unarmed combat skills form 
the foundation for use of other tools. Furthermore there is always the risk that officers 
may not actually be able to draw their weaponry in time. This means that reliance on the 
weapon system alone could have very negative consequences (Schneider, 2008: 100). 
They should also receive training in the use-of-force applications of all equipment that 
they carry. The need for on-going and refresher training is critical. 
 
It is not uncommon for officers who may operate in jurisdictions that do not allow for the 
legal carry of alternative weapons to carry or secure improvised weapons in their 
vehicles or workplaces (Bastable, 2008; Pole, 2008 and McGuire, 2010). Improvised 
weaponry is limited only by the imagination of the person who intends to utilise it but 
usually includes objects such as baseball bats and/or even knives (Advanced Combat 
training, 2008). There are obviously many concerns with this trend but certain 
interviewees that did not want to be quoted stated this was because they had no choice 
and did not want to get hurt themselves when attacked. As one respondent stated:  
The police are not there when you need them and there are some crazy guys 
out there that just want to prove how tough they are, they come in with knives 
and guns…. There is no way I am not gonna carry [have a weapon] when that’s 
what’s I am facing all the time (Anonymous interview respondent). 
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Category 3: Security officers  
(Armed/Medium to high risk level or likelihood of attack) 
This category is differentiated by the previous category by the addition of handguns to 
the tools the officer may carry. Security officers that operate with handguns may often 
also carry alternative weaponry. The dramatic change between this level and the 
previous level is based on the reality that an officer carrying a firearm has the potential 
to easily apply lethal force. This level of responsibility should necessitate a far higher 
level of training and re-training. There should also be a higher level of vetting for officers 
that work in this category. In many countries this level is the ceiling of the security 
industry, i.e. in Australia C-I-T operators may carry handguns but assault type weaponry 
is not permitted. As mentioned in Category Two the officers should have a sound 
foundational capability in unarmed combat for the reasons previously outlined.  
 
Category 4: Security officers  
(Armed/High risk and likelihood of attack) 
This category refers to security officers that operate in high risk environments with 
assault type weaponry. In certain countries such as Australia, this category does not 
exist. However, in South Africa and many other developing or unstable countries this 
category forms a substantial component of the private security industry (i.e. the C-I-T 
industry in South Africa operate in this level as do embassy guards in countries such as 
Mexico). This level is commonly associated with private security operator’s working in 
areas such as Iraq or Afghanistan (Minnaar, 2007 and Stoddard et al, 2007). In many 
cases this category is often sourced from ex-military or police personnel. As a result of 
the background of these officers it is often assumed that persons with this background 
are already trained to a higher level. This may not necessarily be true as many of the 
skills required to utilise assault weaponry are perishable and re-training and on-going 
training is a critical concern. Needless to state, that persons operating with this level of 
weaponry must have an extended requirement to ensure that they are not only capable 
of using the said equipment but can apply it in terms of best practice use-of-force 
considerations.  
 
